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Abstract 
 
Since 2005, the Thai government has, as a matter of policy, been seeking to increase 
production of biodiesel from oil palms. As a result, the number of oil palm plantations 
in the Northeast region has been growing, particularly in Nong Khai province. Nong 
Khai is a relatively remote, predominantly agricultural area and is the field site for 
this research. However, oil palm production is a complex and hotly contested issue 
both globally and in Thailand and it has ardent critics and supporters. For example, 
expanding oil palm production could, on the one hand, contribute to deforestation and 
a range of social problems that threaten traditional livelihoods, whilst on the other 
hand it could offer a source of renewable energy, alleviate poverty, and lead to a 
higher standard of living for farmers. The ultimate purpose of this study is to 
understand the changeover to oil palm production, specifically in the Thai context, 
through the development and application of a distinctive analytical approach. This 
approach is a synthesis of: the eight elements of farmers’ decision-making (Ohlmer et 
al., 1998), the IDS Knowledge, Technology, and Society (KNOTS) team’s framework 
on policy processes (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; 2001; 2003; KNOTS, 2006). 
 
This analytical approach is used to investigate factors influencing farmers’ decisions 
to take up oil palm cultivation, and the rationale behind the government’s oil palm 
policy and how it is implemented in the Northeast Thailand. Approximately nine 
months were spent carrying out the research in three selected villages in Nong Khai 
province, using qualitative methods including semi-structured interviews, purposive 
sampling and snowballing techniques. The results show that economic security is an 
important factor for farmers in deciding to change over to oil palm cultivation. 
However, it has emerged that what farmers really want is to achieve a comfortable 
lifestyle and to live in the same locality as their children, which implies urban to rural 
migration. Other critical factors are characteristic of oil palm cultivation, such as long 
life-span and short harvesting period, governmental projects supporting oil palm 
production, the roles of inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm producers, 
the price of oil palm fruits, the links between farmers and local buyers, and the 
experiences of oil palm growers in the southern region of Thailand, as well as the low 
productivity and high production costs involved in rice cultivation, and the success of 
rubber plantations. 
 
The findings also suggest that the oil palm policy processes in Nong Khai province do 
not have policy space for farmers to participate in the networks, or to design the oil 
palm policy that directly affects them. The policy was made in top-down in which the 
government only transferred oil palm knowledge through seminars and trainings. 
There were also issues concerning inequality amongst farmers and how that affects 
participation in the oil palm projects. Indeed, the OPPSP favours rich farmers, as they 
need a significant amount of capital to prepare for and maintain oil palm crops. 
Implementation of a ‘farmer-first’ approach is recommended in order to push the 
policy forward to serve resource-poor farmers properly. New behaviours and attitudes 
must be encouraged in most of the professionals encountered in this research.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the factors shaping the decision-making of 
farmers in switching from rice to oil palm plantations specifically in Nong Khai 
province, which is located in the Northeast region of Thailand. In order to understand 
this change to oil palm cultivation, I developed the research’s analytical framework 
based on the two main analytical approaches namely the eight elements of farmers’ 
decision-making (Ohlmer et al. 1998), and the IDS Knowledge, Technology and 
Society (KNOTS) team’s framework on policy processes (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; 
2001; 2003; KNOTS 2006). 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem  
 
Since 1961, Thailand has embarked on a mainstream, state-led development path of 
capitalist economic growth based on industrialisation, export-oriented trade, foreign 
investment, private sector investment, and infrastructure development. Although this 
strategy of development has led to rapid economic and material progress, as well as a 
reduction in poverty, it has also led to increased socio-economic inequality, 
environmental deterioration, a rural-urban divide, and general unsustainable 
development. Strong economic growth and rapid industrialisation are also considered 
as both cause and effect of Thailand’s huge expansion in energy consumption, which 
has been rising dramatically since the 1980s. In the last few decades, the country has 
paid more attention not only to the problems of environmental sustainability but also 
to national energy security, not forgetting that energy consumption costs the country a 
huge amount of foreign currency. 
 
Lacking an abundant supply of domestic energy resources, Thailand’s energy sector is 
heavily dependent on imported energy and is the second largest in terms of energy 
consumption amongst Southeast Asian countries. In 2008, Thailand’s dependence on 
imported energy (the ratio of imported commercial primary energy to the total energy 
consumption) stood at 58 percent, with the total value of the imported energy at 1,178 
billion Baht, equivalent to 12.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Out of this 
total, 88.7 percent was spent on importing crude oil. Crude oil is a form of fossil fuel 
from non-renewable sources, which will eventually run out. The serious problem of 
being heavily dependent on imported oil has led the Thai government to pursue 
alternative energy strategies. Thailand has paid greater attention to the development 
of renewable energy since the oil price rise beginning in 2004, setting a target of 
increasing the share of renewable energy from 6.5 percent of commercial primary 
energy in 2008 to 20.3 percent in 2022 (DEDE 2008; MOEN 2009).  
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With a large agricultural sector and the fact that oil palms are the main oilseed crop 
for biodiesel production in Thailand, it was not unforeseen that Thailand would be 
one of the first Asian countries to have a policy to encourage production and 
utilisation of biodiesel from oil palms, one of the key elements in the country’s 
development of alternative energy. Since 2005, the Thai government has pursued a 
biodiesel development strategy in order to increase the energy security of the country, 
to generate rural economic development and to mitigate climate change.  
 
On the demand side, the consumption of biodiesel has increased drastically from 0.02 
million litres per day in December 2006 to 1.80 million litres per day in December 
2009. This resulted mainly from two government measures: one was to mandate 
biodiesel B2 (a blend of 2 percent biodiesel and 98 percent conventional diesel) as the 
standard grade for diesel oil in February 2008; the other measure was to subsidise the 
retail price through excise tax reduction and exempting it from State Oil Fund 1. 
However, limited availability of oil palms, on the supply side, was the main obstacle 
to acceleration of oil palm based biodiesel development in Thailand. In order to cope 
with the rising demand for biodiesel, a major oil palm expansion policy was promoted 
in the Northeast region of Thailand, including Nong Khai province. This is a 
relatively remote, predominantly agricultural area, and was the field site for the 
research. Oil palm plantations in Thailand have increased significantly from 2.41 
million rais in 2004 to 4.08 million rais in 2010, an increase of more than 1 million 
rais in the last seven years2
 
 (OAE, 2010a).  
Oil palms have not typically been grown in the Northeast region. The Southern 
provinces of Thailand have the most suitable climate and soil conditions for oil palm 
cultivation, account for approximately 90 percent of Thailand’s total oil palm planted 
area. However, the Southern region, which has only 19.86 million rais of agricultural 
land compared to 57.65 million rais in the Northeast, is running out of available 
agricultural land. Thus, prominent areas of oil palm expansion are found in some 
provinces in the Northeast region, including Nong Khai province, where the the area 
of land under oil palm cultivation has rapidly increased from none in 2004 to 24,848 
rais in 2010 (see Chapter 2 for further details) (OAE, 2010b). From my experience at 
the field site, it appears that the oil palm plantation areas may have reached even 
higher levels than the government’s official figure, as I interviewed numerous oil 
palm farmers who have not been recorded in the government’s statistics. 
                                                              
1The State Oil Fund in Thailand was established in 1979 by the Thai government to safeguard the 
country from being affected by future global oil crisis. It comprises of monetary reserve that will be 
used to maintain domestic retail price level at a set ceiling in times when the global petroleum prices 
sore by subsidizing domestic oil producers and importers.  
 
2 Land in Thailand is measured in Rai, Ngan and Wah. 1 sq. Wah = 4 sq. m. 1 Ngan = 100 Wah (or 400 
sq. m.). 1 Rai = 4 Ngan (or 1600 sq. m.). 1 Acre = 2.5 Rai (approx.) or 43,560 sq. ft. 1 Hectare = 6.25 
Rai or 10,000 sq. m. 
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Oil palm production is a complex and hotly contested issue, however, with strong 
critics and supporters. On the one hand, land-use changes driven by the expansion of 
oil palm plantations for biofuels production have been criticised in many parts of the 
world for contributing to deforestation; loss of biodiversity; forest fires; land 
competition; and a range of social issues that threaten traditional livelihoods. On the 
other hand, they have also been seen as a major driver of rural economic growth, 
which could alleviate poverty and lead to a higher standard of living for farmers as 
well as a source of renewable energy (see Chapter 2 for further details) (Astyk, 2006; 
Barison, 2007; Cassman and Liska, 2007; FAO, 2008a; CIFOR, 2009). There have 
been urgent calls for a rapid research response to determine the options for small-
scale farmers to use oil palms as part of a farm diversification approach, and identify 
choices on the management spectrum (CIFOR, 2009). What are the needs of these 
farmers, how can they be met, and what are the consequences of their beginning to 
farm oil palms?  
 
In this era of rapid change and urbanisation, Thailand’s economy has been 
transforming, so that agricultural activities are no longer a major driver of economic 
growth. In 2009, Thailand’s agricultural sector only accounted for 8.5 percent of 
GDP, but employed 40 percent of the labour force on average (NESDB, 2010). 
Nonetheless, things are different in Thai culture when it comes to agriculture, 
particularly rice. Rice cultivation, which occupies most of the cultivated land area, has 
shaped a way of life, faith, belief, politics, economics and cultures in Thailand. Thai 
people have a long tradition of consuming rice, which is grown throughout the 
country, and it has always been a vital or fundamental part of the agricultural sector. 
Indisputably, rice is not just a food for Thai people, it is perceived as a symbol of 
independence as well as of the precious cultural heritage of the ancestors (Kwanchai, 
2001; Vanichanont 2004). In the Northeast region, rice cultivation occupied more 
than 50 percent of the land available for agricultural activities in 2009 (OAE, 2010a) 
and it is no surprise that the majority of Thailand’s rice production is from this region. 
 
Given this background, this research has been developed to fill in some of these gaps 
by providing crucial analysis of the key factors influencing the rapid spread of oil 
palm cultivation among small-scale rice farmers in Nong Khai province, which is in 
the Northeast of Thailand. Once a predominantly rice-growing region, the number of 
oil palm plantations in Nong Khai province has risen significantly, as mentioned 
earlier. Thus, Nong Khai province offers an ideal location in which to assess the 
dynamics of oil palm policy impacts and outcomes. 
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In summary, based on a rapid expansion of oil palm cultivation in Thailand (and 
particularly in Nong Khai province); and the controversial issues regarding oil palm 
plantation; this research has sought to understand the reality of change to oil palm 
cultivation in Nong Khai province by exploring the decision-making of farmers; and 
oil palm policy processes. The research findings will be potentially useful to 
policymakers in understanding the challenges surrounding oil palm cultivation and 
will assist them in thinking about how to further develop oil palm policy in ways that 
bring greater benefits to the poor.  
 
1.2 Research Objective and Research Questions 
 
The specific research objective of this thesis has been to understand changes in oil 
palm cultivation in Nong Khai province, by determining the critical factors shaping 
the decision-making of farmers in adopting oil palm cultivation, and by examining the 
oil palm policy processes specifically in Nong Khai province. After studying relevant 
literature (see Chapter 2), obtaining insights from the fieldwork, and discussing ideas 
with my supervisors on developing the analytical framework for the research, the 
main research question and sub-questions were specified more tightly. The resulting 
main research question for this thesis, and its three sub-questions, are outlined below 
(see Chapter 3 for further details). 
 
 
The Main Research Question 
- What are the critical factors shaping the change towards oil palm adoption 
of small-scale farmers in Nong Khai province (in the Northeast region of 
Thailand), and what are the implications for Thailand’s oil palm policy 
development? 
 
  
The Two Sub-questions 
- What are the key factors affecting the farmers’ decision to adopt or not to 
adopt oil palm cultivation? 
 
- What is the rationale of the oil palm policy and how is it implemented? 
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1.3 Research’s Analytical Framework and Its Rationale 
 
In order to analyse the change to oil palm cultivation specifically in the Thai context, 
I have developed an analytical framework which draws from two main analytical 
approaches, namely: the eight element model of farmer decision-making (Ohlmer et 
al., 1998); and the IDS KNOTS team’s policy processes framework (Keeley and 
Scoones, 1999; 2001; 2003; KNOTS 2006) (see Chapter 3 for further details). These 
two different analytical approaches were drawn on in order to encompass the oil palm 
issues fully, as exploring only one particular perspective could not fully reflect the oil 
palm issues in Nong Khai province.  
 
Because of a substantial increase in oil palm plantations in Nong Khai province in 
particular, mentioned earlier, it was necessary to understand the rice farmers’ 
rationale for engaging in oil palm production. The adaptation of the eight elements of 
farmers’ decision-making theory will be discussed with the aim of understanding the 
change to oil palm cultivation from the bottom-up, as well as identifying the factors 
which influenced the local farmers in choosing whether or not to move to oil palm 
cultivation. Comprehending the decision-making of oil palm farmers provides a 
fundamental insight for further analysis of oil palm policy processes, namely to 
investigate whether the change to oil palm farming was significantly influenced by 
the oil palm expansion policy and, if so, in what ways.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology, Research Sites and Sampling Selection 
 
According to Kanbur (2001), there have been various debates regarding the strengths 
and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research. Perhaps the most notable 
element in the distinction between these two methods is that the quantitative method 
is defined by the use of numbers, which can be more easily aggregated, but can hide 
texture such as in-depth details that could be derived from the qualitative research. In 
order to gain data in relation to the farmers’ lives and attitudes, such as their reasons 
for growing oil palms, it is important to apply qualitative research methods to the 
study, as they are geared towards tackling issues of a subjective nature. Thus, I chose 
to adopt the qualitative approach to understand the reality of the oil palm issues 
because the focus of the thesis is on understanding the social and political context of 
oil palm farmers in the villages rather than on generating a model as a means to test a 
theory.  
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Purposive and snowball sampling methods (Coleman, 1958; Patton, 1990; Salganik 
and Heckathorn, 2004; Bryman, 2008) and semi-structured interviewing (May, 2001; 
Bryman, 2008) were the types of social research methodology that were used in the 
study. I was seeking to sample the research sites and participants in a strategic way, so 
that those samples were relevant to the research question and sub-questions. Research 
sites and people within the sites were selected for their relevance to understanding a 
social phenomenon, i.e. the change to oil palm cultivation. The snowballing technique 
was used in the thesis to identify key actors as it allowed me to make initial contact 
with a small group of people who were relevant to the research topic, and then use 
their community knowledge to establish contacts with others, whilst the semi-
structured interview was chosen because it enabled me to direct the structure of the 
interviews whilst at the same time maintaining a degree of reflexivity to react to the 
interviewees’ positive answers and pose further questions in response.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Nong Khai province was chosen to be a research site because it 
was considered to be one of the areas with the most suitable climatic and soil 
conditions for oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region, and also the ideal place to 
build up understanding of food and energy trade-offs. I narrowed down the scope into 
three districts in Nong Khai province, which were Phon Phisai, So Phisai, and Seka. 
One village in each district was selected as a research site, using knowledge gained 
from various local government agencies and members of the community (see Chapter 
3 for further details). However, I have altered the villages’ real names so that the 
respondents in the research can remain anonymous. The following names have been 
given to the three selected villages: 
 
1) Baan Tarn for a village in Phon Phisai district, 
2) Baan Sa Ard for a village in So Phisai district, and 
3) Baan Hat for a village in Seka district.  
 
I decided to interview all the small-scale oil palm households in the selected three 
villages, resulting in 14 households being interviewed in Baan Tarn, 23 households in 
Baan Sa Ard and 8 in Baan Hat. I divided the rice farmers who have not yet adopted 
oil palm cultivation into two groups. In the first group were the rice farmers who had 
more than 20 rais of rice paddy fields and could be described as relatively large-scale 
rice producers, whilst in the second group were the farmers who devoted less than 20 
rais of land to rice cultivation. This was because I intended to investigate whether the 
amount of rice paddy fields they had was a significant factor for the rice farmers in 
choosing not to get involved in oil palm cultivation. Three households were selected 
in each category, i.e. a total of six households in each village (see Chapter 3 for 
further details).  
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Applying the snowball sampling method, the study identified 15 key actors including 
private seedling suppliers; private buyers of oil palm fruits; various local government 
agencies; central government offices; large-scale oil palm producers; inspirational 
local leaders; and a large-scale palm oil refinery in Chonburi province. In total there 
were 78 interviewees in the study (63 oil palm and rice farmers and 15 key actors). I 
conducted semi-structured interviews during 6 visits to the research sites which 
ranged from 8 to 12 days per visit. I also conducted several interviews with the key 
actors in Chonburi province and Bangkok over a period of approximately 9 months, 
from 25th April 2010 to 15th January 2011.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of three main parts. The first part includes a brief rationale of 
biofuel development, oil palm basics and the structure of the oil palm sector in 
Thailand (particularly in the Northeast region), and a discussion of whether oil palm 
plantations can be economically viable in the Northeast region. The second part 
presents the analytical framework used to analyse oil palm issues specifically in the 
Thai context; research methodology; research designs; and some reflections on the 
author’s research experiences. The final part provides the analysis of the thesis using 
the in-depth data obtained from the field sites in order to comprehend the change to 
oil palm farming in Nong Khai province. The three main parts are divided into seven 
chapters as follow: 
 
Part One
 
: The Expansion of Oil Palm Cultivation 
The second chapter focuses on biofuel development and specifically on oil palm 
based biodiesel development and the controversial issues associated with oil palm 
plantations. This chapter begins with a discussion of the drivers of the biofuel 
development. These include energy security, economic development, and climate 
change mitigation. The second section then focuses on biodiesel derived from oil 
palms and its relevant literatures. Current oil palm debates and concerns, which 
involve many controversies such as the issues of deforestation, greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, small-scale oil palm production, land tenure, and food versus oil 
palms, are also discussed in this section. Thereafter, I narrow down the scope to focus 
on the basics of oil palms and oil palm cultivation specifically in Thailand and the 
Northeast region, in order to lay down the fundamental knowledge to analyse specific 
oil palm issues there. The chapter ends with a review of the literature on whether oil 
palm plantations can be economically viable in the Northeast region. 
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Part Two
 
: Analytical Framework of the Research, Research Methodology, and 
Research Designs  
The third chapter outlines the analytical framework, logic, and research methodology 
for the thesis. It provides the justifications of their roles in developing a holistic 
approach to understanding the change to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province. 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the analytical framework used in the thesis. 
The choice of methodology, logic, and research designs of the study are then 
explored. This includes research site and sampling selection, and the logic of data 
collection and data analysis. The ethical issues in the fieldwork are then investigated 
in the final section of this chapter.   
 
Part Three
 
: Analysis and Discussion of the Thesis 
The third and final part consists of chapters 4, 5 and 6. The fourth chapter analyses 
the key factors affecting the farmers’ decisions in relation to oil palm adoption. In 
accordance with the analytical framework used in this research, this chapter is divided 
into eight sections, reflecting the eight elements of the farmers’ decision-making 
approach. The first six sections examine the key factors affecting the farmers’ 
decisions to adopt oil palms. The seventh and eighth sections are the analysis of the 
socio-economic consequences of establishing oil palm plantations and the farmers’ 
satisfaction with having done so. 
 
The analysis in the fifth chapter focuses on the oil palm policy processes in the Nong 
Khai province mainly through the IDS KNOTS team’s policy processes framework, 
which consists of policy narrative, actors/networks, and politics/interests. The chapter 
is divided in accordance with these three themes of policy processes analysis. 
Through the examination of these three themes, policy space will then be identified so 
that it can be made use of for advocating different ways of doing things with regard to 
the oil palm issues.  
 
The final chapter presents the summary of the key findings of the thesis with 
reference to the main research question and sub-questions. Policy implications and 
future research into oil palm issues are also explored in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2:  
From Biofuels to Oil Palm Based Biodiesel Development and 
the Oil Palm Expansion in the Northeast Region of Thailand  
 
The rapid expansion of oil palm plantations particularly in Southeast Asian countries 
is generating considerable concern and debates: it still remains uncertain whether oil 
palm plantations will lead to sustainable development or be a costly route to 
environmental ruin. This chapter discusses oil palm development and the controversy 
surrounding it in order to get a clearer understanding of oil palm issues. It is presented 
in four sections as follows.  
 
The chapter begins with the drivers of biofuel development, which are energy 
security, economic development and climate change. The second section then focuses 
on biodiesel derived from oil palms and its relevant literatures, and the current oil 
palm debates and concerns will be discussed. This section is divided into two sub-
sections, of which the first highlights the impacts of oil palm expansion on the 
environment (such as contributions to deforestation, loss in biodiversity, and GHG 
emissions), whilst in the second sub-section attention will be drawn to a range of 
social issues that threaten traditional livelihoods (such as the impacts on local 
communities and small-scale oil farmers, land tenure, and food versus oil palms).  
 
Thereafter, I will narrow down the scope to describe the basics of oil palms and oil 
palm plantations specifically in Thailand. This section includes the literatures on 
debates and discussions as to whether oil palm plantations can be economically viable 
in the Northeast region of Thailand, where Nong Khai province (the research’s field 
site) is located. The chapter ends with some brief concluding points.  
 
2.1 The Rationale for Biofuel Development 
 
Biofuels, which are fuels made from locally grown renewable resources such as 
agricultural crops and waste, have become a focus of interest over the last few 
decades. Governments in many countries, including Thailand, have aggressively 
pursued biofuel development ever since a sharp increase in crude oil prices during the 
1970s. Biofuel development appeared to provide an alternative to expensive and non-
renewable fossil fuels obtained from beneath the earth’s surface. The development of 
biofuels was thus driven by three main factors: first, the nations’ worries about energy 
security, second, the benefits in rural economic development including creating or 
sustaining jobs in the agricultural sector and, third, the need to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (Wakker, 2006; Koh and Ghazoul, 2008).  
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For many countries, seeking energy security was the initial primary driving force in 
developing biofuels. Because economic progress must be facilitated by reliable and 
affordable sources of energy, sovereignty and control over energy supplies in order to 
meet rising energy demand were clear motivations for many governments. In order to 
enhance energy security, governments set out to diversify their national energy 
portfolios towards alternative fuels, including biofuels. According to the European 
Commission (2000: 4)’s Green Paper, energy security can be understood as “the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a price which 
is affordable for all consumers”. The importance of energy security has seldom been 
disputed, but many debates have focused almost exclusively on fossil fuel scarcity or 
disruptions to fossil fuel supplies from international markets, which could affect the 
price of energy and disrupt the provision of energy to consumers. Although lower 
energy demand and consumption is a primary goal to secure energy security in the 
long-run, the expectation of continually rising future demand for transport fuel and 
the envisaged negative effect of another such price hike on the economy have made 
biofuels a promising candidate in the search for alternative fuels.  
 
It is generally believed that imported energy is inherently less secure than domestic-
based sources of energy. In other words, the countries that have no reliance on 
imported sources of energy, which are typically from geopolitically unstable regions 
and/or inherently and harmfully volatile in price, are more secure in terms of energy. 
The production of fossil fuels is dominated by a few major producers, many of them 
in politically less stable regions, for example the volatile Middle East. Any disruption 
of supply due to geopolitical tensions, war, etc. could very possibly mean that energy 
prices would drastically increase overnight (IEA, 2008). Therefore this is used by 
many governments to argue for increasing biofuel production from local sources. 
However, energy security, in reality, depends on both domestic and international 
factors which threaten it in numerous ways.  
 
A lack of investment in domestic energy infrastructure such as power stations, 
refineries and storage facilities could potentially pose a risk to energy security. 
Technology and infrastructure failures resulting from faults or external stresses either 
inside or outside the country in question (for instance, extreme weather) could also 
pose a serious threat to energy security. Although biofuels might present fewer risks 
in terms of spills and toxic leaks than the traditional crude oils, severe weather could 
still affect crop yields and destroy harvests, which in turn would reduce the 
availability of feedstock and drive up biofuel prices. However, the impact of energy 
insecurity could be uneven so that the fuel-poor households or energy-intensive 
industries would be particularly vulnerable to the effects of the elevated fuel prices 
(Wicks, 2009; NCB, 2011).  
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The advantage of rural economic development is the second main driver behind the 
biofuel development particularly in developing countries, which generally experience 
a higher level of poverty and a lower standard of living. There is an expectation that 
investment in biofuels will contribute significantly to the economic development of a 
country, including creating new jobs and providing income-generating opportunities 
for farmers in rural areas. For example, because crop growing and harvesting require 
extensive labour and manual work, biofuel development could create new local 
employment, as well as encourage smallholders’ participation in biofuel crop 
production (IEA, 2004; Dufey, 2006; Demirbas, 2009; Yan and Lin, 2009). Many 
developing countries such as India and China, which often lack indigenous sources of 
energy and are inefficient in their utilisation of energy, have established biofuel 
strategies with the aim of diversifying their agricultural products and increasing the 
security of income from local agriculture, and also of increasing national exports, 
which will lead to greater contribution in global economic activities (NCB, 2011).  
 
Certainly, awareness of the potential consequences of climate change has spurred 
interest in biofuel development. Although there are some disputes within the scientific 
research community regarding the average global temperature, and the magnitude and 
impact of climate change, most climatologists have concluded that climate change 
could lead to severe economic, social and environmental consequences globally 
(IPCC, 2007). Thus, climate change mitigation is recognised as one of the greatest 
global challenges of the 21st century, and there is general consensus that reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is one of the highest priorities in tackling climate 
change. However, there are several routes to lowering GHG emissions, the 
development of biofuels being one of them. In view of increased energy security and 
further economic development, biofuels are expected to be alternative fuels which 
will not require changes in vehicle technology and have the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions in the transport sector, which is heavily reliant on traditional fossil fuels.  
 
Biofuels are considered to contribute to mitigating climate change in terms of 
reducing GHG emissions by replacing fossil fuels. In other words, they have the 
potential to achieve net zero carbon emission over their life cycle because the carbon 
released in combustion is equal to the carbon that the crop previously sequestered 
from the atmosphere during photosynthesis (Somerville, 2007). For this reason, 
biofuels have been proclaimed as an immediately available technology that might 
make a significant contribution to GHG emissions savings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Three major reasons (energy security, economic development and climate change 
mitigation) for the development of biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels have been 
briefly described here. Definitely, biofuels offer no perfect solution, as warning 
voices have been raised from an early stage about their potential problems. However, 
there is a range of biofuels, including biodiesel and bioethanol, produced from various 
feedstocks such as oil palms (the focus of this research), sugarcanes, soybeans, maize 
and sorghums. Comparing these types of biofuels is complex and difficult as each has 
specific advantages and costs (Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008). In the next section I 
will recount the story of current biofuels, specifically biodiesel from oil palms, and 
lay out the controversial issues which have been raised during their development.  
 
2.2 Oil Palm Based Biodiesel Development 
 
The current oil palm debates and concerns involve many controversies as to whether 
oil palms are a valuable route to sustainable development or a fast track to 
environmental ruin. As mentioned earlier, the expansion of oil palm cultivation, 
which is one of the main agricultures in biofuel development, is a major driver of 
rural economic growth and a source of renewable energy, but could also contribute to 
deforestation, a loss of biodiversity, forest fires, and a range of social issues that 
threaten traditional livelihoods. This section describes the current literatures on the 
ongoing expansion of oil palm cultivation, particularly in Southeast Asia. The first 
sub-section focuses on the impacts of oil palm plantations on the environment, 
including debates on GHG emissions, whilst the second sub-section highlights the 
issues of livelihoods, such as food versus oil palms, land tenure, and small-scale oil 
palm production. 
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2.2.1 Impacts on the Environment 
 
The expansion of oil palm plantations has triggered an outcry from the environmental 
sector for numerous reasons. Much of the controversy is about deforestation to make 
way for the oil palm plantations, which has generated widespread negative publicity 
(Murphy, 2007; Naylor et al., 2007; Gouverneur, 2009; McCarthy, 2010). However, 
quantifying the specific contribution of biofuels, including oil palms, to deforestation 
remains challenging (Gao et al., 2011). Clay (2004) has concluded in his research that 
there is a direct relationship between the growth of oil palm estates and deforestation 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. Oil palms continue to be widely connected with the loss of 
natural forests and habitats, despite some claims that much forest destruction is 
attributable to previous impacts and uses, for instance, logging and oil palm 
plantations (Hansen, 2005; Silvius, 2006; Abdullah and Nakagoshi, 2007; Yusoff and 
Hansen, 2007). In Malaysia, the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC) insists that 
primary forests should no longer be cleared for oil palms. Oil palm expansion only 
occurs on land that has already been used for cultivation. However, the accusation of 
destruction of forests is far from reaching a conclusion and there is still a debate over 
the issues of converting degraded and secondary forests (Tan, Lee at al., 2009). 
Although the Malaysian oil palm companies claim good practice locally, they are 
accused of being behind a major forest conversion in Indonesia (Greenpeace, 2007).  
  
Likewise, many Indonesian biofuel companies, and also the government, deny any 
link between oil palms and deforestation. Nonetheless, oil palm plantations are 
believed to be a major cause of fragmentation and loss of natural forests in Indonesia 
(Buckland, 2005; McCarthy and Cramb, 2009; Silvius, 2006; Koh and Wilcove, 
2008). There is widespread debate on the definition of ‘forest’ and ‘deforestation’: oil 
palm plantations could be considered forests, in the view of many pro-oil palm 
commentators. The clearance by fire of land for plantations, including oil palms, 
could have negative impacts on biodiversity, natural habitats, global warming, and 
even human health (Tacconi, 2003; Murdiyarso and Adiningsih 2006; Simorangkir, 
2007). Burning, which was part of traditional land management practice throughout 
Southeast Asia, is still considered the simplest, quickest, and cheapest method to clear 
land for plantations (Guyon and Simonrangkir, 2002). Prohibiting the use of fire 
would not be straightforward, as smallholders could not typically afford the initial 
outlay for heavy land-clearing machinery (Carson et al., 2007). 
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Both Malaysia and Indonesia established a strict ban on the use of fire in relation to 
the clearance of land during the 1990s. Malaysia has no severe smoke and haze 
problems, but its success in reducing fires might be related to the fact that most of 
their oil palm plantations were already established and did not require the same 
degree of land clearing for replanting. Indonesia’s oil palms, in contrast, were often 
associated with fire because many oil palm plantations were just being established 
and fire was the easiest way to clear the land (Simorangkir, 2007). Oil palm 
companies, particularly in Indonesia, are often suspected of setting fire to natural 
forests intentionally in order to obtain land-use permits from the government (Casson, 
2003). Moreover, forest degradation, including fragmentation from planting oil palms, 
increases the likelihood that a forest will dry out sufficiently to cause fires. 
Development of oil palms often brings an increase in both the degradation of 
surrounding forests and the types of human activities that might result in afire being 
started either intentionally or accidentally. Thus, many fires which occur in the areas 
surrounding oil palm plantations are likely to be attributable to the oil palm 
plantations whether as a direct or indirect consequence (Laurance, 2003, CIFOR, 
2009).  
 
Another factor contributing to deforestation in relation to oil palm expansion in 
Indonesia is land clearance fraud. According to the work of Casson (2000), Casson 
(2003), and Casson et al. (2007), some investors use oil palms as a means to gain 
access to timber because it can be easier to obtain land clearing permits than logging 
permits from the government. This explains why oil palm permits have been issued 
for 5.3 million hectares in West Kalimantan, whilst less than 1 million hectares of 
land has actually been planted with oil palms. In other words, the tropical forests were 
cleared, but oil palms were not planted. Thus we can deduce that, although 12.5 
million hectares of degraded land was available in 2003, most oil palm plantations 
were established in natural forests. The gain from selling timber could offset the costs 
of establishing the oil palm crop, which otherwise take several years to repay.  
 
Because biodiversity loss is directly related to deforestation, there is a concern about 
this issue particularly in Southeast Asia, where the lowland forests are amongst the 
world’s most species-rich environments. Loss of these forests could threaten the 
region’s exceptional conservation value (Tinker, 1997; Curran et al., 2004; Sodhi et 
al., 2004; Sodhi et al., 2006; Phalan, 2009). Research carried out in oil palm frontier 
areas on the island of Sumatra has concluded that oil palm plantations result in a 
significant biodiversity loss, whether the plantations replace primary and secondary 
forests, agroforests, or even degraded forests (Gillison and Liswanti, 1999; Maddox, 
2007). Not surprisingly, several NGOs have campaigned against the oil palm 
plantations on the basis of the threat posed to endangered species such as the 
orangutan and the Sumatran tiger (FOE, 2004; Brown and Jacobson 2005). The work 
of Maddox (2007) also suggested that Indonesia’s large-scale oil palm monocultures, 
which usually result in the near total clearing of former vegetation, are very poor 
habitats for most terrestrial mammal species.   
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The work of Aratrakorn et al. (2006) also showed that converting forest to oil palm 
plantations led to a 60 percent reduction in species richness, especially forest-
dependent birds. Other endangered species are also threatened by oil palm expansion, 
as they are often captured or killed when the areas are opened up to establish the 
plantations. Sumatran elephants are considered to pose a threat to the oil palm 
industry because they often destroy the plantations and feed on the oil-rich palm nuts 
(Susanto and Ardiansyah, 2003). Orangutans have been known to become violent 
around the oil palm plantation areas because their food sources are threatened (Brown 
and Jacobson, 2005; Buckland, 2005), whilst Sumatran tigers are often killed if they 
are considered to pose a risk to oil palm workers (Brown and Jacobson, 2005). 
Indeed, it has become apparent that the impacts of oil palms are not only forest loss, 
but also the increases in human access and population, and their closeness to forest 
edges. The decline in biodiversity occurring around the oil palm plantations might not 
solely be from habitat changes, but from direct human impacts (Maddox, 2007).  
 
However, the study of Turner et al. (2008) suggests that it would be possible to 
enhance biodiversity in oil palm plantations by altering vegetation characteristics at 
the local level or by increasing natural forest cover at landscape level. It is worth 
noting that the benefits in biodiversity resulting from these practices are relatively 
minor compared to the losses that can occur when the natural forests are cleared. On 
the positive side, oil palm plantations could be considered to pose less risk to the 
environment than most other alternative crops, simply because more oil palm crop can 
be produced on less land. Improving farm management, better yields from improved 
varieties and planting on degraded land could improve yields significantly without 
further deforestation (Hardter et al., 1997).  
 
Because oil palm plantations consume large quantities of chemical fertilisers in order 
to increase and maintain yields, the oil palm industry was responsible for some of the 
1900 percent increase in fertiliser use in Asia in the last four decades of the 20th 
century (Zhao et al., 2006).Chemical fertilisers increase eutrophication in water 
bodies and wetlands affected by runoff.  In Malaysia, chemical runoff and palm oil 
mill effluents have entered rivers on which local communities depend and have 
created problems for the aquatic ecosystems (Kittikun, 2000; Johnstone, 2008). 
Additionally, pesticides and herbicides also increase pollution in general, especially 
with repeated use (Hartemink, 2005). The Malaysian government banned the use of 
hazardous herbicides and the oil palm industry then had to seek alternatives. 
Integrated biological pest management, such as using snakes to control rat 
populations (Fee, 2000), could offer an alternative to the use of pesticides. It was 
believed that many of the negative environmental impacts of oil palm plantations and 
palm oil production could likely be reduced significantly by good management 
(Yusoff and Hansen, 2007).  
 
 
 26 
Nonetheless, most positive reports on the environmental impacts of oil palm 
plantations have been generated by oil palm companies and their collaborators, or by 
government agencies, which could then lack credibility, whilst most negative stories 
came from NGOs. A systematic assessment of these environmental issues by 
unbiased researchers is necessary and would be valuable for future oil palm 
development.  
 
Undeniably, there have been considerable debates over the life-cycle analysis of GHG 
emissions. Amongst the most common biofuel crops, oil palm has the highest 
potential for carbon offsetting (Gibbs, 2008). A review of literatures soon showed that 
there are many different ways to assess the carbon emissions balance, which allow 
those for or against oil palms to find calculations to present the benefits or the 
drawbacks as they wish (Hill, 2007; Righelato and Spracklen, 2007; Danielsen et al., 
2008; Searchinger, 2008; Butler et al., 2009). In brief, oil palms are claimed to have a 
positive net energy balance when compared to the use of fossil fuels. During palm oil 
production, carbon is lost when lands including natural forests are converted to oil 
palm plantations and when fossil fuels are used in management, processing, or 
transport. Net carbon gains are achieved when the total amount of carbon emitted 
from palm oil production is less than that emitted by burning an equivalent amount of 
fossil fuels. Estimating this net carbon balance requires an analytical tool generally 
known as the ‘life-cycle’ or ‘well-to-wheels’ approach. 
 
According to Frondel and Peters (2007), each tonne of petroleum diesel releases 
approximately 3.57 tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere. However, the figures for oil 
palm based biodiesel are harder to estimate and would vary considerably with the 
context. The estimation depends on various factors, for instance, the fertilisers and 
irrigation system used in growing and harvesting oil palms, crop locations, conversion 
technologies, and processes of storing, distributing and retailing the palm oil (Udo der 
Haes and Heijungs 2007; von Blottnitz and Curran 2007; Liska and Cassman 2008; 
Börjesson 2009; Yee, Tan et al. 2009; Yu and Tao 2009). Besides, the impact of 
converting natural habitats to produce palm oil could have a substantial influence on 
the GHG balance. Replacing one hectare of primary forest with oil palms releases 
around 250 tonnes of aboveground carbon. This figure might be reduced to 160 
tonnes of carbon per hectare when the oil palm trees reach maturity due to their 
containment of 90 tonnes of carbon per hectare (Tomich et al., 2002; Casson et al., 
2007; Yusoff and Hansen, 2007). But not all forests are the same and certainly there is 
a considerable variation across locations.  
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Many researchers believe that producing and using oil palm based biodiesel from 
converted natural forests caused greater GHG emissions than refining and using an 
energy equivalent amount of fossil diesel, at least in the short term (Fargoine et al., 
2008). In contrast, planting oil palms on degraded or open land could contribute to a 
positive net carbon total (Hartemink, 2005; Gibbs et al., 2008). The study of Reijnders 
and Huijbregts (2008) found that one tonne of palm oil could be linked to the emitted 
CO2 ranging from 2.6 to 18.2 tonnes (3.57 tonnes for petroleum diesel). Based on a 
compilation of published data, Venter et al. (2009) estimated that each hectare of 
Southeast Asian tropical forest replaced by oil palms released an average of 698 
tonnes of CO2 over 30 years. However, the environmental impacts of oil palm 
plantations on non-CO2 GHG emissions, such as methane (CH4), volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), and Nitrous Oxide (N2O) are poorly understood and remain to be 
examined (Murdiyarso et al., 2002; Wuebbles and Hayhoe, 2002; Wilkinson et al., 
2006). 
 
Indeed, biodiesel from oil palms could release less carbon per unit of energy released 
than fossil fuels and still result in increased net carbon emissions in the short or 
medium term. This was because of the significant amount of carbon that was lost in 
the original land-use conversion, which would counterbalance any carbon benefits 
that oil palm based biodiesel might offer for a significant period. Estimates of the time 
required for oil palms to make carbon gains vary from 71 to 93 years for converting 
forests to oil palms and more than 600 years for peat-swamp forests (Danielsen et al., 
2008; Gibbs et al., 2008). In contrast, oil palms planted on degraded lands might take 
only 10 years to become carbon positive (Danielsen et al., 2008) or, in some cases, 
they might become carbon positive immediately (Gibbs et al., 2008). Fargione et al. 
(2008) also found similar results, as the study showed that it could take 86 years to 
recover from the carbon debt of replacing normal forests with oil palms from biofuel 
production and uses, and 420 to 840 years if converting peatlands to oil palm 
plantations. Overall, it is believed by many researchers that oil palm plantations could 
contribute to global warming in the short term, if they replace vegetation with higher 
carbon content, such as tropical forests.  
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2.2.2 The Issues of Livelihoods 
 
Research on the impacts of large-scale oil palm plantations on local communities vary 
greatly and are specific to local conditions (Giller et al, 2007; Phalan, 2009; Hought et 
al., 2012). Different regional characteristics including climate, political and 
institutional structures, and types of feedstock used suggest that the local context must 
be considered when evaluating the environmental and socio-economic impacts of 
farmers’ adoption of oil palms. As mentioned earlier, most messages are highly 
conflicted and are disseminated by oil palm companies or NGOs based on a small 
number of selected case studies. In Malaysia, large-scale oil palm production benefits 
many rural people by providing income and employment, and thus enhances the 
quality of life of local people. The oil palm industry is seen as one of the country’s 
largest employers (Barison, 2007). In Indonesia, the number of people who worked in 
the plantation sector was 1.7 to 2 million people (Wakker, 2006; Zen et al., 2006). 
Goenadi (2008) estimated that the oil palm industry profited around 6 million people, 
many of whom were rescued from poverty. At the national level, oil palms earned 
Indonesia export revenues of more than 12 billion USD in 2007.  
 
According to Zen et al. (2006), oil palms have brought benefits to oil palm workers in 
terms of secure incomes, access to healthcare, and education. At times, oil palm 
companies have successfully engaged with local needs and investigated how local 
people would benefit from the plantations (Zen et al, 2006). However, some negative 
findings emerged. The first criticism was the exploitation of labour forces. It was 
alleged that 90 percent of the plantation workers in Sabah (in Malaysia) were 
Indonesians, who were employed for harvesting, weeding and other maintenance 
works, and essentially did not receive the rights and protection that a Malaysian 
worker normally obtained for hard and long hours of work (CIFOR, 2009). Women 
workers, who were preferred by oil palm companies as they were considered to be 
better at applying pesticides and fertilisers, often experienced serious health and 
safety problems for various reasons such as a lack of safety equipment or protective 
clothing (Marti, 2008).  
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Significant erosion of local culture and institutions has been reported by several 
commentators (Belcher et al., 2004; Sheil et al., 2006; Marti, 2008; Van Noordwijk et 
al., 2008, Borras Jr. et al., 2010). Conversion of forests to plantations has a substantial 
impact on forest-dependent people, who typically rely on forests for their diets, which 
include a wide range of wild plants and animals. Correspondingly the lifestyles of 
these people are difficult to reconcile with the more repetitive and orderly works and 
landscapes required for development of large-scale oil palm monocultures. There are 
also accounts of abuse of local people by oil palm companies because of the frequent 
conflicts (FOE, 2008; Marti, 2008). Friends of the Earth (2008) stated strongly that 
the unsustainable expansion of Indonesia’s palm oil sector has left many indigenous 
people and communities without land, water, or sufficient livelihoods. Some 
communities were being denied their human rights, such as the right to water and 
health and the right to be protected from ill treatment and arbitrary arrest.  
 
In the case of small-scale palm oil production, oil palms are attractive to farmers 
because they offer good returns from a low outlay (Belcher et al., 2004). The average 
net incomes of Indonesian small-scale oil palm farmers in 1997 were seven times 
higher than those of subsistence farmers (Hardter et al., 1997; Hartemink, 2005). 
Generally, smallholders achieve lower yields than large-scale oil palm producers: 66 
percent less according to Hasnah and Coelli (2004)’s study in Indonesia. Research 
suggests that small-scale oil palm production has gained a significant role in the palm 
oil sector and the yields would rise rapidly, particularly in Indonesia, if the 
smallholders had sufficient training, support, and good planting materials (Hartemink, 
2005). Indeed, oil palms are rapidly becoming a smallholder crop, especially in 
Indonesia. In 2006, in both Malaysia and Indonesia, small-scale oil palm producers 
accounted for approximately a third of the palm oil production and 35 to 40 percent in 
terms of area cultivated (Vermeulen and Goad, 2006).  
 
Small-scale oil palm farmers typically function in one of two ways: supported or 
independent, each of which has its own risks and benefits. Supported farmers share 
risks with either oil palm companies or the government but they lose their 
independence and have less flexibility in how they manage their land. In return, they 
might have a guarantee that the prices will be more stable than in the local markets. 
Independent farmers, on the other hand, face other risks, such as being susceptible to 
the theft of ripe crops. Access to capital is an important issue for most small-scale oil 
palm producers, who might have trouble getting loans or face arduous repayment 
schedules. Both types of smallholders are tied to a long-term crop and exposed to 
significant financial risks, for instance, poor harvests due to natural disasters, 
fluctuation in palm oil prices, and pests and diseases (Vermeulen and Goad, 2006).  
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Although expansion and improvement of small-scale oil palm production presents a 
major opportunity for meeting the rising demand for palm oil, it is important to note 
that small-scale oil palm farmers are notorious for poor management of their 
plantations (Hasnah and Coelli, 2004; Hartemink, 2005). As mentioned earlier, 
smallholders almost always use fires to clear land, thus causing environmental 
degradation. This is because the farmers are unable to afford expensive land clearing 
machinery and because they are accustomed to using fire in the land preparation 
process. These small-scale famers rarely follow the regulations and often clear the 
land without the appropriate permits (CIFOR, 2009).   
 
Moving to the issue of land tenure, oil palm expansion has called critical attention to 
potential conflicts between land use and food security, especially in the case of large-
scale projects where land tenure is poorly defined (Tauli-Corpuz and Tamang 2007; 
Cotula et al., 2008). According to Hall et al. (2012), the dramatic expansion of export-
oriented crops including oil palms and conflicts over land use could lead to different 
forms of exclusion in Southeast Asia. The exclusion from land use of some is a 
necessary condition for the use of land by others. According to the case study of palm 
oil in Malaysia (Hall et al., 2012: 21), as the booming crop has spread rapidly, 
‘volatile exclusions’ have emerged, which have fostered “a strong tendency for 
people to make more individualized claims to land”. McCarthy (2010) explored the 
consequences of massive plantation investments in the oil palm sector in Indonesia. 
He found that the social, political, and economic conditions on the ground affect 
outcomes in widely divergent ways depending very much on the ‘terms’ under which 
incorporation into the oil palm economy occurs, such as the workings of land tenure 
systems and the informal land market. This research found that displacement and 
dispossession are crucial parts of the oil palm narrative and are the parts that those 
with a positive vision of biofuel development are keen to hide.  
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Contested tenure has affected most large-scale oil palm development to some degree. 
Every oil palm company in Sumatra had land disputes with local communities during 
2000 (Vermeulen and Goad, 2006) and these land tenure disputes often led to 
conflicts, injuries, intimidation, arrests, tortures, and even deaths (DTE, 2000; 
Nicholas, 2005; McCarthy, 2009; Hall, 2011). According to Colchester et al. (2006)’s 
study in Indonesia, procedures for gaining land titles are ambiguous, absent, 
defective, or rarely applied, though the rights of traditional communities to their lands 
are recognised in law. Interestingly, potential title disputes might be one of the 
reasons why oil palm companies prefer to develop in forest areas rather than cleared 
or degraded areas. On cleared land, many individuals might move into the areas and 
claim ownership. The oil palm companies would then have to negotiate with more 
stakeholders than in forested areas, which are often within the claim area of a single 
village, or only a few. Negotiating with a large number of parties increases the costs 
to the companies and potentially delays the establishment of the plantations (CIFOR, 
2009). In Indonesia, Matri (2008) also reported that there were social conflicts 
between oil palm companies and small-scale producers, as some smallholders had a 
desire to plant other crops on their lands, but were contractually obliged to plant oil 
palms on the majority of their land holding.  
 
The current ‘first generation’ biofuel technologies are based on conventional 
agricultural commodity crops, which are land-intensive and have been widely 
criticised (Murphy et al., 2011; NCB, 2011) Increasing the land devoted to biofuels 
could possibly mean a reduction of land for food and feed crops. Hence, there is an 
ongoing debate on land competition between food and biofuels (FAO 2008a; FAO 
2008b; NCB, 2011). The sharp rise in the price of crude oils has meant that grain, 
sugar, and oilseed crops including oil palms are increasingly being planted in order to 
produce biofuels. Using food to produce biofuels might place a further tension on 
already tight availability of arable land, thus pushing up food prices and raising 
concerns over food security. Palm oil is the cheapest food oil in many countries and it 
is feared that palm oil production would link the price of palm oil and food prices 
more closely. 
 
Biofuels, including biodiesel from oil palms, have received enormous criticisms for 
being one of the major factors in increasing food prices. The rising demand for 
biofuels and the ensuing increase in food prices will negatively affect the food 
security of the poor, especially in the least developed countries, who are net buyers of 
food and have to buy food through international markets (FAO, 2005; Worldwatch 
Institute, 2006; Cassman and Liska, 2007; Fresco, 2007; Naylor et al., 2007; IFPRI 
and Rosegrant, 2008; Msangi, 2008; Royal Society, 2008; FAO, 2008a; FAO, 2008b; 
Zhou and Thompson, 2009; NCB, 2011). Mendoza (2007) once stated that biofuels 
were the greatest threat to food security particularly in the low-income countries 
because of their influence on the supply and price of staple foods.   
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However, many blame the rise in food prices on quite separate issues. Cassman and 
Liska (2007) suggest that even without land competition, food prices will rise with 
increased fuel costs resulting from the increased costs of management, agricultural 
inputs, processing, and transport. Speculators turned away from the relatively risky 
stock market and property sectors to invest in food commodities, and their activities 
are also important drivers for a rise in food prices. Higher prices for cooking oil and 
other staple foods such as soya, rice and beans are also attributable to severe weather 
and floods in major food producing areas (CIFOR, 2009).  
 
Although there is general evidence that biofuel production has contributed to the 
volatility of food prices, which adversely affects the poor that rely on food imports, it 
is clear that biofuels are only one factor. According to von Braun (2007), the world 
food situation is already changing rapidly due to a range of powerful forces, for 
instance, income growth, urbanisation, high energy prices, globalisation, and climate 
change. These completely transform food consumption patterns, production, and 
markets. Even without biofuels, world food and energy prices and fluctuations are 
increasingly linked. There have been calls for an urgent research response to examine 
the role of these relationships and processes. Cassman and Liska (2007) suggested 
that the critical challenge was not only to produce enough food to meet rising demand 
from population increase and expansion of biofuel production, but to do so in an 
environmentally sound and socially sustainable manner.  
 
In short, biofuels including oil palms are seen as a renewable source of energy, with 
the potential to contribute to energy security, reduce GHG emissions, support 
sustainable development by providing increased employment and income to some 
rural populations, and to contribute to poverty reduction (Clancy, 2008; Reddy et al., 
2008; Sukkasi et al., 2010). However, it is as yet unclear whether biofuels will 
alleviate or aggravate poverty in the long term, particularly amongst the most 
vulnerable rural smallholders (Arntdt et al., 2010). The report from the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2011) concludes that many biofuel policies fail to take account 
of important ethical issues, for instance, protecting human rights, environmental 
sustainability, climate change mitigation, just reward, and equitable distribution of 
costs and benefits. Evaluating potential advantages and disadvantages of biofuels was 
specific to local conditions.  
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2.3 Oil Palm Basics and Oil Palm Plantations in Thailand  
 
Following on from the literatures mentioned earlier, this research was shaped by 
curiosity as to why small-scale oil palm farmers choose to undertake oil palm 
cultivation and whether the oil palm plantations specifically in the Northeast region of 
Thailand have had an impact on their environment and livelihood, and if so in what 
ways. This section, then, focuses on the background and structure of the oil palm 
sector in Thailand and the Northeast region in order to set forth the fundamental 
knowledge required to analyse oil palm issues. This includes the ongoing debates as 
to whether oil palm plantations can be economically viable in the Northeast region.  
 
Agriculture is indisputably the major economic activity of the Northeast region. The 
region had 57.6 million rais of agricultural land areas, the highest number of the 
country, which accounted for 43.7 percent of Thailand’s agricultural lands in 2008. 
Rice paddy field occupied the majority of the land areas at 37.7 million rais, 65.3 
percent of the Northeast’s agricultural lands during the same period (OAE, 2010a). 
Although the region has the highest number of agricultural households and farm 
labour (see Table 2.1), the Northeast has reputation of infertile sandy soils, water 
shortages, poor irrigation systems, and low socio-economic indicators comparing to 
other parts of the country. The average farm income of farmers in this region was the 
country’s lowest figure at 62,227 Baht per year, far below the average of 132,184 
Baht nationwide in crop year 2008/2009 (OAE, 2009).  
 
The Northeast typically faces shortages of irrigation water during many months of the 
year, especially in the dry season and also suffers from severe flooding during periods 
of heavy rainfall in the rainy season. This results from the fact that rainfall in the 
region is not equally distributed in space and time and the sandy soils at the surface 
are not able to capture the available water long enough for the crop use (Moroizumi et 
al., 2009). In addition, the irrigated area in the Northeast was only 3.78 million rais in 
2008, equivalent to 6.6 percent of the Northeast’s agricultural lands (OAE, 2009). 
Consequently, low crop productivity happens throughout the region (Phien et al., 
1980; Wijnhoud et al., 2003; Moroizumi et al., 2009).  
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Table 2.1: Socio-Economics Indicators of Farm Households in Thailand 
(2008/2009) 
 
Indicators 
Crop Year 2008/2009 
Country North  Northeast Central South 
1. Incomes 
(Baht/Household) 219,912 208,440 152,447 369,043 296,935 
  - Farm Incomes 132,184 142,263 62,227 254,378 210,493 
  - Non-farm Incomes 87,728 66,177 90,220 114,665 86,442 
  - Ratio of Farm to Non- 
farm Incomes (%) 
60.11 68.25 40.82 68.93 70.89 
2. Number of Farm 
Households  
(Million Households) 
5.86 1.34 2.74 0.85 0.93 
3. Household Size 
(Persons/Household) 4.19 4.03 4.15 4.29 4.12 
4. Agricultural Labour 
Aged 15-64  
(Million Persons) 
16.08 3.91 7.55 2.43 2.30 
5. Occupied Lands 
(Rais/Household) 22.62 23.57 21.52 27.77 18.05 
 
Source: OAE (2009) 
 
Oil palms need tropical, humid conditions to thrive, with an ideal annual rainfall of 
1,780 to 2,280 millimetres and a temperature range of 24 to 30 oC (NewCrop, 1996). 
Thus, the conditions in Southeast Asia are ideally suited. Oil palms can also be 
productive on a wide range of soil types including ‘problem soils’ (Auxtero and 
Shamshuddin, 1991), as long as the plantations are well watered. Seasonal droughts 
greatly reduce the yields of oil palms as water-stressed oil palm trees produce fewer 
female flowers and thus lower yields (Barison, 2007). Direct sunshine also benefits 
oil palm yields, which explains why yields are higher in Southeast Asia than in West 
Africa, which has a greater incidence of cloud (Dufrene et al., 1990).  
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Under appropriate management, each oil palm tree can produce 10 to 15 bunches of 
fruits per year, with an average weight of 15 to 20 kilogrammes per bunch. Total fresh 
fruit bunch (FFB) yields are thus 15 to 30 tonnes per hectare per year. These FFB 
yields often vary with the terrain, but patterns are unpredictable. For instance, the 
highest yields are generally from higher ground but sometimes also found in valleys 
(Balasundram et al., 2006). Lower FFB yields are attributable to, for instance, labour 
shortages, low-grade planting materials, oil palm trees being too old or too tall, 
inadequate fertiliser application, increased production costs, and pests and natural 
disasters (Casson, 2000). Under good conditions, these oil palm bunches are 52 
percent dry weight and have an extractable oil content of 15 to 25 percent, depending 
on ripeness at harvesting time (Weng, 1999; Henson, 1999). Oil palm seedlings are 
typically raised in a nursery for a year before being ready to plant out. Oil palms 
mature rapidly and fruits can be harvested within 2 to 3 years of planting, although 
the trees are most productive when they are between 9 and 15 years old. After 25 to 
30 years oil palm trees become too tall for the fruit to be harvested (Barison, 2007).  
 
Most modern oil palm varieties belong to the Tenera group, which was developed by 
crossing the wild type Dura and the shell-less Pisifera. The Tenera varieties, which 
are widely cultivated in Asia (Wahid et al., 2005), are easier to process than wild oil 
palms (Poku, 2002). In recent years, yields and disease resistance have been improved 
by plant selection and breeding; selected varieties can produce 2 to 3 times higher 
yields than Tenera varieties. In addition, various genetically modified plants are being 
developed with the aim of producing shorter oil palm varieties that could yield fruits 
for longer than 25 years (Parveez et al., 2000). However, it remains to be 
demonstrated what improvements can be achieved in practice and how much is 
commercial ‘hype’. It is also important to note that oil palm fruits deteriorate very 
quickly once harvested and must be processed into crude palm oil (CPO) within 48 
hours (Vermeulen and Goad, 2006).  
 
In Thailand, oil palm plantations have increased significantly from 2.41 million rais in 
2004 to 4.08 million rais in 2010, i.e. an increase of more than 1 million rais in the 
last seven years. Out of the total oil palm planted areas in 2010, 3.55 million rais were 
mature oil palms. The southern provinces of Thailand have the most suitable climatic 
and soil conditions for oil palm cultivation, and account for approximately 90 percent 
of the total oil palm land cover. Prominent areas of oil palm expansion were also 
found in the Eastern region, for example in Chonburi and Trat provinces, and in some 
provinces in the North and Northeast regions including Nong Khai province (the 
research’s field site), which had 24,848 rais of land planted with oil palms in 2010 
(see Table 2.2). In the same year, 121,306 households were involved in oil palm 
cultivation, mostly on small to medium sized farms (OAE, 2010c). According to 
Dallinger (2011), small-scale farmers, i.e. those who own less than 50 hectares (325 
rais) of land, account for approximately 70 percent of the total oil palm land in 
Thailand and a similar percentage of FFB production.  
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Annual FFB yields per rai in Thailand have increased significantly from 1,964 
kiligrammes per rai per year in 1998 to 2,315 kilogrammes per rai per year in 2010, 
despite some fluctuations over the last 5 years (see Table 2.2). The overall oil 
extraction rates in Thailand ranged from 16.06 percent to 17.00 percent between 2006 
and 2010. In terms of palm oil production, there were 14 biodiesel plants, 12 palm oil 
refineries and 60 oil palm crushing mills in operation in Thailand. In 2010, production 
of CPO reached 1,287,509 tonnes, of which 65,942 tonnes (5.1 percent) was exported. 
This figure is the normal proportion of Thailand’s palm oil that is exported, as the 
average palm oil export was around 6 percent between 1990 and 2010 and it was only 
in a few specific years that the figure reached 20 percent of total CPO production. It is 
important to note that 380,000 tonnes of CPO, which accounted for 29 percent of total 
CPO production, were used to produce biodiesel in 2010.   
 
Focusing on the oil palm expansion in the Northeast region, there is much debate and 
discussion amongst Thai academics as to whether oil palm plantations could become 
economically viable in the Northeast region. Pratummintra (2008)’s findings 
suggested positive outcomes in planting oil palms in the Northeast. Field site testing 
in collaboration with the Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO) confirmed that 
oil palms started to yield in the second year with an average production of 1.3 tonnes 
per rai per year and 22 percent oil content, significantly better than the standard yields 
of 900 kilogrammes per rai per year and 19 percent oil content. Besides, the survey 
and mapping analysis carried out for this study showed that the Northeast region has 
shallow groundwater levels, less than 1 metre below the surface, which is considered 
highly suitable for oil palm cultivation. This region also has a plain land with sandy 
soil and sandy clay loam, in which rice and cassava cultivation cannot offer high 
productivity as the topsoil does not retain water. Consequently, the study postulated 
that oil palms could be economically viable in the region and would be a good 
alternative for farmers.  
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Table 2.2: Oil Palm Planted Areas, Annual FFB Yields, and Oil Extraction Rate in Thailand, between 2006 and 2010 
 
Country/ Regions 
Oil Palm Planted Areas (thousand rais) FFB Yields (kilogrammes per rai) Oil Extraction Rate (percent) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Whole Country 2,953.92 3,227.85 3,676.10 3,888.40 4,076.88 2,828 2,399 3,214 2,560 2,315 16.32 16.45 16.65 17.00 16.06 
1. Central Region 228.89 291.66 381.24 411.95 446.53 2,321 1,825 2,956 2,440 2,069 
 
2. Southern Region 2,725.03 2,908.96 3,246.13 3,421.32 3,535.64 2,869 2,447 3,248 2,589 2,367 
3. Northern Region - 2.15 7.02 8.39 19.68 - - 373 474 412 
4. Northeast Region - 25.08 41.70 46.73 75.03 - - 508 702 824 
- Nong Khai 
      (the field site) 
- 17.16 18.98 21.90 24.85 - - 29 569 512 
 
Source: OAE (2010c) 
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The work of Sakulareewattana et al. (2009) also confirmed the suitability of oil palms 
for the region. The study involved developing oil palm varieties in search of high 
yield varieties suited to the conditions in the Northeast. The results indicated that oil 
palms, especially the hybrid variety Surat Thani 2, could be grown and achieve 
reasonable yields in the region if they were planted in appropriate areas and had 
appropriate water and farm management. Additionally, Chaikiattiyos et al. (2008) 
pointed out in their study based on the evaluation of existing oil palm trees in the 
Northeast region that oil palm farming in the region made sense, but one of the most 
important factors in determining its success was the source of planting materials, such 
as the quality of oil palm seedlings.  
 
However, some academics have suggested the opposite. The studies of Yingjajaval 
(2005), Yangdee (2007), and Esaan Alternative Agriculture Network (2010) found 
that planting oil palms in the region was extremely risky due to the environment being 
unsuitable. The chief factor in the unsuitability was intermittent shortages of 
underground water resulting from the uneven distribution of rainfall over a period of 
time. This region faces 115 days of water annually and 1,500 millimetres of annual 
rainfall, which directly affects yields and oil content. Hesakul (2009) also indicated 
that the crop was not worth the investment because of a lack of knowledge and skills 
in growing oil palms, including variety selection, maintenance techniques, and oil 
palm diseases. In addition, the nearest oil palm crushing mill is located in Chonburi 
province, a distance of 700 kilometres from Nong Khai province. Thus, the high 
transportation cost would make oil palm investment in this region infeasible.  
 
2.4Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the relevant literatures on biofuel development, 
specifically in oil palm based biodiesel development and the controversial issues 
concerning its impacts on the environment and traditional livelihoods. Although 
biofuels are believed to offer benefits to many developing countries in terms of 
improving energy security, promoting rural economic development, and mitigating 
climate change, cultivating oil palms, which are one of the potential feedstocks for 
biofuel production, could result in negative impacts on the environment: loss of 
natural forests and biodiversity due to conversion of forest lands to oil palms, using 
fire in land clearing processes, land clearance frauds, large-scale monoculture, and 
chemical fertiliser runoff, and potential increases of global carbon emissions from the 
plantations themselves as well as from deforestation. Oil palm expansion could also 
threaten the lifestyles and livelihoods of local farmers in ways such as erosion of local 
cultures due to forest clearance, exploitation of labour forces, abuses against local 
people, land tenure conflicts, and food security issues.  
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The basics of oil palm cultivation and the structure of the oil palm industry in 
Thailand were also presented in this chapter, in order to provide fundamental 
knowledge for understanding the change to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai 
province which is dealt with in the empirical chapters which follow (Chapters 4 and 
5). Southeast Asian countries including Thailand are known to be ideal places for oil 
palm plantations because of high annual rainfall, temperature, and sunlight hours, 
which could lead to higher yields and oil extraction rate. In Thailand, oil palm 
plantations have surged to 4.08 million rais in 2010, of which 24,848 rais are in Nong 
Khai province (the research’s field site). However, literatures on the economics of oil 
palm plantations in the Northeast region of Thailand have identified concerns over the 
environment in this region being inappropriate for oil palm plantations.  
 
The following methodology chapter contains the analytical framework of the 
research, which I specifically developed in order to understand the change to oil palm 
cultivation in the northeast of Thailand. This framework highlights the farmers’ 
decision to start growing oil palms, the socio-economic impacts of the change and its 
policy processes specifically in the context of Thailand. Choices of methodologies, 
the research questions, and the design of the research will also be introduced and 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3:  
Research Framework, Logic, and Methods 
 
The preceding chapters established the rationale, the significance of the research topic 
and the significance of the expansion of oil palm farming for developing biodiesel, 
from both global and Thai perspectives. This chapter develops the analytical 
framework used to analyse oil palm issues specifically in the Thai context and also 
provides a critical account of the design of the study and the research methods used. 
 
This chapter consists of six sections. The first section is the analytical framework of 
the study. The second section describes the choice of methodology, research question 
and sub-questions. The third section focuses specifically on research sites and sample 
selection. It includes some reflections on the author’s research experiences and 
considers how some of the difficulties encountered were resolved. The fourth section 
covers data collection and data analysis, and the fifth discusses ethical issues in the 
fieldwork. The chapter ends with a summary of the key points.  
 
3.1 Analytical Framework of the Research 
 
The analytical framework of this research consists of two main theoretical 
approaches, namely the eight elements of farmers’ decision-making, and IDS KNOTS 
team’s framework on policy processes. The analytical framework is introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter (see Figure 3.1 below) in order to provide a holistic view of 
the research before exploring in detail the two theoretical approaches and how they 
were developed for analysing the change to oil palm cultivation, specifically in the 
Thai context. The two different analytical approaches mentioned earlier are drawn on 
in order to encompass the oil palm issues fully, as exploring only one particular 
perspective could not fully reflect the reality of the oil palm issues in the Northeast 
region of Thailand. Because of a substantial increase in oil palm plantations in Nong 
Khai province in particular, it was necessary to understand the rice farmers’ rationale 
for engaging in oil palm cultivation. Comprehending the decision-making of oil palm 
farmers provided a fundamental insight for further analysis of oil palm policy 
processes, to investigate whether the change to oil palm cultivation was significantly 
influenced by the oil palm expansion policy and, if so, in what ways. Thus the first 
sub-section is devoted to discussing the adaptation of eight elements of farmers’ 
decision-making theory, with the aim of understanding the change to oil palm 
cultivation from the bottom up, as well as identifying the factors which influenced the 
local farmers in choosing whether or not to move to oil palm cultivation.  
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The second sub-section then explores approaches to policy processes and employs 
IDS KNOTS team’s framework for policy analysis of oil palm planting in Nong Khai 
province. The final sub-section presents the analytical framework of the research, 
which is shaped by the adaptation of these two main theoretical approaches, in order 
to comprehend the change towards farming oil palms, specifically in the Thai context. 
 
Figure 3.1: Analytical Framework of the Research 
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author 
 
3.1.1 Adaptation of Eight Elements of Farmers’ Decision-Making 
Concept 
 
Figure 3.2 below presents the concept of eight elements of decision-making, which 
are: values and goals, problem detection, problem definition, observation, analysis, 
development of intention, implementation, and responsibility bearing. The researcher 
has adapted this concept to suit the aims of the research, which was to understand the 
change to oil palm cultivation through the farmers’ perspectives, a bottom-up 
approach per se. The adaptation of the eight elements concept will be discussed after a 
brief survey of the literature on farmers’ decision-making.  
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Figure 3.2: Eight Elements of Farmers’ Decision-Making  
 
Source: Ohlmer et al.(1998)  
 
Most research and teaching across the social sciences has explored the drivers of 
individual behaviour and suggested various models of decision-making from diverse 
perspectives ranging from, for instance, utility-based decision models and behavioural 
economics, technology adoption theory and attitude-based decision-making, social 
and environmental psychology, and social construction of decision-making (Wilson 
and Dowlatabadi, 2007). However, few studies have been made of how farmers make 
decisions (Ohlmer et al., 1998).  
 
In the literature on how farmers make decisions, the decision-making process has 
traditionally been viewed as a linear series of stages, a list of five to eight decision-
making steps (Bradford and Johnson, 1958; Johnson et al., 1961; Castle et al., 1972; 
Boehlje and Eidman, 1984, Castle et al., 1987; Kay and Edwards, 1994). Johnson et 
al. (1961), for example, identified six steps of decision-making, namely problem 
definition, observation, analysis, decision, action, and responsibility bearing. Steps 
not listed explicitly by Johnson et al. (1961) but listed by others include setting goals, 
monitoring, and evaluating outcomes. It was implied that these steps followed 
sequentially for every decision; however, researchers (Witte, 1972; Johnson 1976; 
Mintzberg et al., 1983; Johnson, 1986; Johnson, 1994) have found that farmers do not 
follow the decision-making process sequentially. Based on the insight that farmers 
should not be expected to follow a common set of steps in any simple, sequential 
process, Ohlmer et al. (1998) developed eight elements of decision-making at the 
farm level, which are: values and goals; problem detection; problem definition; 
observation; analysis; development of intention; implementation; and responsibility 
bearing (see Figure 3.2). These eight elements may or may not be sequential and 
should be viewed as separate actions. Each element may be part of an individual 
decision, but every element is not required to be part of every decision. 
 43 
This research has therefore adapted the conceptual model of farmers’ decision-
making process developed by Ohlmer et al.(1998) as a tool for understanding the 
farmers’ decisions to adopt oil palm cultivation, particularly in the Thai context. This 
decision-making model was chosen because it includes farmers’ values and goals, 
which is essential to understanding farmers’ behaviour in moving towards oil palm 
cultivation. A Theory of Human Need (THN) developed by Doyal and Gough (1991) 
was employed to elaborate farmers’ needs in the values and goals element and to 
investigate whether oil palm adoption was in fact meeting their needs. Although 
Ohlmer et al. (1998) has proposed a revised model of decision-making, which is 
viewed as a matrix of four phases (problem detection, problem definition, analysis 
and choice, and implementation) and four sub-processes (searching and paying 
attention, planning, evaluating and choosing, and checking the choice), reflecting the 
non-linear process of making decisions. The farmers’ values and goals are not listed 
in this revised model as they should be understood to have been developed before the 
start of any decision-making processes. Because values and goals are essential to 
comprehending the factors shaping farmers’ decisions to plant oil palms, I chose to 
adapt the traditional eight elements of decision-making to comprehend the oil palm 
issues in Nong Khai province.  
 
The values and goals element is the first of the eight elements of farmers’ decision-
making to be explored. Values and goals can significantly affect farmers’ decision-
making. Values signify the goodness and badness of results, situation, and things, and 
express the farmers’ needs. Goals are things for which farmers have decided to strive 
and are a means for the farmers to follow their values. In this element, I have given 
priority to understanding the farmers’ needs by analysing them through the lens of 
THN. According to Doyal and Gough (1991), “physical health and autonomy are the 
two basic needs for all human beings and if these two are not satisfied, individuals 
will suffer serious harm, which significantly impairs the achievement of their goals 
(page 73)”.  
 
According to THN, these basic needs are not satisfied directly, but are met through 
the satisfaction of eleven intermediate needs, which are met in different societies via 
locally determined specific needs satisfiers. The eleven intermediate needs are food 
and water; housing; a non-hazardous work environment; a non-hazardous physical 
environment; health care; security in childhood; significant primary relationships; 
economic security; physical security; education; and safe birth and child-bearing. 
When individuals’ basic needs are met, according to THN, it enables them to 
participate more fully in social life. For example, when individuals are in good health, 
they can perform cultural activities such as “tum boon” (paying respect to the Buddha 
by giving donations to the temple) or “fung ted” (listening to monks preach).When 
people are autonomous they are in control of what they believe to be in their interest. 
Certainly, planting oil palm is one of the farmers’ aims and strategies in the case 
study.  
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In this respect, this element aims to investigate the eleven intermediate needs or 
“needs satisfiers” of the farmers in relation to oil palm adoption in Nong Khai 
province, in order to understand their needs in choosing to cultivate oil palms. After 
understanding the farmers’ needs, there are two key questions to be investigated: what 
other factors (for instance, what kind of personal histories and belief systems) shape 
the farmers’ decision to adopt the oil palm? And what are the consequences after oil 
palm adoption? Are the farmers’ needs met? The second to sixth elements will be 
adapted to answer the former question, whilst the seventh and eighth elements aim to 
address the latter.  
 
Problem detection is the second element. According to Ohlmer et al. (1998), it 
involves examining both internal and external data to become aware of a problem or 
opportunity. The word “detection” is used instead of “recognition” as one must detect 
a problem before one can recognise it. Problem detection is essential for the farmers 
to be motivated to engage in the decision-making process. Thus, in this research this 
element focuses on the farmers’ perception of rice cultivation, as every household 
interviewed was or had previously been involved in the paddy fields; rice cultivation 
was a crucial activity that significantly affected the farmers’ decision about oil palm 
adoption.  
 
Problem definition is the third element. Problem definition is typically the process of 
stating the problems, searching for options, and then identifying alternative actions in 
order to solve the problems. Having used the previous elements to understand the 
farmers’ needs and their problems, I have adapted this element to understand the 
reasons why the farmers choose oil palm cultivation rather than other possible crops 
such as eucalyptus, cassava or rubber. The options are evaluated in terms of their 
compatibility with the farmers’ morals, values, beliefs and goals. 
 
The fourth element is observation, which involves collecting and processing 
information about the options favoured by the farmers, such as the information 
required to plan the actions, and information about the consequences of the actions. 
Because specific knowledge and a significant amount of capital are required to grow 
the crop successfully, the research uses this element to examine the farmers’ sources 
of knowledge about oil palm cultivation and of funding for it. This element connects 
the oil palm farmers with key actors in the research, for example, the local 
government agencies for providing knowledge, or Nong Khai Oil Palm Research 
Centre (NKO) for providing financial support to the oil palm farmers. This element 
also discusses the differences in the knowledge acquired by and sources of funding 
available to the oil palm farmers in the three villages in the study.  
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The next element is analysis, which typically involves planning actions, estimating 
consequences, evaluating, and opting for actions. However, this element is adapted to 
highlight the key factors affecting the farmers’ decision in choosing to adopt oil palm 
cultivation. In order to understand the oil palm issues in Nong Khai province from a 
different perspective, the final section of this element is devoted to the analysis of rice 
farmers who have not yet adopted oil palm cultivation, using another set of evidence 
from 18 households in the three villages.  
 
Development of intention, the sixth element, is about deciding to implement the 
actions selected based on social norms, personal norms, habit and direct influence of 
the situation. The choice having been made, through the factors discussed in the 
previous five elements, to move to oil palm cultivation does not guarantee 
implementation. Thus, this element is adapted to understand the farmers’ view of oil 
palm cultivation based on personal norms and habits. This element examines whether 
oil palm planting is suited to the farmers’ lifestyle and in what ways.  
 
Next is the implementation element, which typically involves acquiring resources, 
putting the selected plan into action, controlling the results and evaluating them. 
However, this thesis focuses on evaluating the socio-economic aspects of the farmers’ 
situation after the implementation of oil palm cultivation in the study areas. In social 
terms, the changes to the farmers’ ways of life as a result of oil palm adoption will be 
investigated, whilst in economic terms, the farmers’ financial situation after adopting 
oil palm production will be examined and explanations given of both troubled and 
thriving households.  
 
The last element is responsibility bearing, which is about accepting the evaluation 
after implementation, and realising who is responsible for the decision-making. This 
element is used to discuss the consequences of oil palm adoption in terms of the 
farmers’ satisfaction with the oil palm crop in relation to their needs as discussed in 
the first element. This will be analysed at two different stages of growing: households 
who have started harvesting, and those waiting to harvest for the first time. Problems 
related to the growing of oil palm will also be highlighted.  
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3.1.2 Policy Processes Approaches 
 
The adaptation of the concept of eight elements of farmers’ decision-making provided 
us with an understanding of the transition to oil palm from the farmers’ perspective. 
However, this study found that the oil palm expansion policy, which is currently 
under the direction of the 5-year Oil Palm Industry and Palm Oil Development Plan 
(2008-2012) (MOAC, 2008) and the 15-year Alternative Energy Development Plan 
(2008-2022) (DEDE, 2008), was a crucial factor affecting the farmers’ change to the 
oil palm adoption. Hence it is necessary to develop a framework for policy analysis 
that allows us to understand the transition to oil palm farming specifically in the Thai 
context. This sub-section then presents the analytical framework of IDS KNOTS team 
that was used in analysing oil palm expansion policy and explains how they were 
developed and applied to the research. We will begin by briefly considering the 
literature on the approaches to policy processes. 
 
In fact, there is a large amount of literature and a long-running debate on how to 
understand policy processes, which can be characterised into two main perspectives: 
rationalist and political. The rationalist believes that science is sufficiently well 
developed and should be applied to policy-making processes so that the most rational 
policy positions are adopted. Thus, the rationalist approach suggests that a linear 
policy-making process, in which rational decisions are taken by those with authority 
and responsibility for a particular policy area, should underpin policy making. In 
other words, the rationalist views policy-making as a technocratic, top-down, 
problem-solving process, which involves a number of stages that lead to a policy 
decision (Sabatier, 1986; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996; 
Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Sutton, 1999; Blaikie and Soussan, 2001; Pasteur, 2001). 
Within the linear model, decisions are made rationally through each logical stage of 
the process, starting from understanding the policy issue or problem (agenda-setting), 
exploring possible options for resolving the problem, weighing up the costs and 
benefits of each option, making a rational choice about the best option (decision-
making), implementing the policy, and ending, possibly, with evaluating the outcome 
(KNOTS, 2006).  
 
In the linear approach, it is assumed that there is a clear separation between 
policymaking and policy implementation. As defined by Lampton (1987: 5), policy 
implementation is “the stage between the high politics of policy formulation and 
feedback once the effects of policies become apparent”. The linear model treats 
implementation as separate activity that occurs after policy decisions have been made. 
In this model, the implementation is viewed as administrative activity meant to 
resolve the problem as understood in the policy. The dichotomy between policy-
making and implementation is a major fault in the linear model because policies often 
change as they move through bureaucracies to the local level where they are 
implemented (Juma and Clark, 1995).  
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The main consequence of the separation between policy-making and implementation 
is the possibility that policy-makers will avoid taking responsibility. This is because it 
dangerously separates the decision from the implementation and hence opens up 
“escape hatches” through which policy-makers can shirk responsibility (Clay and 
Schaffer, 1984). Failure to achieve the intended results is often not blamed on the 
policy itself, but on, for instance, unsuccessful management of and commitment to 
implementation, weak institutional capacity, shortage of resources, or a lack of 
political will (Clay and Schaffer, 1984; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; Juma and Clark, 
1995; Brinkerhoff, 1996). 
 
This traditional model of policy-making assumes that policy-makers approach the 
issues rationally, going through each logical stage of the process and prudently 
considering all relevant information. Also, there is an apparent separation of facts (a 
rational policy approach, based on evidence, sciences, and objective knowledge) and 
value (seen as a separate issue, dealt with in the political processes). Policy-making is 
a bureaucratic or administrative exercise, in which implementation is an entirely 
technical or administrative procedure (realm of facts), whilst decision-making is 
indivisible from politics (realm of value). Scientific expertise is presumed to be 
independent and objective, and the role of technocrats is viewed as crucial to the 
process of making rational decisions (Wolmer and Scoones, 2005; KNOTS, 2006).  
 
On the other side, the political view argues that science can rarely provide a definitive 
answer to any policy choices. The act of policy-making is fundamentally political, 
and the traditional model of policy processes cannot adequately and accurately reflect 
the complexity of the reality (Parson, 1995; Hill, 1997, Brock et al., 2001). To allow 
technical experts to take a key role in policy decision-making is to foster technocracy, 
which stands in opposition to democracy. Policy is, in fact, an astonishingly slippery 
word and difficult to define as Keeley and Scoones (1999: 3) have pointed out: 
“policy is rather like an elephant: you know it when you see it, but you cannot easily 
define it”. In this political approach, policy-making must be understood as a complex 
and messy process, by which policy is formulated and implemented, and involving a 
range of actors. Policy-making processes are by no means the purely technical, 
rational activity that they are often held up to be, but are incremental, complex and 
messy as Lindblom (1959; 1979) has pointed out on his classic works: policy-making 
is the science of muddling through. 
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The political view also highlights the importance of policy implementation, which 
should not be divorced from policy processes as “implementation always makes or 
changes policy to some degree” (Lindblom, 1980; 65). Indeed, implementation itself 
can be intensely political (Grindle, 1980; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Crosby, 1996; 
Sutton, 1999; Little, 2008), is greatly complex, and is shaped by both “the content of 
the policy (in terms of interests affected, the types of benefits expected, the extent of 
change envisioned, sites of decision-making, the number and type of programme 
implementers and resource committed) and the context of implementation (power, 
interests and strategies of actors involved, institution and regime characteristics, 
compliance and responsiveness)” (Little, 2008: 16). Implementation is an interactive, 
non-linear process that needs to be managed through, for instance, consensus 
building, stakeholder participation, and resource mobilization (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991).  
 
Another theme that is worth emphasising in this political approach is the importance 
of context and policy history. Policy processes are influenced to a large degree by 
local context (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Indeed, the social, economic, political, and 
governance contexts can significantly affect policy-making and implementation 
(Fisher and Forester, 1993; Blaikie and Soussan, 2001). As Keeley and Scoones 
(2000: 90) underline, in order to understand the policy processes, “the interplay 
between context specific circumstances and the changing effectiveness of different 
networks of actors in the policy debate” is essential. Moreover, path dependency is 
critical to understand policy-making and change. As suggested by Blaikie and 
Soussan(2001), path dependency includes, for instance, “policy heritage” (past 
policies that have been important in defining the present policy processes), important 
conferences, key events that catalysed policy change, publication of rules, influential 
evaluations and public responses.  
 
The political approach also tends towards a more bottom-up view of policy-making 
by highlighting the importance of the issues of empowerment and people’s 
participation, with a wide range of actors being able to influence the policy processes 
(Ostrom, 1990; Long and Long, 1992; Shankland, 2000; Blaikie and Soussan, 2001). 
Nonetheless, there is no final conclusion nor unified understanding of the policy 
processes, which often vary depending on the sphere of the policy-making across the 
context-specific political system (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992).  
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In this study, I applied the framework of the Knowledge, Technology and Society 
(KNOTS) team of IDS, which builds on the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999, 
2001; 2003) to understand the policy processes concerned with oil palm adoption in 
Nong Khai province as these works offered a novel perspective on policy processes 
and thus set out a distinctive framework for policy analysis. The IDS KNOTS team’s 
framework was developed from extensive reviews of the literature on the policy 
processes which revealed three broad approaches to understanding policy-making, 
rooted in different schools and disciplines. The first highlights political economy and 
the interactions of state and civil society and different interest groups, whilst the 
second examines the role and agency of individual actors. The last considers the 
histories and practices linked to shifting discourses, and how these shape policy 
problems and courses of actions. The attempt to integrate these different, but 
overlapping, perspectives into a simple framework led to the IDS KNOTS team’s 
framework (Keeley, 2001). 
 
In essence, the IDS KNOTS team’s framework suggests that policy processes can best 
be understood using three interconnected themes: knowledge and discourse (What is 
the policy narrative? And how is it framed?), actors and networks (Who is involved 
and how are they related?), and politics and interests (What are the power dynamics 
involved? (KNOTS, 2006). The diagram can be seen in the Figure 3.3 below.  
 
Figure 3.3: IDS KNOTS Team’s Framework to Understand Policy Processes 
 
 
Source: KNOTS (2006) 
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Understanding these three influences on policy enables us to address questions such 
as how do policies get created and by whom? Whose voices and views are taken into 
account in the policy processes? How are boundaries drawn around problems and 
policy storyline elaborated as well as the networks associated with them? What is 
included and excluded (often the perspectives of the farmers and marginalised people) 
from consideration? And how, when, and due to what influences do policies change? 
Each theme comes from different intellectual traditions, yet each offers particular and 
valuable insights. Understanding the policy processes, therefore, comes as a result of 
looking at the intersection of the three overlapping themes. Using the IDS KNOTS 
team’s perspective on the policy processes, each theme and the policy space can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 
Policy Narratives 
Policy narratives, in other words “received wisdoms”, are stories with a beginning, 
middle, and end that explain events, or define the world in certain ways, and so shape 
policy decisions. Indeed, policy narratives have a capacity for persistence which 
cannot be overturned by simply presenting them as fallacious in a particular instance, 
but only by providing a superior and more convincing story (Kaplan, 1990; Roe, 
1991; Roe, 1994). These storylines define a problem, describe how it comes about, 
and show what needs to be done to prevent disaster or bring about a favourable 
conclusion. In other words, they aim to explain what is wrong and how it must be put 
right. Policy milestones and implementation are included in this theme in order to 
understand the oil palm policy in Thailand’s context. As suggested by Keeley (2001), 
policy narratives involve sets of questions: what are the narratives and the basic 
problems being addressed? (How is it to be framed?) Whose interests and 
perspectives are included and excluded? And how could this be reframed? These 
questions are addressed and analysed in the policy processes analysis chapter 
(Chapter 5).   
 
 
Actors and Networks 
Networks, coalitions and alliances of actors (individuals or institutions) with a shared 
vision or similar beliefs are essential in spreading and maintaining narratives through 
chains of persuasion and influence, such as conferences, education or informal 
introductions. Through the actor-networks, “norms of good and bad practice are 
reinforced, research agendas are set, and orthodoxies or conventional wisdoms are 
reiterated and, very often, dissenting opinions or unconventional views are 
suppressed” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 20).  
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Importantly, the actor-networks are not exclusively restricted to state institutions. 
Instead, they link the government and civil service with the private sector, donors, and 
actors in civil society: for instance, local scholars and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Hence, the existence of actor-networks can make for pluralist policy-making 
concerning a range of different stakeholder/actors. Processes of negotiating and 
bargaining between interest groups are at the centre of policy-making. Networks can 
significantly change narratives as well as reinforce them, as they bring together 
people who strategise and exchange ideas. On this theme, we address the questions of 
who is inside and outside a policy network? How do people or institutions become 
enrolled into a network? How do ideas circulate through a network? What are core 
beliefs? And where is the network weak, and where is it strong? 
 
 
Politics and Interests 
Certainly, policy is intrinsically political and contested, and more incremental and 
haphazard than is suggested by the conventional view of it, in which facts and values 
are separated. Politics shape policy processes in several vital ways. Firstly, differing 
political contexts can affect policy-making. Different interests of particular regimes 
and authorities seeking to remain in power can impose different constraints on what is 
achievable. Certain strategies that look promising within a democratic setting, and 
with an active civil society, are not possible elsewhere. Competition exists between 
groups in society, based on their differing interests with regard to, for instance, 
allocation of resources, or social concerns. Indeed, politics could influence policy 
processes to suit the interests of particular regime, especially when Thailand’s politics 
have been sharply polarised ever since the military coup in September 2006. Thus, 
this section of analysis discusses the Thai politics, and how they shaped the oil palm 
policy processes.  
 
Secondly, policy processes are influenced by a range of interest groups that exercise 
power and authority over policy-making at every stage. The vested interests of 
various actors in the network, such as influential private companies or independent 
experts, might be served by the perpetuation of certain narratives. Because policy-
makers sometimes make important policy decisions before soliciting expert advice, 
and then seek to obtain spurious scientific support for those decisions, there are strong 
vested interests in playing down uncertainty and portraying risk as insignificant. 
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Thirdly, technical or scientific language, which emphasises rationality and objectivity, 
is always in some ways political. In other words, the political nature of policy is 
hidden by the use of these types of language. Lastly, bureaucrats are not just neutral 
executors of policy. On the contrary, they have their own personal and political 
agendas to negotiate. Bureaucratic politics are relevant - for instance, battles within 
ministries for control over policy arenas. Hence, the research, on this theme, deals 
with the questions: who is engaged in the policy processes? How many stakeholders 
are involved in the issue? Are there clear vested interests in the policy arena? Are the 
processes essentially inside or outside a bureaucracy? How much capacity exists 
within the bureaucracy to reflect on policy aims and implementation? What types of 
informal relationships occur within ministries or departments? And what “policy 
space” is there for pressing for different ways of doing things? 
 
 
Policy Space 
Identifying the policy space of an issue involves bringing together the three themes 
set out above. Influencing policy is entirely about identifying moments for change. 
According to KNOTS (2006: 13), the idea of policy space “relates to the extent to 
which a policy-maker is restricted in decision-making by forces such as the opinions 
of a dominant actor network or narrative”. Often there appears to be very little 
flexibility in policy processes, where the governance setting may offer little room to 
manoeuvre in terms of either demands for inclusion or facilitation of voices from 
local grassroots. Decision makers may not have much room to consider wider sets of 
options if particular actor-networks associated with dominant perceptions and 
interests seem to be firmly entrenched.  
 
Definitely, understanding policy processes by examining knowledge and narratives, 
actors and networks, and politics and interests can be of help in recognising policy 
spaces. These often include spaces within the networks, for example, capacity for new 
actors to join a network, or the opportunity for a key actor in one network to be 
enrolled into another network. This thesis aims to identify and make use of policy 
spaces in order to push for change in the oil palm issues, based on the six types of 
spaces proposed by Wolmer and Scoones (2005): invited spaces (discussion on policy 
led by government agencies, involving selective participation of stakeholders), 
popular spaces (demonstrations led by social movements, putting pressure on formal 
policy-making), practical spaces (pilot projects initiated by interest groups, giving 
policy-makers the opportunity to observe and monitor them), bureaucratic spaces 
(formal policy-making spaces within the government system, led by government 
officers with selected input from external experts), electoral spaces (formal 
participation in the electoral system, allowing voting on the policy positions of 
competing candidates), and conceptual spaces (spaces where new ideas are introduced 
into debates and circulated through a range of media). 
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However, the research also adopted a salient concept in the work of Majone (1989), 
who argues that policy processes should be understood in terms of three main 
elements: evidence, argument and persuasion. He suggests that policy is not made 
solely on the basis of evidence, but evidence is an important concept for the adoption 
of policy. Evidence in this context is not similar to data or information, “it is 
information selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in the 
argument in order to persuade a particular audience of a truth or falsity of a 
statement” (Majone 1989: 10). If its strengths and appropriateness are wrongly 
assessed, its inclusion might weaken the argument and damage attempts to reach a 
conclusion. He further argues that policy is made on the basis of constructing 
arguments, which often start from opinions, values, and contestable points of view, 
combined with factual statements, interpretations and subjective evaluations. Joining 
the evidence and argument together in order to convince the public, including the key 
actors in the society, to adopt a particular course of action is what he terms 
persuasion. It is worth noting that this thesis uses the salience of these three concepts 
(evidence, argument, and persuasion) in analysing oil palm policy processes in the 
policy narratives theme of the IDS KNOTS team’s framework. 
 
3.1.3 Summary of the Analytical Framework for this Research  
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, in order to accommodate insights from the fieldwork and to 
guide the analysis and the research designs, this thesis proposes an analytical 
framework which incorporates two main theoretical approaches, namely the eight 
elements of farmers’ decision-making, and the IDS KNOTS team’s policy processes 
framework. At the centre of the diagram is the change towards oil palm adoption of 
the farmers in Nong Khai province. Although previously oil palm was not typically 
grown in the Northeast of Thailand, the number of oil palm plantations in the region 
has risen significantly from none in 2005 to 46,739 rais in 2009, in which 21,897 rais 
were concentrated in Nong Khai province (OAE, 2009). From my experience in the 
field sites, I believe that the actual figures for oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai 
province were higher than central government suggested, as there were numerous oil 
palm farmers interviewed who were never registered in the government’s oil palm 
database.  
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The left circle of the diagram was developed to understand the farmers’ decision in 
relation to changing over to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province through the 
adaptation of the eight elements of the farmers’ decision-making model. Using the 
eight elements of farmers’ decision-making and the THN as analytical tools to 
understand the oil palm issues, Chapter 4 will examine the values and needs of the oil 
palm farmers, problems regarding rice production, choices between optional crops, 
knowledge and funding of the oil palm crop, factors which influence oil palm 
adoption, personal norms and habits in relation to oil palm cultivation, the socio-
economic outcomes of oil palm adoption with regard to the farmers’ values, and the 
farmers’ satisfaction with the oil palm crop.  
 
Farmers in Nong Khai province have been harvesting oil palm crops since the 
government promoted oil palm planting in the region in 2005. Rice farmers, who can 
be found in all areas in the Northeast region, have become interested in potentially 
planting oil palm in various areas in the province. Although oil palm expansion policy 
is currently following the direction of the 5-year Oil Palm Industry and Palm Oil 
Development Plan (2008-2012) (MOAC, 2008) and the 15-year Alternative Energy 
Development Plan (2008-2022) (DEDE, 2008) set by MOAC and MOEN 
respectively, the oil palm issues in Nong Khai province date back to May 2005 when 
the cabinet approved the action plan for the development and support of biodiesel. 
The right circle of the diagram was developed to address oil palm policy issues.  
 
As there were various factors affecting the farmers’ decisions to adopt oil palm 
cultivation (discussed in the Chapter 4) and oil palm expansion policy was one of 
them, the right circle of the diagram, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5, 
analyses the oil palm policy processes in the Nong Khai province using the IDS 
KNOTS team’s policy processes framework. The analysis is divided into three themes 
according to the IDS KNOTS team’s framework, which are discourse/narratives, 
actors/networks, and politics/interests. Policy space is then identified through the 
examination of these three themes in order to make use of it for promoting different 
ways of doing things in oil palm production. Majone’s concept of evidence, argument 
and persuasion is also utilised mainly in the discourse/narratives section.  
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3.2 Choice of Methodology and Research Question 
 
The analytical framework for the research described in the previous section 
influenced my choice of methodology for the study and the design of the research (see 
also Section 3.3).  Firstly I will explain why the qualitative research methodology was 
applied to this research. According to Kanbur (2001), there are various debates 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research. 
Perhaps the most notable distinction between the two is that the quantitative method 
implies the use of numbers, which can be more easily aggregated, but it can hide the 
texture or in-depth detail that can be derived from qualitative research. It is useful to 
reflect briefly on the nature of these two approaches to better understand them before 
moving on to my choice of methodology. 
 
From an epistemological point of view, quantitative research is linked with positivism 
and thus seeks to apply a natural scientific model to study social reality. Much 
emphasis is therefore placed on understanding reality as an objective and external 
phenomenon which is observable. From the observations, theories and hypotheses are 
generated or refuted. In contrast, qualitative approaches are usually linked with an 
interpretive position. Interpretivism rejects the link between natural and social 
sciences, and argues that the most appropriate way to understand the social world is 
through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants, using 
specific research techniques such as “participant observation”, “ethnography”, and 
“qualitative interviewing” (Bryman, 2008). According to Geertz (1973), the task of 
the social researcher is to get as close as possible to the reality where individuals 
interpret the world through their own experiences. In other words, the research 
methods used in social sciences can approximate reality, but this is not absolute 
reality. What is called “reality” in social sciences, according to Geertz (1973), has 
been constructed through the interrelations of human action. 
 
Although qualitative research has been much criticized for being too impressionistic 
and subjective, difficult to replicate, restricted in the scope of its findings, and lacking 
transparency, I chose to adopt the qualitative approach because the focus of the 
research was on understanding the social and political context of oil palm farmers in 
the villages, rather than on generating a model as a means to test a theory. In order to 
gain data relating to the farmers’ lives and attitudes, such as their reasons for starting 
to grow oil palms, it was important to apply research methods that were geared 
towards tackling issues of a subjective nature. As such, this study did not approach 
the oil palm issues by proving or rejecting constructed hypotheses, but rather by 
allowing the data to dictate the method of the research. 
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Thus, the two types of social research methodology used in the study are purposive 
sampling (Coleman, 1958; Patton, 1990; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004; Bryman, 
2008) and qualitative interviewing (May, 2001; Bryman, 2008). This research did not 
seek to sample the cases on a random basis, but to sample the research sites and 
participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled were relevant to the research 
question and sub-questions. Because purposive sampling is a non-probability 
sampling approach that does not allow the researcher to generalise to a population, 
research sites and people within the sites were selected for their relevance to 
understanding a social phenomenon: oil palm adoption. The snowballing technique 
was also used to identify key actors in the thesis as it allowed me to make initial 
contact with a small group of people who were relevant to the research topic, and use 
their knowledge of the community to establish contacts with others. The selection of 
research sites and participants is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.  
 
The type of qualitative interviewing that was used in the research is a semi-structured 
interview, which was applied to all the interviews carried out. This style of interview 
was chosen because it allowed me to direct the structure of the interview whilst at the 
same time maintaining a degree of flexibility to react to the interviewees’ answers and 
pose further questions in response. In contrast to the structured interview used in 
quantitative research, the semi-structured interview takes greater account of the 
interviewees’ point of view and thus provides insights into how research participants 
view the world, through their rich and detailed answers. These characteristics of the 
approach were well suited to the nature of this research into oil palm adoption. At the 
field site, I had an interview guide consisting of a list of questions, which can be seen 
in Appendix E, to direct the interviews towards the focus of the research as well as to 
help the questioning to flow reasonably well. However, when the interviews took 
place the questions did not follow on exactly as outlined in the interview guide. In 
fact, the order of questions changed in many of the actual interviews. I was able to ask 
unplanned questions when an interviewee made an interesting point that could be 
related to the research topic. By and large, all the questions in the interview guide 
were asked with similar wording from interviewee to interviewee.  
 
At first, I planned to use a tool called Net-Map in the research to map the local and 
national actors involved in planting oil palm at the field sites in order to understand 
their relationships, the power/influence of the actors in the network, and the goals and 
interests of these different actors. Essentially, Net-Map is an empirical research tool 
that merges characteristics of the two existing methods, namely social network 
analysis (Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988; Scott, 1991; Hanneman, 2003) and the 
power mapping tool (Schiffer, 2005; Schiffer, 2007).  
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Social network analysis or network mapping is a set of relationships mapped between 
key actors. The actors are represented as nodes and their interactions are represented 
as links, with the aim of understanding the social and political situation by focusing 
on both formal and informal structures. The characteristics of actors such as their 
power/influence and goals are given less attention. That is to say the power/influence 
of actors is only explained by the positions of the actors in the network, for example, 
their closeness, betweenness, and centrality. Power mapping, on the other hand, is 
good for collecting data about the perceived power of various actors within a policy 
field. By bridging these two methods, Net-Map creates a three-dimensional structure 
in which interviewees and interviewers together draw a network map of the actors 
involved in the issue, including the different kinds of links between the actors. Then 
influence towers are added to the network in order to transfer abstract concepts of 
power/influence into the three-dimensional form. Finally, the interviewees are asked 
to assess the goals that these different actors pursue (Schiffer and Waale, 2008).  
 
However, my experience in the field suggested that there were not many stakeholders 
involved in oil palm adoption issues in the three villages: a total of 15 key actors, 
which included government agencies, private seedlings suppliers, private merchants, 
large-scale oil palm producers, inspirational local leaders, and large-scale palm oil 
refinery in Chonburi province. Thus, their networks and influences could be mapped 
and understood individually through the semi-structured interview. Difficulty in 
gathering the oil palm farmers together was another constraint on the application of 
this research method. I had made several attempts to assemble the oil palm farmers in 
Baan Tarn village, but failed for various reasons, such as the workload in the rice 
paddy fields, the necessity for them to be at social events such as ‘tum boon’ at the 
temple or attending an ordination ceremony, and unavailability in the morning due to 
harvesting rubber at night. When I asked if it would be possible to gather the oil palm 
farmers at a place in the village, the head of Baan Tarn village responded, “Can they 
be rice farmers instead? Rice farmers are a lot easier to find and make a group. We 
have plenty of them around here, every household. Oil palm farmers, we have like 10 
to 15 households in each village around this area. Difficult. Very difficult.”  
 
Returning to the focus of this thesis, the research process started with finding a 
general research question and sub-questions, which came about from reading relevant 
literature reviews as described in Chapters 2, and discussing ideas with my 
supervisors. Based on the insights obtained from the fieldwork and a discussion with 
the supervisors on developing the research’s analytical framework, the research 
question and sub-questions were specified more tightly. The resulting main research 
question for this thesis, and its three sub-questions, are outlined below.  
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The Main Research Question 
- What are the critical factors shaping the change towards oil palm adoption 
of small-scale farmers in Nong Khai province (in the Northeast region of 
Thailand), and what are the implications for Thailand’s oil palm policy 
development? 
 
  
The Two Sub-questions 
- What are the key factors affecting the farmers’ decision to adopt or not to 
adopt the oil palm cultivation? 
 
- What is the rationale of the oil palm policy and how is it implemented? 
 
3.3 Research Sites and Sampling Selection 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the Southern and Eastern regions of Thailand, 
the number of oil palm plantations in the Northeast region has been growing. The 
majority of oil palm plantations are concentrated in the areas of Nong Khai, Loei, 
Amnat Charoen, Ubon Ratchathani, Mukdahan, and Sisaket provinces. Nong Khai 
province was chosen to be a research site because Nong Khai was considered to be 
one of the most suitable areas in terms of climatic and soil conditions for oil palm 
cultivation in the Northeast region and also the ideal place to build up understanding 
of food and energy trade-offs: Nong Khai was formerly one of the major rice 
producers in the Northeast, in which 64 percent of the total cultivated land in the 
province was devoted to rice paddy fields (OAE, 2010a).  
 
According to data from the Northeastern Region Economic and Social Development 
Office (NESO) (2009), Phon Phisai district ranked third amongst the 17 districts in 
Nong Khai province in terms of the area devoted to oil palm plantations at 4,319 rais 
in 2008, whilst Bueng Kan and Seka districts were first and second, at 7,185 and 
6,276 rais respectively. From an informal email discussion with the director of NESO, 
I learned that a significant number of small-scale oil palm farmers were concentrated 
in Phon Phisai district. In addition, Phon Phisai had been chosen by the local 
government to be a pilot site for oil palm cultivation and the policy of oil palm 
production had been actively promoted in the district. Taking these facts into 
consideration, I decided to investigate the oil palm issues and compare similarities 
and differences in the networks between the oil palm farmers and the key actors in the 
areas of Phon Phisai district. However, it is worth noting that it was extremely 
difficult to find comparable planted areas of oil palm and numbers of oil palm 
households/farmers at district, sub-district, and village levels, and the statistics could 
vary widely across different local government agencies. For example, the areas 
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growing oil palm in Phon Phisai district could range from 799 rais to 4,319 rais in the 
same year according to different sources of data.  
 
In accordance with the research plan, the sampling selection started with accepting the 
three sub-districts in Phon Phisai district that had the largest area of oil palm 
cultivated land, using information obtained during the actual fieldwork from the 
government sector, for instance, Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO), 
Department of Agriculture (DOA), Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), and 
(Phon Phaisai Agricultural Extension Office (PAE). Four categories of farmers were 
subsequently chosen for each sub-district. The first category concerned the small-
scale oil palm farmers who were previously rice producers and then turned the lands 
over completely to oil palm growing. Data from the NESDB (2009a), which 
suggested that the small-scale oil palm farmers accounted for 80 percent of the total 
number of oil palm farmers in Thailand, with an average of 30 to 40 rais planted per 
household. Based on this, the small-scale oil palm farmer in this research was defined 
asa household that occupied less than 50 rais of oil palms. The next two categories 
were small-scale farmers growing both rice and oil palms. The second category 
included oil palm farmers who planted oil palm on more than 50 percent of their land. 
The third was oil palm farmers with less than 50 percent of their land devoted to oil 
palms. Small-scale rice producers were the final selection, because they allowed me 
to examine reasons for not adopting oil palm cultivation.  
 
Each category consisted of a sample of five households. Each category included at 
least one household headed by a female, in order to explore whether there were any 
differences between male and female-headed households in shaping the farmers’ 
decisions to adopt the oil palm cultivation. At this stage, there would be 60 
interviewees from the three sub-districts to be included in the research. Other key 
actors relating to the change towards oil palm adoption in each sub-district would be 
identified through the snowball sampling technique. The before-fieldwork sampling 
selection and sample size are summarised in the Table 3.1 below. 
 
During the actual fieldwork, it is normal for a researcher to discover that their 
research does not always proceed sequentially or as expected. The possibility of 
change and emergence of new ideas are a normal occurrence in research and this 
thesis is no exception. Although I tried to ensure that the research objective did not 
deviate from the original research plan, which focused on understanding the decision-
making of small-scale farmers in adopting the oil palm cultivation and the impact of 
oil palm policy, during the first and second field visits in Nong Khai province some 
changes were made regarding the research sites, sampling selection, and sample size.      
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Evidence from several interviews with the oil palm farmers in Jumpon, Kud Bong, 
and Baan Pho sub-districts in Phon Phisai district has shown that there were no 
significant differences in the oil palm issues between these three areas. For example, 
the oil palm farmers in these sub-districts acquired the oil palm seedlings and 
knowledge from the same source, and named the same private buyer, inspirational 
local scholar, and large-scale oil palm producer. The history of oil palm farming in 
the sub districts and the attitude of the farmers were also similar.  
 
After a discussion with the key persons at NKO and PAE using the local data, they 
reckoned that there were a significant number of small-scale oil palm growers in other 
districts in Nong Khai province apart from Phon Phisai, namely So Phisai, Seka, and 
Bueng Kan districts. I therefore decided that including these three districts in the 
research would better represent the holistic view of the change to oil palm cultivation 
in Nong Khai province. It also offered an opportunity to compare similarities and 
differences and to comprehend the different perspectives of the oil palm question in 
different geographical areas in Nong Khai province. However, an in-depth interview 
in qualitative research is a time-consuming process, taking me approximately 50 
minutes to 1 hour per interview in the actual fieldwork. As a student, I had limited 
time and budget, which forced me to omit one district from the research. Bueng Kan 
district was excluded due to the difficulties in transport to the area and a possibility of 
flash floods from the Mekong River during the fieldwork period. Hence the research 
sites then changed from being concentrated merely in Phon Phisai district to being 
distributed across three districts, namely Phon Phisai, So Phisai, and Seka. 
 
The fieldwork experience led me to think about focusing the interviewing on a village 
by village basis. In doing that the number of key actors and networks would be better 
organised and thus allow me to compare similarities and differences between the 
villages. One village was then chosen in each district, based on a discussion with and 
data obtained from NKO, PAE, So Phisai Agricultural Extension Office (SPAE), and 
Seka Agricultural Extension Office (SAE), and some suggestions from local people 
around the research sites. Factors that were used in selecting the villages included the 
estimated number of small-scale oil palm farmers, the co-operation of the village 
headman and villagers, and accessibility of transportation. The villages’ real names 
have been altered, so that the respondents in the research remain anonymous (see 
Section 3.6 for a discussion on ethical issues). The following fictitious names have 
been given to the selected three villages, which were: 
 
1) Baan Tarn for a village in Phon Phisai district, 
2) Baan Sa Ard for a village in So Phisai district, and 
3) Baan Hat for a village in Seka district.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of Sampling Selection and the Sample Size in the Research Plan 
 
Case 
Small-Scale Oil 
Palm Farmers 
(Completely 
Switched from 
Rice Cultivation) 
Small-Scale Farmers Who Adopted 
Both Rice and Oil Palm Cultivation 
Small-Scale Rice 
Farmers 
 
Key Actors from 
the Snowballing 
Technique ** 
 
Sample Size in 
Each Sub-
district 
More than 50 
Percent of Lands 
Devoted to Oil 
Palm Plantations 
Less than 50 
Percent of Lands 
Devoted to Oil 
Palm Plantations 
I. Sub-district A 
(Jumpon) 
5 5 5 5 X 20 + X 
II. Sub-district B 
(Kud Bong) 
5 5 5 5 Y 20 + Y 
III. Sub-district C 
(Baan Pho)     
5 5 5 5 Z 20 + Z 
 
* The figures shown in the Table 3.1 are sample size in each category. In each case the unit is a household.  
** The key actors identified through the snowball sampling method may be businesses, universities, local scholars, NGOs, and local government organisations.
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Returning to the sample selection in the research, my experience in the field sites 
demonstrated that it was extremely hard to unearth small-scale farmers in these areas 
who were growing only oil palm. This is to say it did not even exist in some villages. 
Likewise, it was difficult to find farmers who devoted more land to oil palm than rice 
cultivation. For most of the farmers, rice cultivation was their main agricultural 
activity. As a result, the categorisation of farmers in the original research plan proved 
impractical in view of the reality in the actual fieldwork. Therefore I made the 
decision to interview all the small-scale oil palm growers in the selected three 
villages, resulting in 14 households being interviewed in Baan Tarn, 23 households in 
Baan Sa Ard and 8 in Baan Hat.  
 
In terms of the rice farmer category, I divided the small-scale rice farmers into two 
groups. The first group was the rice farmers who had more than 20 rais of rice paddy 
fields, whilst the second group was the farmers who devoted less than 20 rais of land 
to rice cultivation. This was because I intended to investigate whether the amount of 
rice paddy fields which could directly be converted to oil palm plantations was a 
significant factor for the rice farmers in choosing not to be involved in the oil palm 
cultivation. Three households were selected in each category, i.e. a total of six 
households in each village. The snowball sampling technique was still applied to 
identify key actors in relation to the oil palm farmers of the three villages and the 
interview guide prepared for the semi-structured interviewing remained similar to the 
one in the original research plan. A summary of sampling selection and sample size 
used in the research, and a summary of linkages between research questions, sampling 
selection and interviewing method can be seen in the Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 
respectively.
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Table 3.2: Summary of Sampling Selection and the Sample Size Used in the Thesis 
 
Case 
Interviewed Small-Scale Oil 
Palm Farmers / Small-Scale 
Oil Palm Farmers in Total 
(As of November 2010) 
 
Rice Farmers Who Have Not Yet 
Adopted Oil Palm Cultivation 
 
Key Actors from 
the Snowballing 
Technique** 
 
Sample Size of the 
Research 
Occupied More 
than 20 Rais of 
Paddy Fields 
Occupied Less 
than 20 Rais of 
Paddy Fields 
I. Baan Tarn 
  (Phon Phisai District) 
14 / 14 3 3 
15 63 + 15 = 78 
II. Baan Sa Ard 
(So Phisai District) 
23 / 23 3 3 
III. Baan Hat 
(Seka District)     
8 / 11 3 3 
 
* The numbers shown in the Table 3.2 are sample size in each category. In each case the unit is a household.  
** The 15 key actors are from NKO, Nong Khai branch BAAC, DOA, PAE, SPAE, SAE, private seedlings supplier A, private seedlings supplier B, private merchant C, 
private merchant D, large-scale oil palm producer E, large-scale oil palm producer F, inspirational local leader G, inspirational local leader H, and a large-scale palm oil 
refinery in Chonburi province. 
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Figure 3.4: Summary of Linkages between the Main Research Question, Sub-questions, Sampling Selection, and Interviewing Method 
Used in the Thesis 
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author
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3.4 Data Collection and Data Analysis 
 
The actual fieldwork was undertaken over a period of approximately 9 months from 
25th April 2010 to 15th January 2011. Preparation for the fieldwork started in March 
2010 when I went to Nong Khai province to familiarise myself with the area, and also 
to Khon Kaen University in a quest for research assistants. From April to November 
2010, I conducted the interviews in the research sites during 6 visits ranging from 8 to 
12 days per visit. Then I arranged interviews with the key actors in Chonburi province 
and in Bangkok, which took place between December 2010 and January 2011.   
 
Understanding the language and dialect are bound to be of importance for a 
qualitative researcher because it is through language that, in interviews, questions are 
asked and answered. Because I was from central Bangkok and my undergraduate 
degree in development economics was at Chulalongkorn University, also located in 
Bangkok, I had no experience of speaking and listening in Esaan and thus could not 
fully understand or communicate with local people. Esaan refers to the Northeastern 
part of Thailand, where the research sites were located, and most people used Esaan 
or Lao as the local languages. From my experience in the field, speakers of central 
Thai could not fully understand what Esaan people were saying because of some 
differences in pronunciation, lexicon, and/or grammar. 
 
Although Esaan people express their feelings and communicate with each other in the 
Esaan language, most of the interviewees in the research were able to understand and 
speak central Thai. However, they were not comfortable doing so, for fear of ridicule 
from their friends. The key actor at PAE explained,  
 
“I can understand what you say. The villagers also understand, but speaking 
central language here makes us feel a bit dut ja rid (pretending to be someone 
else or being a different person according to time and/or environment). The 
response to questions will be slow because we have to think of words before 
saying.” (Male, semi-structured interview, May/June 2010).  
 
In order to cope with the language concerns and to make the conversations flow 
during the interviews, the need for research assistants with ability in Thai and Esaan 
languages was evident and this research therefore employed two research assistants. 
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One assistant was a student from the department of community development at Khon 
Kaen University. He was a native Esaan speaker, who was able to speak central Thai 
fluently, and had regularly participated in community development volunteer camps 
in various places across the Northeast region. He was also the president of the senior 
student of the community development department. His experiences in the field of 
rural development helped me greatly in terms of conducting the interviews in the 
Esaan language, being able to locate places and finding contact persons in the 
communities. Another research assistant was a postgraduate student and a member of 
the Research Group on Wellbeing and Sustainable Development (WeSD) at Khon 
Kaen University, who was able to communicate fluently in both Esaan and Thai. He 
assisted by taking down notes, following up interesting points made and clearing up 
inconsistencies in answers during the interviews. The collected data from the 
interviews was subsequently discussed, validated, and fully written up almost every 
night at our residence near the research sites.  
 
I trained the two research assistants to ensure that they understood the objectives and 
themes of the research. They were given the interview guides to study and I clarified 
all the issues and questions to be addressed to the interviewees. I also taught them 
both how to use Net-Map, before discovering later in the research sites that the 
methodology did not suit well in this context. Although most of the interviews from 
the first visit to the field sites, particularly in Kud Bong and Baan Pho sub-districts 
were not included in the research, they worked well as interviewing exercises. These 
interviews helped us to become familiar with the questions in the interview guide. 
They also helped me to investigate whether the questions prepared were 
understandable to the interviewees and whether the settings for the interviews were 
appropriate to the local context.  
 
Originally, I had planned to audio-record the interviews so that I would not be 
distracted by having to concentrate on getting down notes, and would be able to focus 
on not just what the interviewees said but also on the way that they said it. The 
process of recording and transcribing interviews also permits repeated examinations 
of the interviewees’ answers and opened up the data to other researchers who could 
evaluate the analysis or reuse the data in other ways than the original research.  
 
However, I had tried using an audio recorder in the actual interviews, but the method 
did not work well in this research. When I informed the interviewees that the 
conversations would be recorded using the audio equipment and they agreed to 
participate in the interviews, it was obvious that they talked very softly and quietly, 
answered the questions with reluctance, and said only all the good things about the 
issues. They also gave less opinion on everything, and expressed their feelings 
towards the issues in a more neutral way. It was apparent that using this method could 
lead to biased results, as there were discrepancies between what the interviewees told 
me and what they really thought.  
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The reason for this was that the interviewees allowed us to record the interviews out 
of politeness. It is part of the unique Thai value system not to hurt anyone’s feelings 
and to avoid conflict (Kreng Jai in Thai). The first reaction of some interviewees 
when they knew the conversations would be recorded was to ask questions such as 
“Does it need to be this serious?” or “Easy is better? I am not familiar with this.” 
However, they still agreed to participate in audio-recorded interviews. I found that a 
better way was to set up the interviews in a more relaxed atmosphere and let the 
farmers talk more naturally, so that they were able to express their thoughts explicitly. 
Thus it was decided not to use audio equipment in the research.  
 
Nonetheless, without audio recording there arose a concern over the natural limitation 
of human memory in remembering what was said in the interviews. I recognised this 
concern and therefore instructed one of the two research assistants to be highly 
attentive to what was being said by the interviewees and focus just on taking down 
notes. Discussion with the research assistants almost every evening after the 
interviews, which occurred in the daytime, was very fruitful because I was able to 
examine more thoroughly what the interviewees had said. It also helped me to check 
the accuracy of the data and to correct any misunderstanding that had occurred during 
the interviews. The story of the word “bia” is a good example. The word “bia” in the 
central Thai language meant something close to money that can be used for trading 
things. When the interviewees explained that they did not have “bia” to grow oil 
palm, I assumed that the households did not have enough money or savings to grow 
oil palm. After a discussion with the team, we established that the word “bia” in 
Esaan language meant seedlings in this context, so in this case the interviewees meant 
that it was difficult to find the oil palm seedlings. Thus, the correction had to be made 
to prevent the analysis from being biased. 
 
The preliminarily data analysis in the research took place in the field sites through the 
discussions mentioned earlier. The collected data was then typed into a Word 
document in central Thai language in order to preserve the true meaning from the 
interviews. I carried out this conversion while I was off the field sites in Bangkok, 
preparing for the next field visit. The next process of data analysis involved coding 
the data. Initially, I was considering the use of Computer-assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) called NVivo to code the data. Although using the 
NVivo allows a researcher to group together all the fragmented data that correspond 
to a certain category or theme, it meant I would have to learn to use a new software 
package and to spend a substantial amount of time on naming and grouping the codes. 
Moreover, during the time of data coding, the latest version of the program (NVivo 
version 9) was not supported on the Macintosh (Mac) operating system, which I had 
been using for a long time. Because there was a relatively small set of data (78 
interviews), spending a lot of time and trouble navigating my way around a new 
operating system would have been impractical. As a result, I decided to complete the 
data coding manually. However, the data was coded in Thai and only the answers that 
are quoted in this thesis were translated into English.  
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I coded all the interview data myself in order to sharpen my understanding of it. The 
data were coded with the aim of answering the research question and sub-questions. 
The relationships between the interviewees were highlighted and linked by the codes. 
Comparisons within and across the villages were carried out to identify the main 
similarities and differences. The findings were explored to investigate their 
relationships to the existing literatures in the Chapters 2, as well as to consider 
whether the results established new theories or concepts, or raised issues that had 
been unobserved in research into biofuels, particularly in biodiesel from oil palm and 
sustainable development in the Thai context.  
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations  
 
I was well aware of the ethical issues that might arise in the processes of collecting 
and analysing the data in and out of the field. My most important ethical principle was 
to ensure that the research did no harm to the participants. According to Bryman 
(2008), research that is likely to harm participants, whether the harm is in the form of 
physical harm, harm to participants’ development, loss of self-esteem, or high levels 
of stress and anxiety, is regarded as unacceptable by most social researchers. Thus, I 
assured the interviewees that I would do my utmost to uphold confidentiality and 
anonymity. The participants were informed that their real names would not be used in 
the research and they were guaranteed anonymity. However, the real names of the 
government agencies have been used in this thesis, but other specific details such as 
gender or age that could be used to identify the respondents in these organisations 
have been kept confidential.  
 
After being informed that his/her anonymity would be assured, one of the 
interviewees in a government organisation expressed his/her feelings as follows: 
 
 “Talking about the failure of the policy is quite dangerous. No one 
wants to talk about it in detail. It is not the culture here. Actually, it is 
not the culture for anyone in the Thai government. Talking about 
success is a lot easier. But I talked to you, so it is a relief to know that 
you understand the situation.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
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I have also altered the names of the three villages in the study to Baan Tarn (in Phon 
Phisai district), Baan Sa Ard (in So Phisai district), and Baan Hat (in Seka district) in 
order to make sure that the areas where the farmers lived would be kept confidential 
and they could remain anonymous. I ensured that the transcribed documents both in 
electronic and paper files did not contain the participants’ real names. Pseudonyms 
were used in any transcribed documents, and the lists of participants and addresses, 
and their identifier codes, were stored separately in a safe cabinet. I also ensured that 
the details that were changed did not affect the analysis of the oil palm issues in any 
way. 
 
Other principles that influenced my research were in the areas of informed consent 
and invasion of privacy. According to Diener and Crandall (1978)’s classification of 
ethical principles, these two areas overlap to some degree. The principle of informed 
consent means that social researchers should give as much information as possible 
about the research to prospective participants, so that they can make an informed 
decision about whether they wish to participate in a study. This principle was 
addressed very seriously in the research. Thus, before starting the data collection 
process, I emphasised to the research assistants the importance of providing a clear 
statement of the nature, intentions and purpose of the research to all the interviewees 
before proceeding to the interviews. We took approximately 5 to 10 minutes to 
explain the ideas and goals of the research (and also assure the participants of 
confidentiality and anonymity), speaking mostly in Esaan to ensure that the messages 
were well understood by the interviewees. The interviewees were also informed that 
there would be no repercussions if they decided not to participate.  
 
Although the ethical principle of privacy is very much linked to the notion of 
informed consent, in the sense that research participants acknowledge that the right to 
privacy has been surrendered after informed consent is given, research participants 
can refuse to answer certain questions or to comply with any research methodology 
on whatever grounds they feel are justified. This was the case with the use of audio-
recording equipment in the interviews. As mentioned in the discussion of the question 
of audio recording, as a result of the Kreng Jai culture many interviewees did not 
react directly by refusing to participate in the audio-recorded interviewing. However, 
I observed that the participants answered the interview questions with anxiety and 
gave opinions about the oil palm issues in a very generalised way. This was linked to 
the ethical issues of anonymity and confidentiality mentioned earlier, in that the 
participants might feel uncomfortable with the audio-recording procedure because 
they were anxious about whether harm could come to them from factors outside our 
control, such as theft of confidential documents. In order to respect the anonymity and 
privacy of those who participated in the research, I decided that it was not appropriate 
to record the interviews as it might lead to transgressions of the ethical principles of 
the research.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the analytical framework, logic, and research methodology and 
the justification of their roles in attempting to develop a holistic approach to 
understanding the change to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province. The chapter 
started with a discussion of the analytical framework used in the thesis. In essence, 
the research’s analytical framework was developed from two main theoretical 
approaches, namely the eight element of farmers’ decision-making, and the IDS 
KNOTS team’s policy processes framework. The first part of the research’s analytical 
framework was devoted to the understanding of the oil palm change from the bottom-
up perspective: the farmers’ decisions to be precise. The concepts of eight elements of 
farmers’ decision-making and THN were adapted to appropriately address the oil 
palm issues in the context of Thailand. The second part then adopted the IDS KNOTS 
team’s policy framework to comprehend the oil palm issues, as oil palm expansion 
policy is one of the key factors shaping the change towards the oil palm adoption in 
Nong Khai province.  
 
The chapter then explored the choice of methodology, logic, and research designs of 
the study. It began with the choice of methodology, which resulted in the use of 
qualitative research methods, semi-structured interviewing, and snowball sampling 
methods. The discussion then moved to site and sample selection, which deviated 
from the initial research plan to some extent. In essence, the research sites changed 
from three sub-districts in Phon Phisai district to three villages in three different 
districts in Nong Khai province. The 15 key actors were then identified through the 
snowballing technique. Semi-structured interviewing was applied to all the 
participants in the research.  
 
The logic of the data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations were then 
investigated. The data in the research were collected through the eight visits to the 
field sites (including two preparatory visits) and two interviews with key actors that 
occurred outside the field sites, in Bangkok and Chonburi provinces. Two research 
assistants were employed in the research due to concerns over the Esaan language 
used by the local people. The process of data analysis began in the field sites, where I 
set up meetings with the team almost every night to check for errors and ensure the 
accuracy of the collected data. I then converted the collected data into a Word 
document and coded it manually during the periods between field site visits and after 
the fieldwork was completed.  
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As for the ethical issues, the real names of the research participants and the three 
villages have been kept confidential and anonymous, so that there will be no harm to 
the participants. The research participants were clearly informed in detail of what 
their involvement were likely to entail. No audio-recording equipment was used 
during the interviews, partly due to concerns over possible transgressions of the 
ethical principles. In accordance with analytical framework discussed in this chapter, 
the next chapter will analyse the key factors affecting the farmers’ decisions in 
relation to oil palm adoption. 
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Chapter 4:  
Understanding the Change to Oil Palm Cultivation: 
Farmers’ Decisions and Consequences 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the thesis’s analytical framework has been 
developed to understand the change to oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region of 
Thailand, where the area occupied by oil palm plantations in Nong Khai province has 
increased dramatically from none in 2005 to 24,848 rais in 2010 (OAE, 2010b). This 
chapter will provide insights for the Thai government and all other stakeholders into 
the oil palm issues from the bottom-up perspective. In order to understand the oil 
palm issues in Nong Khai province, this chapter discusses the critical factors shaping 
the decision-making of farmers to adopt or not to adopt oil palm cultivation as well as 
the consequences of the change. This chapter is divided into two sections, described 
below. 
 
The fourth chapter begins with an overview of the analytical framework used in this 
chapter, and introduces the main findings. There follows a discussion of the key 
factors affecting the decisions of farmers in adopting oil palm cultivation in 
accordance with the adaptation of the eight elements of farmers’ decision-making 
concept, which is divided into eight sections. The first six sections (elements) 
examine the key factors affecting the farmers’ decisions about changing over to oil 
palm production. The seventh and eighth elements then analyse the socio-economic 
consequences of the change towards oil palm plantations as well as the farmers’ 
satisfaction after oil palm adoption. The final section of this chapter concludes our 
examination of oil palm issues from the farmers’ perspective. 
 
4.1 Understanding the Farmers’ Decisions in Adopting Oil Palm 
Cultivation and the Consequences of the Change: Key Areas 
 
In order to analyse the change to oil palm cultivation specifically in the Thai context, 
I developed an analytical framework which draws from two main analytical 
approaches, namely an eight element model of farmers’ decision-making, and the IDS 
KNOTS team’s policy processes framework. This chapter addresses the analytical 
framework shown in the diagram (Figure 4.1), which is devoted to understanding the 
change to oil palm cultivation from the farmers’ point of view. The concept of eight 
elements of farmer decision-making (Ohlmer et al., 1998) was adapted to 
appropriately address oil palm issues in the context of Thailand.  
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Figure 4.1: Analytical Framework Applied in Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author 
 
The findings in this research suggest that economic security is important to farmers 
when deciding whether to engage in oil palm cultivation. However, it has emerged 
that the real desires of the farmers are to live comfortably and close to their children, 
which implies an urban to rural migration on the part of the children who moved 
away. Other critical factors are intrinsic characteristics of oil palm cultivation such as 
long life-span and short harvesting period, the low productivity and high production 
costs of rice cultivation, the government’s support for oil palm farming, the roles of 
inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm producers, the price of oil palm 
fruits, the links between farmers and local buyers, some farmers’ experience of oil 
palm cultivation in the southern region of Thailand, and the success of rubber 
plantations.  
 
All the findings will be justified in detail in the subsequent sections, according to the 
adaptation of the eight elements of farmers’ decision-making model discussed in 
Chapter 3. The analysis starts with the values and goals element, which explores 
whether the farmers’ values and goals can significantly affect their decision-making.  
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4.2 Values and Goals Element 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, the Theory of Human Need (THN) was deployed in this 
element to elaborate the farmers’ needs in choosing to start cultivating oil palms. The 
insight in this element will provide a foundation for a further investigation into 
whether these needs are met as a result of the farmers adopting oil palm production. 
The consequences will be discussed in the implementation and responsibility bearing 
elements which follow. According to the theory, the two basic needs, which are 
physical health and autonomy, are met through the satisfaction of a set of eleven 
intermediate needs, or needs satisfiers. These eleven needs satisfiers are: adequate 
nutritional food and water; adequate protective housing; a non-hazardous work 
environment; a non-hazardous physical environment; appropriate health care; security 
in childhood; significant primary relationships; economic security; physical security; 
appropriate basic and cross-cultural education; and safe birth and child-bearing. All 
eleven are critical to safeguard the two basic needs of people and thus enable them to 
participate in their preferred way of life according to their culture. However, 
identifying specific intermediate needs in particular contexts could vary from society 
to society. In other words, the THN underlines the importance of local contexts, by 
recognising that in different social and environmental contexts the eleven 
intermediate needs can be met in different ways.  
 
In this research, evidence from the oil palm farmers shows that success in moving to 
oil palm cultivation could have several effects on the farmers’ autonomy, which is 
one of the two basic needs according to the THN. As suggested by Doyal and Gough 
(1991), autonomy must be distinguished from independence or separateness; it refers 
to the capacity of individuals to formulate consistent aims and strategies, which they 
value or are interested in, and their ability to put them into practice in the activities in 
which they engage. Obviously, most of the oil palm interviewees (41 of 
45households) identified that an increase in economic security, which was one of the 
eleven intermediate needs, was what they perceived as their need before making the 
decision to invest in oil palms. All of these farmers broadly accepted that this 
intermediate need would be satisfied through success in cultivating oil palm and 
rubber rather than the traditional rice. 
 
In fact, a rise in someone’s standard of living would allow that persons’ autonomy to 
increase, and thus improve their capacity to participate in their way of life. One of the 
farmers said,  
 
“If we get more money from oil palms in the future, it will help reduce 
our household expenses. So we can do other things … I want to buy 
my son equipment for fixing motorcycles. He loves it and it can be his 
future job.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
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Some households planned to pursue their agricultural strategy by investing the money 
in ploughing machines to increase their productivity in rice cultivation and/or for hire 
purposes, or investing in the irrigation systems on their farms. However, the priorities 
of some interviewees were to obtain luxury goods such as the famous Toyota Hilux 
Vigo and Isuzu MU-7 pick-up cars or new motorcycles, or to refurbish their houses. 
These farmers’ values could lead them into debt, as there would be no opportunities to 
sustain their incomes in the future. I found this group of farmers quite different from 
the previous one, who had likewise identified economic security as their need, but 
planned to use the forthcoming income from oil palms to invest in activities or 
equipment that could generate more income in the future. In one case where the 
interviewee was already in debt from buying luxury goods, the situation was getting 
worse. This interviewee explained,    
 
“I’ve got the Vigo now just to be cool driving to town. It looks great. 
But now I have to find more money just to pay for it every month. Not 
good I know, but I don’t know what to do. It has already happened. I 
hope that the oil palm crop can help.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-
structured interview, June 2010).  
 
Nonetheless, probing deeply into the issue revealed that the farmers have another set 
of values. Although they are very interested in earning more, their motive for wanting 
an increased income is to live comfortably with their children in the areas of their 
hometowns. This highlights the significance of primary relationships in the eleven 
intermediate needs. Certainly social relationships are important satisfiers for 
maintaining and extending autonomy, which could be satisfied through interactions 
with close friends and relatives, or other relationships that matter, in particular 
community and societal contexts. In the past, many households, particularly in the 
Northeast region, had to force their children to work in urban or industrial areas in 
order to acquire sufficient income. Krongkaew et al. (1992) found that farmers 
normally migrated to find work during the slack seasons, whilst long-term migration 
was also apparent across country. Since the economic boom in the mid-1980s, the 
demand for manufacturing labour increased drastically. As manufacturing offered a 
higher and more stable income than agriculture, rural workers migrated to urban 
centres, including a significant number of the children of the farmers in this research, 
who were long-term migrants.  
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It is a well-known fact that migration has been perceived in Thailand as a means to 
alleviate poverty and achieve a better standard of living (Krongkaew et al., 1992; 
Sussangkarn and Chalamwong, 1994; Tsay, 2002; Osaki, 2003; Guest, 2003). 
Seasonal migrants bring back income to their households, whilst long-term migrants 
send remittances home. In fact, there is evidence that these remittances contribute 
significantly to reducing poverty and income inequality among households in 
Thailand (Guest, 2003; Osaki, 2003; NESDB and World Bank, 2005). In the 
Northeast region, approximately 45 percent of all households received remittances, 
the highest proportion in the country (NESDB and World Bank, 2005, p.108). Osaki 
(2003) also found that the poorer the households they came from, the more likely the 
migrants were to send remittances. However, the findings in this research suggest a 
reversal of the trend of migration because of oil palm plantations. Many interviewees 
(26 of 45 households) believe that oil palm plantations could create more employment 
and thus attract their children who had migrated to come back to agricultural work in 
their home areas.  
 
This is illustrated by the following excerpts from interviews: 
 
“I want them (oil palms) to be successful, then my daughter can come 
home when she has a kid. Doesn’t have to job around in Bangkok.” 
(Female, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010),  
 
“You see, in that village (the next village), his sons came back helping 
their dad doing rubber tapping. I want more money, more jobs, I want 
my son to come back too. It has been a long time since he went. 
Seeing your son only once a year (during Songkran Festival) is not 
enough. It is never going to be enough.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-
structured interview, May 2010),  
 
“If they (oil palms) work in the future, my kids don’t have to go 
anywhere. This is for my family. I want to live as a family. Everyone 
does.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 2010).  
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In many oil palm households, an increase in income also means the family can save 
additional money for the future education of their children, which is one of the 
farmers’ needs contributing to the strengthening of their autonomy, according to the 
THN. The position of Pen Jao Khon Nai Khon, which could be translated into English 
as ‘being master and having subordinates’, was the farmers’ plan for their children. It 
was believed that the position could be achieved through education. The higher the 
level of education the children could achieve, the better their future life would be. 
There would be no need to sell valuable assets such as land, cows, or their stores of 
rice for their children’s education if the households had adequate incomes. According 
to the THN, this desire to invest in the education of their children means that their 
children’s autonomy will be strengthened, according to the element of education in 
the eleven needs satisfiers.  
 
“If the oil palm can bring us a good income in the future, I will keep 
the money for my children to go to school. So they can choose what 
they want to do and be in the future. Maybe not in agriculture, it is up 
to them, but deep down I want them to be around here.” (Male, semi-
structured interview, Baan Tarn, May 2010).  
 
The values of these interviewees were definitely bound up with the prospects for their 
children. Oil palm cultivation itself has been viewed as a potential source of 
inheritance for their children. This was because of the perception of the oil palm crop 
being Num Seum Bor Srai(“Water Pouring in Sand”). Num Seum Bor Srai is the 
traditional Thai idiom describing the way one generates an income out of something 
for an infinite length of time. Unlike rice cultivation, oil palm plantations have a long 
lifespan; the trees can attain an age of 25 to 30 years under ‘good’ conditions. The 
farmers also stressed the importance of having reliable sources of income throughout 
the year and the opportunity to work equally at every stage of the year, as is the case 
for those engaged in agriculture.  
 
The findings also highlighted that some households valued a crop that involved 
relatively less labour than the rice cultivation. This surfaced in the households without 
children or whose children had settled for work reasons in areas outside the villages. 
These farmers did not show much interest in having huge increases in income, but 
they were concerned about leisure time and not having to work as hard as they once 
used to in labour-intensive rice farming.  
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It was noticeable in the research that every farmer in the interviews had adopted an 
integrated farming method. There are five crops that appear in the research sites, 
namely rice, rubber, oil palm, eucalyptus, and watermelon, and each household 
cultivated two, three or four of these crops (see Table 4.1). The combinations varied 
from household to household. However, there was one householder interviewed who 
at the time of the fieldwork was not growing rice as he had switched the whole farm 
over to oil palms. That householder, who was in Baan Sa Ard, insisted that the reason 
he abandoned rice cultivation was because of his age.  
 
“I am too old to grow rice. So, I have no choice but to grow the crop 
that I can do,” (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010).   
 
Table 4.1: Number of Households and Occupation of Crops by Village 
 
Village  Oil Palm  Rice Rubber Eucalyptus Watermelon 
1. Baan Tarn 14/14 14/14 (100%) 10/14 (71%) 6/14 (43%) 3/14 (21%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 23/23 22/23 (96%) 23/23 (100%) 3/23 (13%) 0/23 (0%) 
3. Baan Hat 8/8 8/8 (100%) 3/8 (38%) 2/8 (25%) 0/8 (0%) 
Total 45/45 (100%) 44/45 (98%) 36/45 (80%) 11/45 (24%) 3/45 (7%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
At first, I was found that 44 of the 45 households were self-reliant in terms of 
producing sufficient rice for their annual household consumption. However, rice and 
oil palms are planted in similar land areas, and it might be possible for farmers to 
plant oil palms in some parts of their rice paddy fields for experimental purposes. 
Hence, I put further questions to the farmers regarding their future oil palm expansion 
plans, and whether they wanted to continue with rice cultivation. The results differed 
from the previous findings, as the number of households planning to abandon rice 
cultivation had surged to nine. All of them were the farmers in Baan Sa Ard (see 
Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Number of Households that Planned to Abandon Rice Cultivation by 
Village 
 
Village  Planned to Switch Completely from Rice to Oil Palm Cultivation  
1. Baan Tarn 0/14 (0%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 9/23 (39%) 
3. Baan Hat 0/8 (0%) 
Total 9/45 (20%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
The explanation for farmers abandoning rice cultivation in Baan Sa Ard lies in the 
character of local leaders. The inspirational local leader H, who influenced farmers in 
Baan Sa Ard to adopt oil palm cultivation, has replaced 50 rais of rice farming with 
oil palm trees since 2006. H was a leader in the community in growing oil palms and 
rubber (see also Chapter 5 for details). H’s reason for switching completely from rice 
paddy fields was the lack of farm labour in his household, and several oil palm 
farmers in Baan Sa Ard followed their leader’s direction. As one household 
summarised,  
 
“He (the inspirational local leader H) buys rice also and I did not see 
him having any problems at all. My household and his household are 
quite the same, no labour for rice farming. As long as we have enough 
money to buy rice, it is fine.” (Male, semi-structured interview, 
August 2010).  
 
Although these nine households would be growing at least two crops (oil palms and 
rubber) on their land after the switch, they would be less able to be self-reliant in 
terms of producing rice for household consumption. This group of farmers showed no 
hesitation in buying rice for their household consumption. One of the farmers in the 
group explained,  
 
“Rice farming makes a loss. Actually, no one in my household wants 
to do any labour. All of my children want to do something else. 
Buying rice is not that bad: it is actually quite convenient.” (Female, 
Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
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Nonetheless, the majority of the oil palm farmers (80 percent: 36 of 45 households) 
insisted that growing rice was important to them, regardless of how much it costs to 
produce it. One of the farmers in Baan Tarn said,  
 
“Profit or loss, we will grow rice. Esaan people will not leave their 
rice paddy fields. Oil palm is good, but I cannot accept the feeling of 
buying rice from others. It is not our culture and it hurts. We need to 
produce rice, at least for ourselves.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured 
interview, June 2010). 
 
The most common answer from the farmers, when they were asked whether to 
continue the rice farming, was “We have to grow rice for our own eating. If not, what 
will we eat?”  
 
The evidence from the farmer in Baan Tarn who had migrated from the Southern 
region to settle in the Northeast suggested that farmers in the Northeast were different 
from the South in terms of how they valued self-reliance and rice farming. Farmers in 
the South were more likely to abandon rice farming and adopt other agricultural crops 
that offer higher profitability, such as oil palm, rubber or prawn farming. The 
Southern farmers switched promptly according to the market prices of agricultural 
crops.  
 
“Unlike Esaan people, Southern people do not value their rice paddy 
fields very highly. It is normal for them to buy rice. Esaan people will 
choose to sell prime pieces of lands instead of selling their rice paddy 
fields, if they are in trouble. That would not happen with Southern 
farmers,” elaborated the farmer in Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured 
interview, May 2010).  
 
The farmer in Baan Sa Ard who reserved 5 rais of land for rice cultivation instead of 
changing all his land to oil palm plantations was another good example. His reason 
for growing rice was simply because rice had a tremendous value for him.  
 
“I am a farmer and I love being a farmer. It is a shame not to produce 
rice for ourselves. If we fail to do that, we should not call ourselves 
farmers,” he declared (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010). 
 
Likewise, the interviews with the rice farmers who were interested in oil palm 
cultivation revealed similar values in terms of their attitudes towards producing rice. 
Many households insisted that they needed to buy new land for oil palm cultivation, 
as they would not convert their rice paddy fields to oil palm cultivation due to 
concerns over food security. One interviewee said,  
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“I do not have much rice land, so I am afraid of having nothing to eat. 
Turning all the rice land into oil palms? No. No way. That is not good 
logic.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
 
According to the biofuel literature discussed in Chapter 2, there is general evidence 
that the increase in land devoted to biofuel production has contributed to a reduction 
of land for food and feed crops, thus raising concerns over food security, especially in 
countries that rely heavily on food imports because of the volatility of food prices. 
The findings in this study suggest that the oil palm farmers in the Northeast region of 
Thailand are unlikely to convert all of their rice paddy fields to oil palm plantations. 
This is to say that the change to oil palm cultivation would not turn the country into a 
net importer of rice because the Esaan farmers felt strongly about producing rice, at 
least for their own consumption.  
 
To sum up, the findings in relation to this element suggest that an increase in 
economic security is the farmers’ main intermediate need in deciding to start growing 
oil palms and could result in greater autonomy for the farmers, which is one of the 
two basic needs according to the THN. The farmers believed that this intermediate 
need would be satisfied through success in oil palm and rubber rather than in the 
traditional rice cultivation. Probing deeply in the issues revealed that the farmers 
valued their family relationship as well as the prospects of their children very highly. 
This is to say that not only an increase in economic security, but also living 
comfortably with their children in the areas of their hometowns and the future of their 
children have been highly prioritised by the farmers. Thus, success in the oil palm 
cultivation will provide sufficient amount of money to support their children’s future 
education and attract them to come back and live with the parents in their hometowns. 
These values of farmers stress towards the significance of primary relationships and 
education elements in the eleven intermediate needs, which can strengthen the 
farmers’ autonomy.  
 
In the next element, I will analyse the farmers’ decisions about oil palm versus rice 
cultivation. The farmers’ perceptions of rice cultivation will be revealed, as every 
household interviewed was or had previously been involved in the paddy fields. 
Certainly rice cultivation is a crucial activity that significantly affects their decisions 
about changing to oil palm farming.  
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4.3 Problem Detection Element 
 
Unquestionably, the driving force for oil palm cultivation in the three villages was 
related to problems in the rice paddy fields. Thailand has a long tradition of rice 
production and consumption. Rice is grown throughout the country and has always 
been a vital part of the agricultural sector. Rice cultivation has shaped a way of life, 
faith, belief, economics, and cultures in the country (Vanichanont, 2004). Of the four 
regions of the country, the Northeast is the largest and covers about one-third of 
Thailand’s total land area. In 2008, rice cultivation occupied 57.4 percent of the 
Northeast region’s agricultural land and it comes as no surprise that the majority of 
Thailand’s rice production, 34.3 percent, was from the Northeast region (OAE, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, rice farming in the Northeast region is mostly, at 95 percent, in rain-fed 
areas, where there is only one growing season per year, between May and October. In 
this region, infertile sandy soils and erratic rainfall are the two major causes of low 
rice production. The rice yield in the North East was the lowest of all the regional rice 
yields at 331 kilogrammes per rai in 2008, compared to the country’s average of 427 
kilogrammes per rai in the same period (NESDB, 2009a). The soil across most of the 
region is sandy, with low organic matter content. Sandy soils do not retail water well 
and the soil quality could not readily be mitigated by simply applying chemical 
fertilisers in order to achieve higher productivity.  
 
As well as soil constraints, the Northeast has an erratic rainfall pattern. Annual 
rainfall land, more critically, rainfall distribution varies considerably in the region. 
There is a distinct rainy season from May to October with peaks in June and 
September. Although the amount of rainfall received could vary from 1,100 
millimetres to 2,200 millimetres per year throughout the Northeast region (Moroizumi 
et al, 2009), the critical factor affecting agricultural production is the huge variability 
both within and between years. A late start to the rainy season in May and June, dry 
spells when the rice is getting established in late June and July, short periods of 
flooding in September, and the late-season droughts in October and November could 
all be detrimental to the rice harvest.  
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The evidence from the interviews confirmed those limitations, as most households in 
the three villages faced problems regarding rice productivity. In the villages, low 
productivity of rice farming was reflected in the households’ low incomes from rice. 
The interviews indicated that the incomes obtained from rice production were low and 
did not cover the costs of production, such as the soaring price of fertilisers and 
agricultural wages. The elderly and the land abundant farmers in the villages did not 
harvest rice themselves, but hired agricultural labourers within the village, in three 
different ways. Some farmers hired agricultural labourers on a daily basis, at a rate 
varying from 180 to 250 Baht per day. Other farmers shared the rice harvest with their 
labourers at a ratio of 1:1, but the farmers had to provide all the agricultural materials 
and equipment. A third group of labourers brought all the materials and equipment 
used in rice cultivation and received two thirds of the rice harvest.  
 
In this research, there were nine elderly households (20 percent) in the three villages. 
All of them hired labourers for rice farming. According to the United Nations 
(2012b), 65 years of age is a normal benchmark for defining an elderly person, in 
order to make a comparison internationally. However, the Constitution of Thailand 
(1997) defines the role of the state in providing financial assistance and welfare to 
satisfy the basic needs of elderly Thai people, regardless of gender and social class, as 
follows: “Persons who are 60 years and over and have insufficient income to maintain 
their living are entitled to receive assistance from the state (Article 54)”. Thus, this 
research uses the age of 60 to define the elderly in Thailand. “Elderly household” in 
this research refers to a household where the person who is respected by other 
household members as head of household is aged 60 or over.  
 
It is important to note that most of the elderly people in this research lived with their 
adult children, which could be explained by the traditional norm that the elderly 
should be taken care of by kin. Most people in the Northeast region are still strict 
about the tradition of filial piety (Philips, 2000), known as Boon Koon in Thai. Adult 
children are morally obliged to take good care of their parents in their old age in 
return for care received when they were being brought up. Grandparents, in return, 
would look after their grandchildren. As a result, people in the Northeast region 
mainly live in large households. The Socio-Economic Survey (SES) in Thailand 
revealed that, on average, more than four people were found in Northeastern 
households in 1998, whilst the average household size in other regions was lower than 
four at 3.30, 3.60, 3.47, and 3.96 persons in Bangkok, the Central, North, and South 
regions respectively. Although there is an increasing trend for elderly Thais to live in 
smaller households (alone or with a spouse), more than 40 percent of older people live 
in families comprising three generations (Keeratipongpaiboon, 2012). However, it is 
clear from this research that the elderly people prefer to live with their children or at 
least nearby, so that they can see their children daily. This is the reason why big 
families in Thailand, particularly in the Northeast region, have not dramatically 
decreased as in the developed world.   
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Returning to rice, the costs of rice production, as mentioned earlier, are seen by most 
of the interviewees as very high and unreasonable, which reduces the profitability of 
the crops and thus makes rice growing less attractive. The areas are also prone to 
flooding in the rainy season, which affects the amount of rice produced. 
Consequently, the farmers had to find new sources of income, whether selling 
agricultural labour, planting alternative crops, or receiving remittances from relatives 
working in urban areas, in order to balance the households’ expenditures. One of the 
interviewees explained,  
 
“Doing only rice will not fill your stomach. You must find other 
things to support it.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, 
July 2010).  
 
His statement also disclosed his inclination towards abandoning rice farming,  
 
“You invest 35,000 Baht and get 15,000 Baht back in selling. If you 
were me, would you still want to do it?” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-
structured interview, July 2010). 
 
The main purpose of growing rice is that the households used to consume rice as a 
major source of energy at every meal of the day. Some households were less 
concerned about the issues of cost and profit of rice cultivation. The respondents felt 
that they have no choice but to grow rice as their main food. Rice is used for the 
domestic consumption rather than for selling to be a major source of income of the 
households. An interviewee in Baan Hat reflected this perception: 
 
“I know it is not worth doing (rice farming), but I do it anyway. I 
consume it in my family. If there is any left, I then think of selling.” 
(Male, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
Apart from the problems related to rice farming, some households perceive growing 
oil palms as an opportunity to try something different. Four households bought 
additional land especially for planting oil palms. There were also several households 
that had acquired a lot of unproductive land, including abandoned arable land and 
bamboo-rich land areas, who wanted to transform these pieces of lands into valuable 
family assets. Oil palm cultivation was certainly considered as one of the potential 
choices by the interviewees.  
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To summarise, this element found that the uncompetitiveness of rice production in the 
areas due to its low productivity and high production costs, particularly in agricultural 
labour, had significantly tempted the farmers interviewed towards alternative crops 
including oil palms. The next element, then, investigates the reasons why the farmers 
choose oil palms rather than other possible crops such as eucalyptus, cassava or 
rubber. The options are evaluated in terms of whether they are compatible with the 
farmers’ morals, values, beliefs and goals.  
 
4.4 Problem Definition Element 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, I have adapted this element to focus on the farmers’ 
justification for rating oil palm cultivation above other optional crops in the area, such 
as eucalyptus, cassava and rubber. In fact, rubber is relatively safe from being 
overtaken by oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region. Despite the growing 
number of rubber plantations in the Northeast region, oil palm and rubber trees are 
planted in different land areas: flatland for the former and slightly higher ground for 
the latter. Besides, the farmers believe that rubber generates slightly more income per 
unit space and time than oil palm, which creates an economic disincentive for 
switching to oil palms. However, even if the price of oil palm fruits rose drastically in 
the future, farmers in the region would not be able to switch from rubber to oil palm 
plantations because the land is not appropriate. The real competition for utilising the 
land is between these four crops: eucalyptus, cassava, rice, and oil palms. Rice paddy 
fields are the most likely to be replaced by oil palm cultivation as the farmers showed 
signs of dissatisfaction with the crop. I have described the difficulties regarding rice 
cultivation in the previous element. This element therefore explains the farmers’ crop 
options, starting with eucalyptus.  
 
Eucalyptus was introduced into Thailand from Australia in the 19th century. 
Government officials encouraged farmers to grow it due to its characteristics of rapid 
growth, hard wood, and ability to grow in tropical areas. After three to five years’ 
growth, eucalyptus trees grew can be turned into pulpwood either for using in the 
domestic pulp and paper industry or for export, mainly to Taiwan and Japan. 
However, as an increasing area has been planted, serious criticisms of the ecological 
problems of eucalyptus planting have emerged from rural NGOs and academics. 
Critics argue that, among other problems, eucalyptus destroys local biodiversity and 
species, uses more water than other crops thus depleting underground water sources, 
lowers soil fertility, and inhibits the growth of other crops (Patanapongsa, 1987; 
Usher, 1990; Doughty, 2000; Tunya, 2000; Jawjit et al., 2006; Bennett, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 86 
The interviewees supported the critics. One expressed the following views on planting 
eucalyptus: 
 
“The environment goes bad if you plant eucalyptus. You can’t grow 
eucalyptus in or near the rice paddy fields. The rice won’t grow. If 
you want to change to other crops, it will be difficult. The soil is spoilt 
and you have to spend a lot of money to get the roots out and also 
getting a lot of fertiliser for the next crop.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-
structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The flow of income from eucalyptus trees is also a concern for several respondents. 
One interviewee lamented: 
 
“You have to wait for three to four years before you can get any 
money from the trees. Then you have to wait for another three to four 
years and you can only do this three times. Don’t ask about oil palms, 
even compared to rice, I will choose rice. Growing eucalyptus doesn’t 
put anything in our stomachs. Growing rice, you can sell it and get 
money or you can keep it for you and your family to eat.” (Male, Baan 
Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
The second alternative crop in the area is cassava. Cassava is an easy growing and 
drought tolerant crop, which grows well on sandy soils of low fertility. It can be 
grown on either flatland or hillsides and is utilised chiefly for the production of starch 
and animal feed, as well as for direct individual consumption. In 2009, Northeast 
farmers had planted cassava on an area of 4.24 million rais, which accounted for 
54.73 percent of Thailand’s cassava planted areas. Only 30.56 percent of the cassava 
production was used domestically (OAE, 2010a). However, there were concerns over 
the long-term detrimental effects on soil productivity of cassava planting (Howeler, 
1991; Putthacharoen et al., 1998).  
 
Although several interviewees believed that cassava causes soil degradation and that 
few other crops grow well where cassava has been grown, the interviewees stressed 
that cassava’s price fluctuation was a larger problem. The farm price varied from 1.18 
Baht per kilogramme in 2007 to 1.93 Baht per kilogramme in 2008 and dropped back 
to 1.19 Baht per kilogramme in 2009 (see Table 4.3). The initial aim of farmers in 
planting cassava was to obtain a more stable income, but farmers’ experiences with 
cassava in the past suggest the contrary. One interviewee explained,  
 
“I was once growing cassava. The price was up and down. If the price 
is good this year, many people will grow it and next year the price will 
fall. We didn’t sell it at a good price and in the end we made a loss.” 
(Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 2010).  
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Table 4.3: Planted Areas, Production, Yield, and Price of Cassava (2001-2010) 
 
Year 
Planted Areas 
(1,000 rais) 
Production 
(1,000 tonnes) 
Yield Per Rai 
(kilogrammes) 
Farm Price 
(Baht / kilogramme) 
2001 6,918 18,396 2,805 0.69 
2002 6,224 16,868 2,731 1.05 
2003 6,435 19,718 3,087 0.93 
2004 6,757 21,440 3,244 0.80 
2005 6,524 16,938 2,749 1.33 
2006 6,933 22,584 3,375 1.29 
2007 7,623 26,916 3,668 1.18 
2008 7,750 25,156 3,401 1.93 
2009 8,584 30,088 3,628 1.19 
2010 7,560 21,941 3,005 1.77 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
 
The findings show that oil palms have advantages over other crops in three 
noteworthy ways. Firstly, oil palms bear harvestable fruits every fifteen days once 
they are four years old, which promises to generate a relatively stable income for the 
peasants. A more stable income than is available from cassava, eucalyptus or rice is 
very attractive for the farmers. As mentioned earlier, with eucalyptus, farmers have to 
wait three to four years before obtaining any income, whilst with cassava the waiting 
time is about ten to twelve months for each crop. Rice farming has a shorter period of 
growing and therefore generates income sooner but can only be planted once a year in 
the area studied.  
 
Another advantage of oil palm cultivation is related to the farmers’ perception of 
using palm oil as a substitute for diesel. The interviewees spoke positively about 
expecting a higher demand for biodiesel in the future, which would be converted into 
a rise in demand for oil palm fruits as a major feedstock for Thailand’s biodiesel 
production.  
 
“The demand for oil will be higher than the demand for cassava or 
eucalyptus in the future. Oil is used in everything. Paper and cassava 
are not.” (Female, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 2010).  
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Although cassava is also used in the production of ethanol, the first preference 
feedstock for the current proven technologies in Thailand is cane molasses because it 
produces ethanol at a relatively lower cost per unit (NESDB, 2009a). Another 
advantage is that obtaining bioethanol from cassava, cane molasses, or sugarcane 
would entail less impact from land competition. This results partly from the 
government’s policy of increasing crop yields instead of turning more land over to 
cassava. Thus, the total area planted with cassava is expected to be at the same level 
as in 2008, when the 15-year Alternative Energy Development Plan is approved (see 
Table 4.3) (Sriroth et al., 2010; Bell et al., 2011). The fact that cassava has less policy 
support from the government than oil palms also makes it less attractive than oil 
palms. One interviewee pointed out another perception in favour of oil palms, which 
was that cassava could and should be grown in less arable, marginal lands where other 
crops could not thrive: 
 
“We normally grow cassava on very infertile soils. Our land’s quality 
is better than to just grow cassava. We then look for other options.” 
(Male, Baan Tarn, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The farmers’ third positive perception of planting oil palms is their long life-span. 
The average life of oil palm trees is 20 to 25 years depending on the climatic 
conditions and maintenance. The respondents felt strongly that this was a huge 
advantage over the other competing crops. In addition, most interviewees suggested 
that oil palm cultivation involves less labour in maintenance and harvesting. The crop 
also involves just a one-off planting, which differs from rice and cassava which entail 
the labour of planting annually3
 
.  
To summarise, this element suggests that in the Northeast region, rubber trees are 
grown on different types of land from oil palms. Thus, oil palm and rubber cultivation 
are not competing with each other. Moreover, the environmental impacts of growing 
eucalyptus and the price fluctuations of cassava have shaped the decisions of the 
farmers in favour of moving to oil palm. In the next element, I will examine the 
farmers’ sources of knowledge about oil palm cultivation and of funding for it. This 
element also discusses the differences between the oil palm farmers in the three 
villages in the study in terms of the knowledge they have acquired and the sources of 
funding available to them.  
 
 
                                                              
3Several respondents also demonstrated a clear Sue Norn Gin attitude. The phrase literally translates as 
‘Tiger Sleep Eat’, and is a reference to Thai classical literature. It implies getting “something for 
nothing”, gaining benefits without hardship, or putting in less effort but still acquiring something. To 
the farmers, oil palm plantations seem to offer a perfect fit with that position.   
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4.5 Observation Element 
 
To understand oil palm issues from the bottom up, this element has been adapted to 
focus on the farmers’ compilation of knowledge about oil palms and their choices as 
regards funding oil palm farming. I have split this element into two sub-sections: the 
farmers’ sources of oil palm knowledge and their sources of oil palm funding. The 
discussion starts with farmers’ acquisition of oil palm knowledge.  
 
5.5.1 The Farmers’ Sources of Oil Palm Knowledge 
 
The findings suggest that householders in the three villages acquire oil palm 
knowledge in three different ways. The first way is through the government sector, 
namely: Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO); Department of Agriculture 
(DOA); and the local Agricultural Extension Offices. The majority of the households 
obtained their oil palm seedlings from NKO and learned about oil palms from them. 
 
I divided these households into two categories based on how the oil palm seedlings 
were obtained from NKO. In the first category are the households who borrowed oil 
palm seedlings from NKO under the Oil Palm Plantations Supporting Project 
(OPPSP). This project enabled the farmers to receive oil palm seedlings without 
laying out initial capital, but with a requirement to pay back in the form of either oil 
palm production or money from the beginning of the 4th year (see details in Chapter 
5). I refer to this type of household as a ‘contracted household’ in this thesis. In the 
second category are the households who bought oil palm seedlings directly from 
NKO, at the price of 50 to 60 Baht per seedling. This type of household is called a 
‘buying household’ in this thesis.  
 
The contracted and buying households were concentrated in two of the three villages 
in the study, namely Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard, whilst Baan Hat householders 
acquired oil palm seedlings differently. In Baan Hat, none of the oil palm growers 
obtained seedlings through the involvement of NKO (see Table 4.4). All of the 
households in this village ordered oil palm seedlings from private suppliers, either 
locally or in the Southern region. Thus the farmers in Baan Hat had obtained their oil 
palm knowledge from different sources from the contracted farmers in Baan Tarn and 
Baan Sa Ard.   
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Table 4.4: Number of Households and Sources of Acquiring Oil Palm Seedlings 
by Village 
 
Village 
NKO * 
Private Suppliers * 
Contracted  
Households 
Buying  
Households 
1. Baan Tarn 9/14 (64%) 6/14 (43%) 2/14 (14%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 9/23 (39%) 11/23 (48%) 5/23 (22%) 
3. Baan Hat 0/8 (0%) 0/8 (0%) 8/8 (100%) 
Total 18/45 (40%) 17/45 (38%) 15/45 (33%) 
 
* The total number in each category might exceed the total number of interviews as several 
households acquired their oil palm seedlings from more than one source. 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
Nonetheless, there were several differences between the contracted and buying 
farmers in acquiring oil palm expertise. Most of the contracted households received 
before-planting advice from NKO, such as land preparation, lining and planting holes, 
planting techniques, and practice lessons in the oil palm testing field. Additionally, 
the contacted farmers were offered initial soil testing by DOA officials to ensure that 
the areas were suitable for oil palm cultivation. Underground water levels were 
checked to ensure the areas had sufficient underground water to support the growing 
of oil palms (see Picture 4.1).  
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Picture 4.1: DOA’s Soil Testing Document from Baan Tarn 
 
 
 
Source: Photograph by the Author (2010) 
 
According to the Oil Palm Plantations Supporting Project (OPPSP), Department of 
Agriculture (DOA) had to provide the contracted farmers with oil palm knowledge 
and maintenance techniques both before and after the seedlings were planted. Nong 
Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO)is the local government agency under DOA 
that works in support of DOA’s measures. However, from the interviews, there was 
confusion in many households that the officials in the soil testing and monitoring of 
oil palms were from NKO, which signified that few farmers were participating in the 
OPPSP.   
 
The fact that the government had made oil palm knowledge accessible played an 
important role in convincing the contracted farmers to make the change to oil palm 
cultivation.  
 
“I was interested in oil palms but I had no idea how to plant them 
here. The project was good for me. They (NKO officials) gave us 
everything we need to plant oil palms. They provided us with the 
seedlings, advised us in the testing fields, and gave us the handbooks. 
The only problem is: will it work here?” explained one interviewee at 
Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
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Talking to the DOA officials while the soil was being tested also assisted the 
contracted farmers in gaining oil palm knowledge, the same interviewee further 
explained: 
 
“I also asked them (DOA officials) during the soil testing, but it was 
all about techniques and tips for oil palm plantations. Water is a key. I 
was excited. Luckily, my land was okay for planting.” 
 
As well as this initial help, DOA officials came to the villages to monitor the oil 
palms’ growth for the contracted farmers. However, the frequency of the visits 
differed between the two villages: they visited Baan Tarn approximately once every 4 
months, and Baan Sa Ard once every 6 months. The contracted farmers could also 
take advantage of these visits to gain further oil palm knowledge by asking the 
officials.  
 
“If we have problems, we can ask them (DOA officials) when they 
come. They gave us some advice, but we don’t actually know exactly 
when they will come to see us. The latest was early this year (in 
2010),” said an interviewee from Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structure 
interview, May 2010).  
 
In contrast to the certified oil palm seedlings received from NKO, the buying farmers 
had to plant oil palms at their own risk and expense. There were no soil testing and 
monitoring processes involved in the oil palm planting for this group of farmers. 
Although the buying farmers were able to ask NKO officials for advice on any oil 
palm related issues, in reality the buying farmers did not ask for oil palm knowledge 
from NKO, and the NKO officials only provided handbooks for the buying farmers 
(see Picture 4.2). Moreover, some buying farmers obtained NKO’s seedlings through 
their friends in the village. The farmers did not contact NKO directly, so they had no 
opportunity to gain proper oil palm knowledge from NKO.  
 
“I wanted the oil palm seedlings from NKO because it is cheaper and I 
trusted NKO. But I didn’t go to NKO myself because it was quite far 
from here. My friend got them (oil palm seedlings) for me, along with 
the handbooks,” explained one interviewee (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-
structured interview, July 2010).  
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Picture 4.2: The Oil Palm Handbooks Provided by NKO 
 
 
 
Source: Photographs by the Author (2010) 
 
The oil palm seminars run by the local Agricultural Extension Offices in co-operation 
with NKO were meant to be an important source of oil palm knowledge for farmers 
who were interested in oil palm cultivation. The seminars included the markets for oil 
palm, management of oil palm farming, suggestions of appropriate fertilisers, and oil 
palm harvesting techniques with oil palm experts from the Southern region as guest 
speakers. However, the fact that the seminars could not be held on a regular basis 
made it difficult for the farmers to obtain oil palm knowledge from the local 
government. They had to go directly to the local Agricultural Extension Offices or 
NKO for advice, as an interviewee described: 
 
“I went to a seminar at Seka Agricultural Extension Office (SAE) a 
long time ago. It was useful, but it was, like, once in two or three 
years. Contacting NKO or SAE is not practical for us. NKO is too far 
away. We can ask the officials at SAE about oil palms at the rubber 
meeting, but we prefer asking people who have planted them around 
our village.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
The evidence also showed that some farmers were reluctant to attend the oil palm 
seminars provided by the government sector. They felt that they did not have the right 
to attend the seminars because they had not borrowed oil palm seedlings from NKO.  
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“I bought seedlings from NKO. But my name wasn’t on the list for the 
seminar. I was too shy to attend so I decided to ask (about the 
seminar) my friend who was in the project.” (Female, Baan Tarn, 
semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The second way of acquiring oil palm knowledge was from the experience some of 
the farmers had gained previously. These farmers were confident about starting oil 
palm plantations because they had previously worked in oil palm farming in the 
Southern region and had learned how to grow and harvest oil palms there. Some 
farmers had worked in the south mainly as rubber tappers or construction workers and 
had just spent their spare time as hired labour in the oil palm fields nearby, cutting 
palm fruit bunches. Some were originally from the south and had migrated to live in 
the Northeast region. The interviewee explained,  
 
“I worked in the south, in the oil palm fields, for 3 years. I learned the 
oil palm skills from there and also brought three oil palm seedlings 
with me when I came back. I just wanted to try. They grew well here 
so I was quite confident in deciding to plant more.” (Male, Baan Sa 
Ard, semi-structured interview, August, 2010).  
 
The final way the farmers in this study had acquired oil palm knowledge was by 
learning from people who had experience of planting oil palms, including private 
suppliers. Many interviewees (31 of 45 households) said that they were not concerned 
about acquiring oil palm knowledge before planting oil palms because they could 
easily consult with other oil palm farmers in their village. Some contacted friends 
who had oil palm plantations either around the village or in the Southern region for 
additional advice. Nonetheless, they were concerned about the techniques they would 
need after planting. As several interviewees stated, there was no single conclusion 
about the best way to maintain oil palms and they were worried about their yields.  
 
In the case of Baan Hat, consulting with experienced farmers was the primary source 
of oil palm knowledge. The interviewees did not pay attention to the government 
supports, although they went to the seminars which were organised - albeit rarely - by 
the local government. The private seedlings supplier B, who lived in the village, was 
essential in providing oil palm knowledge for the oil palm farmers in Baan Hat. 
 
“I got the knowledge from him (private seedlings supplier B). He 
came from the south so he knew how to plant it. I bought the oil palm 
seedlings from him then he taught me. He will come to see if you have 
any problems. The planting of oil palms wasn’t that difficult,” said the 
respondent in Baan Hat (Male, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
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To summarise, this sub-section has shown that the farmers have various sources of oil 
palm knowledge. The knowledge provided by the government plays a significant role 
as most of the oil palm farmers are involved with the government agencies. Oil palm 
seminars organised by NKO and district-level Agricultural Extension Offices, and the 
loans of oil palm seedlings provided by NKO, also help boost the farmers’ confidence 
in growing oil palms. Learning from other farmers with experience of oil palm and 
some of the farmers’ own experience in the South are also useful and help encourage 
the farmers’ confidence to begin oil palm cultivation (see Table 4.5). In the next sub-
section, I will move on to investigating the farmers’ sources of funding for oil palm 
cultivation.  
 
Table 4.5: Number of Households and the Farmers’ Sources of Acquiring Oil 
Palm Knowledge by Village 
 
Village  From Government  
From Southern 
Experiences 
From Oil Palm 
Experienced Farmers 
1. Baan Tarn 12/14 (86%) 2/14 (14%) 5/14 (36%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 19/23 (83%) 3/23 (13%) 15/23 (65%) 
3. Baan Hat 6*/8 (75%) 2/8 (25%) 6/8 (75%) 
Total 37/45 (82%) 7/45 (16%) 24/45 (53%) 
 
* From attending seminars provided by SAE and NKO only.  
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
4.5.2 The Farmers’ Sources of Oil Palm Funding 
 
In terms of the farmers’ sources of funding for oil palm cultivation, the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) could not provide financial 
support to attract the farmers in the three villages. Although the central government 
granted financial support for oil palm investment through BAAC’s soft loans with a 
total value of 7 billion Baht in 2007 (Siriwardhana et al., 2009), none of the farmers in 
this research participated in the Oil Palm Plantations for Alternative Energy Project 
(OPPAEP) because the interest rate was higher than the normal rate that the farmers 
could get.  
 
“I didn’t want to go for the BAAC’s oil palm project. It was 
expensive. Getting money from the village fund or the local co-
operative was cheaper and a lot easier,” explained a respondent in 
Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
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Thus, the farmers had to find their own sources of funding to cultivate the oil palms. 
The evidence shows that oil palm cultivation has favoured the rich farmers in all three 
villages. Most of the oil palm farmers (44 of 45 households) had higher annual 
income than the average incomes of people in Phon Phisai, So Phisai, and Seka 
districts, which were at 38,777 Baht, 38,012 Baht, and 37,502 Baht in 2009 
respectively (see Appendix A). The farmers that are able to invest in oil palms are 
those whose financial position is better than that of the average rice farmer in the 
villages, as one interviewee explained: 
 
“The government only lately came in to play seriously (in the 
OPPSP), but they only help partly. They did not grant us money or 
fertilisers to grow oil palms, unlike rubber. So, the growers have to 
have their own capital, maybe from rubber cultivation, savings, or 
even remittances from family or children working in the cities, and so 
on. Doing only rice farming would make it extremely difficult to 
accommodate oil palms.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
 
Clearly, the picture of oil palm funding was different in each village. In Baan Sa Ard, 
rubber tapping was the major source of household income which provided financial 
support for oil palm cultivation. Every household in the interviews at Baan Sa Ard 
planted rubber trees and only one household of the total 23 households was waiting 
for their first rubber harvest. The evidence indicated that most of the farmers’ loans in 
this village were for the expansion of rubber fields through the BAAC’s rubber 
supporting project, yet the farmers spent part of that money to invest in their oil palm 
cultivation, for instance, in the processes of ploughing, preparing water resources, and 
applying fertilisers.  
 
There were four households in the interviews at Baan Sa Ard which had not yet 
generated income from rubber cultivation when they started growing oil palms. These 
households used other sources of income to help fund their oil palm plantations, 
including working as labourers in rubber tapping, running a small retail shop, and 
being the shuttle driver between the village and the school. These four households 
were also found to have loans from BAAC, the village fund and the local co-operative 
under the name of the rubber supporting scheme, of which part of the money was 
utilised in the growing of oil palms.  
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On the other hand, rubber is not the primary source of household income in Baan 
Tarn and Baan Hat. Hence, the farmers in these two villages had to rely on various 
sources of income to support oil palm investment. Some households utilised their 
savings from when they had gone to work in the south or abroad to facilitate oil palm 
investment. Some households spent the money which they received monthly from 
their children who worked outside the area. Some households were selling their 
labour and assets such as cows and buffalos to invest in the crop. Savings from 
running small businesses in the village and government pensions were other sources 
of income which were invested in oil palms. 
 
Money from agricultural loans was another way to support oil palm cultivation 
especially in the maintenance period as many farmers spend this money on fertilisers 
for their oil palms. The loans in these two villages were from three channels, namely 
BAAC, the village funds, and the co-operatives. The loan from BAAC was intended 
for non-oil palm crops: for instance, rice and rubber. However, in reality the farmers 
spent the money to invest in all agricultural activities including oil palm cultivation.  
 
“I borrowed 40,000 Baht from BAAC this year (in 2010) through the 
rubber project. But I spent the money to buy fertilisers for rice, 
eucalyptus, and also oil palms. So, I don’t really know exactly how 
much money I have spent on oil palms. It was a kind of mixture of 
everything,” said an interviewee in Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured 
interview, May 2010).  
 
Interestingly, the findings suggest that some farmers decided to borrow from village 
funds and co-operatives as they are easy to access and their processes are simple. 
However, the amount of borrowing varied between households depending on the size 
of their oil palm plantations, household incomes, and the amount of oil palm 
investment – which in turn depended on whether the farmers had decided to 
participate in the OPPSP. The summary of sources of financial support for oil palm 
investment is depicted in Table 4.6 below.  
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Table 4.6: Number of Households and the Farmers’ Financial Sources for Oil 
Palm Cultivation by Village 
 
Village  
Savings From 
Rubber 
Cultivation  
From Other 
Sources of 
Income* 
From Loans** 
1. Baan Tarn 3/14 (21%) 10/14 (71%) 7/14 (50%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 19/23 (83%) 4/23 (17%) 15/23 (65%) 
3. Baan Hat 1/8 (13%) 6/8 (75%) 4/8 (50%) 
Total 23/45 (51%) 20/45 (44%) 26/45 (58%) 
 
* Other sources of income included working as labourers, selling assets, savings from 
businesses, pensions, and remittances from relatives. 
 
** Loans were from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), 
village funds, and the co-operatives.   
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
This sub-section has explored the farmers’ sources of oil palm funding. I found that 
there is no oil palm funding from BAAC in any of the three villages and the farmers 
need to find their own sources of funding to support oil palm cultivation. This funding 
comes from savings from rubber cultivation, other sources of income including 
selling their labour and remittances from their relatives, and loans. In the next 
element, I will highlight the key factors affecting the farmers’ decisions in choosing 
to begin oil palm cultivation. The next element will also analyse the rice farmers who 
have not yet begun oil palm cultivation, using another set of evidence from 18 
households in the three villages.  
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4.6 Analysis Element 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, I adapted this element to understand the factors 
affecting the decisions of the farmers in the three villages to grow or not to grow oil 
palm. To understand these factors, I have divided this element into two sub-sections: 
the factors affecting the farmers’ decisions to begin oil palm cultivation, and the 
factors which influenced rice farmers’ decisions not to convert to oil palm cultivation. 
This element begins with the analysis of the farmers who have converted to oil palm 
cultivation. 
 
4.6.1 The Factors Affecting Farmers’ Decisions to Adopt Oil Palm 
Cultivation 
 
In the case of the farmers who have begun to grow oil palms, the belief that demand 
for oil palm fruits will rise in future is one of the key factors in switching to the oil 
palm crop. The oil palm farmers in all three villages stress the importance of the oil 
palm fruits, which are used in many industries to manufacture a wide range of 
products, for instance, palm oil in food industries, soap, detergent, cosmetics, plastics, 
and car tyres. The farmers acknowledged the oil palm’s ability to produce an 
astonishing array of upstream products as one interviewee explained,  
 
“They (oil palm fruits) can be used to produce many things. The 
empty bunches can be sold for animal feeding, fertilisers, or for 
mushroom growing. Go to the kitchen, you will see a bottle of palm 
oil. It is essential. I once tried to squeeze the oil palm fruits myself for 
cooking, but it didn’t work well. I don’t know how they turn them into 
the diesel oil that is used in engines, but I am quite sure it will be good 
for us. We will have a market for our crop.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-
structured interview, May 2010).  
 
Many interviewees also perceived that planting oil palms makes them feel really good 
as if they could produce crude oil above the ground. 
 
“It is like having oil wells on the surface. It is great, isn’t it? Oil is 
expensive these days and we can plant it now. So, oil palms have a 
bright future in my opinion.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010). 
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The price of oil palm fruits and the marketing channels from growers to buyers were 
other factors determining whether farmers adopted the crop. The price of Fresh Fruit 
Bunches (FFB) was at its peak in 2008 at 4.23 Baht per kilogramme, which provided 
a good incentive for farmers to start growing oil palms in that period (see Table 4.7). 
Most of the contracted farmers began to cultivate oil palms during 2007 and 2008, 
when the price of oil palm fruits was good.  
 
“When the government approached us with the project, the price was 
really good and I thought about it. Now (in 2010) the price has 
dropped, but I don’t think it will go down further. I believe that the 
price will go up again and I don’t really care about the price now. I 
focus on the maintenance. 3 Baht per kilogramme is what I want and I 
think it is quite possible.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-structured 
interview, May 2010). 
 
Table 4.7: Average Price of Oil Palm Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB), 2000-2009 
 
Year 
FFB Price 
(Baht per Kilogramme) 
2000 1.66 
2001 1.19 
2002 2.30 
2003 2.34 
2004 3.11 
2005 2.76 
2006 2.39 
2007 4.07 
2008 4.23 
2009 3.64 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
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The link between the farmers and the buyers of oil palm fruits is also essential in 
building the confidence of the farmers enough for them to adopt oil palm cultivation. 
In Baan Sa Ard, the farmers have a clear marketing channel in mind and plan to sell 
oil palm fruits as a group to a private merchant once a fortnight in the next village, 
which we will call Baan Ngam. It was local leader H, who lived in Baan Ngam, who 
contacted a middleman who then shipped the oil palm fruits to feed the oil palm 
refinery in Chonburi province. In the case of Baan Tarn, the same structure of 
planning was applied. The farmers planned to sell the oil palm fruits together with the 
inspirational local leader G in another village that we will call Baan Tarn Mai, who 
had already harvested oil palms. The only difference between Baan Sa Ard and Baan 
Tarn was the fact that the trade system was up and running at the time I interviewed 
the farmers in Baan Sa Ard, whilst in Baan Tarn the system was still at the planning 
stage and the farmers in the village who had already harvested sold their oil palm 
fruits to private merchant A individually. 
 
The farmers in Baan Hat had to transport the oil palm fruits and sell them to the 
middleman at Kum Tha Kla district, Sakhon Nakorn province, which is 35 kilometres 
away from the village. However, they plan to sell as a group in the future. The 
respondent in the village explained,  
 
“If we have more production than we have now, they (the middleman) 
will come and buy them (oil palm fruits) at the village. Now we have 
to sell them at their place. I think we have to wait for the people 
around the area to harvest oil palms, then the buyer will definitely 
come to our village. Selling as a group might get a better price, but it 
is for the future. One step at a time. At least it is good to know that 
there are oil palm buyers around in the area.” (Male, semi-structured 
interview, June 2010).  
 
According to the OPPSP, many farmers were interested in the project and accepted 
that the project was crucial in persuading them towards oil palm adoption, particularly 
in Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard. The OPPSP, which I described in the previous 
observation element, provided contracted farmers with both oil palm knowledge and 
financial support. The knowledge included planting and maintenance techniques. This 
group of farmers was also offered financial aid via the loan of oil palm seedlings. To 
general farmers, NKO, DOA, and district-level Agricultural Extension Offices were 
the government agencies that collaborated to offer oil palm seminars and certified oil 
palm seedlings at the below-market price of 50 to 60 Baht per seedling, compared to 
70 to 180 Baht per seedling from the private suppliers in the areas. 
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However, the project had already finished at the time I was in the field site. Farmers 
were not able to register for the project and hardly any oil palm seedlings have been 
provided by the NKO in the area since 2009. Thus, some of the farmers in the 
interviews who were interested in participating in the project were forced to buy oil 
palm seedlings from either NKO (as buying farmers) or from private suppliers. The 
farmers who had started growing oil palms admitted that the government’s support 
was influential in their deciding to plant oil palms. An interviewee in Baan Tarn 
explained,  
 
“Now there is no borrowing project from the government. I hope the 
project is back soon, so I can plant more without spending my own 
money first. I think there are many people who are interested in 
planting oil palms and want to join the project. To know that the 
government is all around supporting us makes the decision a lot 
easier.” (Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010). 
 
In fact, there were three households in Baan Tarn that had firm intentions of joining 
the oil palm project, but these households did not have land that was suitable for oil 
palm cultivation because their rice land was slightly hilly. The NKO therefore did not 
accept these farmers into the project, so they decided to buy oil palm seedlings from 
NKO and grow them at their own risk. This, in other words, meant that NKO supplied 
oil palm seedlings to farmers who did not have suitable land for oil palm cultivation. 
This could surely affect the overall quality of oil palm cultivation in the Northeast 
region in the future.  
 
Examples of oil palm farmers’ attitudes towards rice cultivation include: 
 
“Planting rice cannot feed your stomach. You have to find extra 
money to support rice.” 
 
“No one is rich from rice. Only orchardist does.” 
 
“You should plant rice just for your own eating and do something else 
with the land.” 
 
“You won’t get rich by growing rice. If you plant rubber trees or oil 
palms on 10 to 20 rais, you will get a car and also have savings in 
your account.” 
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According to the problem detection element, the oil palm farmers also felt that rice 
cultivation in the villages was low in productivity, using huge labour, and with high 
costs of production. Thus, most of the oil palm farmers mentioned dissatisfaction with 
rice cultivation as part of their reason for planting oil palms. When I started to discuss 
oil palm adoption issues, the first reaction of many interviewees was, ‘Rice is not 
worth growing’.  
 
The role of inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm growers had been 
prominent in convincing the oil palm farmers to make the switch. These leaders had 
previously been oil palm producers outside the villages. They brought oil palm 
cultivation into the area and had already harvested oil palms. Most of the households 
in Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard who had already started growing oil palms referred to 
the inspirational local leaders as examples of success with the crop. The picture was 
positive in Baan Sa Ard as the local leader was willing to offer oil palm support to 
other farmers and also had a firm intention of forming a group of oil palm farmers in 
the area. As a result, the oil palm farmers in this village had been confident in starting 
a new crop. 
 
“Esaan people have to see others do it (oil palm cultivation) 
successfully first, they will then follow. He (inspirational local leader 
H) did it well and is a leader around our village.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, 
semi-structured interview, July, 2010).  
 
The situation in Baan Hat, however, differed from the other two villages. There were 
no inspirational local people around the areas. Indeed, there were three households in 
the village that were able to harvest the oil palms at the time I interviewed the oil 
palm producers. However, they were all considered unsuccessful as oil palm 
producers in this research due to low yields and a lack of profit.  
 
On the other hand, some households in the interviews described large-scale oil palm 
producers as their motivation. The oil palm growers stressed that the very fact of the 
capitalists’ investment in oil palm plantations signified that the crop had great 
potential to grow well in the area. This reduced some farmers’ worries regarding oil 
palm cultivation.  
 
“Large-scale oil palm producer E came in to grow oil palms on more 
than 1,000 rais around the area of Phon Phisai district. They have to 
know what they are doing to spend a lot of money in planting oil 
palms. The crop should be good and when big investors come in to 
play, a lot of things will follow such as factories, a market, jobs, and 
knowledge.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
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According to the problem definition element, the characteristics of oil palm itself are 
the factors shaping the farmers’ decisions to establish oil palm plantations. Four 
significant advantages commonly mentioned by the farmers were: the oil palm’s 
ability to produce a harvestable crop every 15 days; its long life-span; one-off 
planting; and using less labour in growing and harvesting. The farmers also thought 
that skilled labour is not necessary to harvest the crop. Thus labour for the plantations 
could be found without difficulty. The crop owner could hire casual agricultural 
labour to harvest the crop at a wage of 180 to 250 Baht per person per day depending 
on the agricultural season. An alternative option open to owners is piece work - 
paying labourers according to the weight of oil palm fruit harvested. One tonne of oil 
palm fruits is equivalent to 150 to 200 Baht of labour cost. This labour cost is 
attractive to oil palm farmers especially in comparison to rice farming.  
 
Some farmers pointed out that they were interested in oil palms because they could 
easily replace oil palms with rice if the oil palm crop was not commercially viable.  
 
“I gave it a try because if it doesn’t work, I can go back to growing 
rice as usual. Not like the eucalyptus. It’s as simple as that,” said a 
respondent in Baan Hat (Male, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
The experience of oil palm cultivation in the Southern region helped encourage the 
farmers to experiment with growing oil palm in the Northeast region by providing oil 
palm knowledge. In many interviews, the farmers stressed the desire to try something 
new on the land they owned.  
 
“I just want to try whether oil palms will work here or not. I had two 
pieces of land growing rice. I chose to plant oil palms on the smaller 
one. It is too risky to plant oil palms on all my rice paddy fields. 
Actually, there are some parts of my rice paddy fields where I can’t 
grow oil palms. It is on a slope and gets flooded at times,” (Male, 
Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 2010).   
 
This perception was widespread amongst the farmers and was reflected in the amount 
of land each household devoted to rice and oil palm cultivation. Only one household 
had replaced all their rice paddy fields with oil palms. The number of households 
which devoted more land to oil palms than rice was still low, at 6 households out of 
the total 45 oil palm farmers in the study (see Table 4.8). The evidence also showed 
that the rice paddy fields were the primary source of land converted to oil palm 
plantations. Although some farmers used less profitable land such as pasturage and 
bamboo-rich lands to cultivate oil palms, 38 households switched rice paddy fields to 
oil palm cultivation (see Table 4.9). An interviewee added his view,  
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“I bought new land for planting oil palms. It has to be rice paddy 
fields with water resources nearby. I think that is the most suitable 
land for oil palm plantations.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
 
Table 4.8: Number of Households and Structure of Oil Palm and Rice 
Cultivation in One Household by Village 
 
Village  
Completely 
Switched to Oil 
Palms 
More Lands 
Devoted to Oil 
Palms 
More Lands 
Devoted to Rice 
1. Baan Tarn 0/14 (0%) 2/14 (14%) 12/14 (86%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 1/23 (4%) 3/23 (13%) 19/23 (83%) 
3. Baan Hat 0/8 (0%) 1*/8 (13%) 6*/8 (75%) 
Total 1/45 (2%) 6/45 (13%) 37/45 (82%) 
 
* One household in Baan Hat had the equal amount of lands devoted to rice and oil palm 
cultivation.  
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
Table 4.9: Number of Households and Previous Crops Occupying the Oil Palm 
Land by Village 
 
Village  Rice  Unbeneficial  Land Cassava Eucalyptus Rubber 
1. Baan Tarn 12/14 (86%) 2/14 (14%) 1/14 (7%) 2/14 (14%) 0/14 (0%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 21/23 (91%) 3/23 (13%) 1/23 (4%) 1/23 (4%) 0/23 (0%) 
3. Baan Hat 5/8 (63%) 2/8 (25%) 1/8 (13%) 0/8 (0%) 1/8 (13%) 
Total 38/45 (84%) 7/45 (16%) 3/45 (7%) 3/45 (7%) 1/45 (2%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
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Remarkably, rubber planting had boosted the confidence of the farmers who had 
made the change in starting to cultivate oil palms. According to the observation 
element, many households spent their rubber savings and incomes to support the 
investment of oil palms (see Table 4.6). However, planting rubber trees had reassured 
the farmers with expectations of good incomes in the future, even during the period 
that they were waiting for their first harvest. Thus, the farmers who had made the 
change, and who were waiting for rubber incomes, had transferred their confidence in 
rubber plantations to oil palm cultivation. A respondent in Baan Tarn explained,  
 
“The first and second year of growing oil palms was a bit difficult for 
us. But when we start rubber tapping next year, the situation will be a 
lot better. We decided to grow oil palms because of the government 
support and the fact that we were on the fourth year of growing rubber 
trees.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The number of households planting rubber trees in the three villages is presented in 
Table 4.10 below.  
 
Table 4.10: Number of Households in Rubber Cultivation by Village 
 
Village 
Rubber Cultivation 
Already Harvested Awaiting for Harvesting 
1. Baan Tarn 3/14 (21%) 7/14 (50%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 22/23 (96%) 1/23 (4%) 
3. Baan Hat 1/8 (13%) 2/8 (25%) 
Total 26/45 (58%) 10/45 (22%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
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As we have seen, this sub-section has identified the key factors affecting the farmers’ 
decision to adopt oil palm cultivation in the three villages. The results show that the 
farmers’ expectation of high incomes from rubber in the future was the key factor that 
gave them additional confidence to invest in oil palms. The farmers’ oil palm 
experience in the Southern region was also essential in terms of providing the skills 
and knowledge to grow and harvest oil palm. Moreover, the roles of inspirational 
local leaders and the large-scale oil palm producers were crucial, as it is part of the 
culture of the Northeast farmers that they need role models in order to start doing 
anything different in the region. The fact that oil palms can be used to produce a wide 
array of products convinced the farmers that the demand for palm oil would increase 
significantly in the future. The robust marketing channels from growers to buyers in 
the area were the key influencing factor for the farmers, especially in the case of Baan 
Sa Ard. Moreover, the characteristics of oil palm cultivation, for instance, a 15 day 
harvesting interval, long life-span, single-time planting, and low labour requirement 
for growing and harvesting, have attracted the farmers to switch to it. Having 
identified the key factors in some farmers choosing to adopt oil palm cultivation, I 
will move on in the next sub-section to discuss the reasons for others choosing not to 
adopt oil palm cultivation but to continue as rice farmers.   
 
4.6.2 The Factors Affecting Rice Farmers’ Decisions Not to Adopt Oil 
Palm Cultivation 
 
On the other side of the story, it is essential to understand oil palm issues from the 
perspective of the farmers who have not yet adopted oil palm cultivation. From the 
evidence of the 18 interviews, I can group the rice farmers into three categories: rice 
farmers who plan to cultivate oil palms in the near future; rice farmers who are 
interested in oil palm cultivation but with conditions; and rice farmers who are not 
interested in oil palm cultivation at all. The details are presented in Table 4.11 below.  
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Table 4.11: Number of Rice-growing Households by Village and their Interest in 
Oil Palm 
 
Village 
Already Plan to 
Cultivate 
Interested with 
Conditions 
Not Interested 
> 20  
rais 
< 20  
rais 
> 20  
rais 
< 20  
Rais 
> 20  
Rais 
< 20  
rais 
1. Baan Tarn 1/3 0/3 2/3 2/3 0/3 1/3 
2. Baan Sa Ard 0/3 0/3 0/3 2/3 3/3 1/3 
3. Baan Hat 1/3 0/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/3 
Total 2/18 (11%) 9/18 (50%) 7/18 (40%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
The “interested” rice farmers stressed the importance of government support in 
funding oil palm cultivation. As stated in Chapter 3, the criteria for interviewing the 
rice farmers were based on how much rice they grew: more than 20 rais of rice paddy 
fields, and less. The findings showed that the latter were more likely to rely on 
government support because most of the rice farmers in this category refused to 
convert all their rice paddy fields to oil palm cultivation. In addition, the “interested” 
farmers who had less than 20 rais of rice emphasised their reluctance to start growing 
oil palms on the grounds of their land being unsuitable. Some of the rice farmers who 
are interested in oil palms underlined that parts of their rice paddy fields are not 
suitable for oil palm cultivation because the land is slightly hilly. Besides, their rice 
paddy fields lack the water resources to meet the requirement of oil palm cultivation. 
Thus, they need to install systems for watering oil palm trees, which would require 
capital that they thought the government should provide.  
 
These farmers also accentuated the need to obtain more capital to invest in buying 
additional land to grow oil palms.  
 
“I want to try oil palms and keep it for my kids, but I don’t have 
money to buy extra land for oil palms. Land is expensive these days. 
If I use my current rice paddy fields to grow oil palms, what will I eat 
then? That’s why I want the government to come in and help 
seriously,” explained the interviewee in Baan Hat (Male, semi-
structured interview, June 2010). 
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Many interested rice farmers stressed that the quality of oil palm seedlings was their 
main concern in making a decision as to whether oil palms were commercially viable 
in the area. Indeed, there are several private suppliers of oil palm seedlings nearby, 
but the “interested” rice farmers would prefer the oil palm seedlings to be provided by 
the government for two reasons. First, they trust the quality of NKO’s seedlings and 
could ask for replacements if the seedlings did not thrive as a result of diseases, 
insects, or unusual infections. However, NKO’s seedlings were difficult to find in the 
market, especially in 2010, due to a supply shortage.  
 
Although most of the private seedling suppliers offer several varieties of DOA-
certified oil palm seedlings, some farmers still hesitate to buy them due to concerns 
over low quality varieties, which would affect the yield and oil content. The second 
reason is that private suppliers were charging a significantly higher price for their 
seedlings than NKO. The price of private seedlings varied from 70 Baht to 180 Baht 
per seedling depending on varieties, whilst NKO’s seedlings were sold at 50 to 60 
Baht per seedling.  
 
Another important factor for the “interested” rice farmers in delaying oil palm 
cultivation was the fact that not many oil palm producers in the villages had yet 
harvested oil palms (see Table 4.12). The “interested” rice farmers emphasised that 
they were worried about the market and the fluctuating price of oil palm fruits.  
 
“Now very few people around the village are selling oil palm fruits. 
They still have to wait for the palms to become productive. If the 
outcome shows that they have profits and the government shows a 
will to support, I will definitely go in,” said a respondent in Baan Tarn 
(Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The want of local farmers who had successfully harvested an oil palm crop affected 
the decision-making of the rice farmers, especially in Baan Hat, where there was no 
local trailblazer to take a lead. In Baan Hat, 4 of the 6 interviewees strongly rejected 
oil palm cultivation, and all of them mentioned the lack of successful examples of 
growing oil palm around the area.  
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Table 4.12: Number of Households Harvesting Oil Palm by Village 
 
Village  Already Harvesting Oil Palm 
1. Baan Tarn 1/14 (7%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 2/23 (9%) 
3. Baan Hat 3/8 (38%) 
Total 6/45 (13%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
As for the farmers who were totally uninterested in oil palm cultivation, there were 
two main explanations. Firstly, these farmers were quite content with their lives and 
jobs at the moment. They stated that they had no incentive to start a new crop and also 
did not want to get themselves into more debt.  
 
“I have heard people talking about oil palms in the village, but I am 
not interested. I only grow rice and I think some parts of my land are 
suitable for oil palm plantations. My children are settled in other 
places and send money back to me every month. I am happy with the 
way it is now. No need to risk anything more,” clarified one 
interviewee (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
Secondly, these households consisted of elderly people or had insufficient labour to 
cultivate a new crop. Some of these households spent their labour in rubber tapping 
either on their own lands or as agricultural labourers.  
 
“Doing rubber tapping with my children on our own land is quite 
hard. We don’t have enough labour to do anything more. Plus, I am 
used to selling rice. If I have to buy rice, it will feel weird to me. I am 
a son of a rice farmer and so proud to be a rice farmer,” explained one 
interviewee in Baan Sa Ard (Male, semi-structured interview, August 
2010).  
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The rice farmers who planned to cultivate oil palm in future presented a different 
picture. These rice farmers were confident in the long-term market for oil palms, even 
though they had concerns over the short-term price of oil palm fruits and the 
suitability of their land. Additionally, a major reason why these farmers were 
planning to cultivate oil palms in future rather than immediately was that they were 
waiting to harvest their first rubber and they planned to invest in oil palm cultivation 
once the rubber income was established.  
 
“I will use part of my rice paddy fields to grow oil palms. Just to give 
it a try. My rubber trees will start to yield next year. So after 
everything is okay, I will plant oil palms. The price should be good in 
the future. It is surely better than rice,” said a rice farmer (Male, Baan 
Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
Interestingly, 4 households of the total 9 households that cultivated more than 20 rais 
of rice were not interested in oil palm cultivation. This implied that how much rice 
they grow has only minimally affected the decision of the rice farmers in this research 
to adopt oil palm cultivation. In contrast, the rice-growing households with less than 
20 rais of rice were likely to adopt oil palm cultivation in the future, as 6 of the 9 
households were interested in oil palm cultivation. It is worth noting that acquiring oil 
palm knowledge was not a concern for the rice farmers; they underlined their 
confidence that they could ask oil palm experienced farmers in and around the 
villages.  
 
To sum up, this sub-section suggested that most of the rice farmers who had not yet 
adopted oil palm cultivation were interested in planting oil palms in the future, subject 
to concerns over future support from the government, the quality of oil palm 
seedlings, and the shortage of successful oil palm producers around the areas. The rice 
farmers who were not interested in oil palm cultivation insisted that they had no 
incentive to plant oil palms because they were happy with their life and jobs at that 
moment, and also because they were short of help on the farm. This research also 
suggests that the amount of rice grown has only minimally affected the rice farmers 
attitudes towards oil palm adoption. In the next element, I will examine the farmers’ 
views of oil palm cultivation based on personal norms and habits, including whether - 
and in what ways - oil palm planting is suited to the farmers’ lifestyle.    
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4.7 Development of Intention Element  
 
I adjusted this element to understand the farmers’ views of oil palm cultivation based 
on personal norms and habits. Even if all the factors discussed in the previous five 
elements were in favour of a farmer choosing to go into oil palm cultivation, this did 
not guarantee implementation. This element therefore examines whether oil palm 
growing is suited to the farmers’ behaviour and, if so, in what ways.  
 
Only one negative perception about oil palm cultivation emerged from both the oil 
palm farmers’ and the rice farmers’ interviews, and it was something that went 
against the farmers’ personal norms and habits. A farmer suggested that one of the 
reasons not to adopt oil palm cultivation was that oil palm trees have a lot of thorns, 
which the farmer was not comfortable with.  
 
“I don’t have enough help on the farm to do oil palms. I am old now. 
But more important, I hate the thorns of oil palms. They hurt my skin 
when I was trying to cut the oil palm bunches and I didn’t want to get 
close to them,” lamented a rice farmer in Baan Hat (Male, semi-
structured interview, June 2010).  
 
Nonetheless, most of the farmers reckoned that oil palm cultivation suited their ways 
of life well, especially compared with rubber cultivation. Rubber trees are not a 
traditional crop in the Northeast region. Thus, oil palm and rubber trees have one 
similarity in terms of being a new crop in the Northeast, and the farmers used to 
compare the suitability of these two crops to their life. In essence, oil palm plantations 
offer the farmers more free time as growing and harvesting is less labour intensive. 
The farmers, thus, have more time which they could either use to concentrate on 
seeking additional jobs to boost their household incomes or spend as leisure time. 
Moreover, some of the farmers suggested that not only is oil palm cultivation easy in 
terms of maintenance, but also oil palm harvesting occurs during daylight hours, 
which suits their habits and personal norms.  
 
In contrast, rubber cultivation requires farmers to change their personal norms and 
habits. Rubber tapping must be done at night during a dry period. The farmers in the 
three villages need to work at night, 5 or 6 days a week, when the weather permits. 
Cultivating rubber trees is hard work, in the farmers’ view. When it is time for 
tapping, the farmers have no choice but to work all night or else lose money. One 
interviewee further pointed out,  
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“When you get older, rubber is less suitable for your life. It is really 
hard to always work in the night. Life is not a life.” (Male, Baan Tarn, 
semi-structured interview, May 2010).   
 
To reiterate, the findings in this element suggest that oil palm cultivation in the three 
villages had shown no characteristics that were contrary to the farmers’ personal 
norms and habits, especially when compared to growing rubber. Oil palm cultivation 
does not disrupt the farmers’ personal norms and habits: 
 
“Oil palms don’t require much of our attention. We can live our 
normal life. It is better than rubber in this respect. In the future, maybe 
I will hire someone else to do the rubber tapping for me and I will do 
only oil palm harvesting myself. I will have more time to chill.” 
(Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
The next element addresses the consequences of oil palm adoption by evaluating the 
socio-economic aspects of the farmers’ situation after the implementation of oil palm 
cultivation in the study areas.   
 
4.8 Implementation Element 
 
This element was adapted to understand the farmers’ socio-economic situation after 
implementing oil palm cultivation. In the first sub-section of this element, I will 
investigate the changes, in social terms, to the farmers’ ways of life as a result of oil 
palm adoption. The second sub-section then examines the farmers’ financial situations 
after adopting oil palm production, looking at both troubled and thriving households. 
The final sub-section of this element is devoted to a discussion of the environmental 
issues of oil palm plantations in the three villages.  
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4.8.1 Social Situation after the Implementation of Oil Palm 
Cultivation 
 
In social terms, the majority of the farmers insisted that cultivating the oil palm did 
not make them feel that their way of life had changed significantly because once it 
was established the crop required simply watering, fertilising, and grass cutting during 
the maintenance period. The farmers might need to tend their oil palms anything from 
twice a week to once in 6 months. The farmers also suggested that oil palms and rice 
are different in terms of the time that has to be devoted to the crop. Rice cultivation 
requires intense work only in a certain part of the year, whilst oil palms involve less 
intense work but require regular monitoring throughout the year. Which of rice and 
oil palm cultivation requires more effort is a subjective question based on an 
individual’s own view. Some of the farmers consider that they have less work after 
switching some parts of their rice paddy fields to oil palms and thus have more time 
for other activities, including spending time with their families, which is something 
some farmers valued.   
 
Some farmers felt as if nothing had changed after oil palm adoption, as one 
interviewee described,  
 
“I feel the same. Okay, it (oil palm cultivation) is less heavy than 
doing rice, but you have to do it in most of the year. So, taking 
everything into account, I didn’t feel much of a change.” (Male, Baan 
Tarn, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
Interestingly, some farmers did not notice the changes because they normally hire 
agricultural labour to do the rice cultivation. In other words, the farmers no longer 
cultivate the rice themselves and oil palm cultivation has only added a small burden to 
their efforts. Some farmers also emphasised that oil palm cultivation has given them 
hope for a better life, which in turn has strengthened their family relationships.  
 
“The crop brings hope to us. I am feeling excited and enthusiastic. 
With hope, I have good feeling about myself. Everyone in my family 
is also excited and we help each other in taking care of the crop and 
everything. The relationships in the family are getting better,” 
expressed a respondent in Baan Sa Ard (Male, semi-structured 
interview, July 2010). 
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Nonetheless, there were some farmers who stated that they put considerably more 
energy into growing, maintaining and harvesting oil palms than they did before. 
These were rubber-based farmers, who had spent most of their time doing rubber 
tapping without hiring agricultural labour and felt that cultivating oil palms had 
brought them additional work. In fact, the farmers admitted that oil palm cultivation 
was considered as light work compared to rice cultivation, but doing all the 
agricultural work themselves for rice, rubber and oil palms was exhausting. This type 
of household was mostly found in Baan Sa Ard as Table 4.13 explains.  
 
Table 4.13: Number of Households and Their Feeling After Oil Palm Adoption 
 
Village  Feeling as Normal 
Working Harder 
than Prior Better Off 
1. Baan Tarn 9/14 (64%) 3/14 (21%) 2/14 (14%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 8/23 (35%) 9/23 (39%) 6/23 (26%) 
3. Baan Hat 7/8 (88%) 1/8 (13%) 0/8 (0%) 
Total 24/45 (53%) 13/45 (29%) 8/45 (18%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
In short, after adopting oil palms, the majority of the farmers insisted that it did not 
make them feel that their way of life had changed significantly, because in the 
maintenance period the crop simply required watering, fertilising, and grass cutting. 
The next sub-section investigates the economic aspect after the farmers adopted oil 
palm cultivation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
4.8.2 Economic Aspect after the Implementation of Oil Palm 
Cultivation 
 
In economic terms, although most of the households (30 out of 45 households), were 
only slightly affected by oil palm investment in terms of their financial situation, 
some households felt that investing in oil palm cultivation had significantly increased 
their household expenditure and thus negatively affected their standard of living 
and/or their ability to maintain the quality of oil palm crop. According to the 
observation element, the farmers’ funding for investing in oil palms comes from three 
channels: savings from rubber cultivation, other sources of income, and loans (see 
Table 4.6). Each household had their own issues depending on household structure 
and whether they had decided to be in the government’s Oil Palm Plantations 
Supporting Project (OPPSP). The source and amount of income, size of oil palm 
plantation, household expenditure, household habits, and individual circumstances 
also varied amongst the households.  
 
In most of the households that were only slightly affected, savings from rubber 
cultivation played an important role in supporting oil palm investment. Many 
households were found to have loans, mostly under the name of a rubber supporting 
scheme, but the farmers had spent the loan money on all of their agricultural activities 
including oil palm growing. The contracted households were likely to be in the 
‘untroubled’ category in terms of their financial situation. This was because the 
farmers are allowed to defer payment for their oil palm seedlings until the crop starts 
to yield. However, there were several households that faced various financial 
difficulties resulting from investing in oil palm plantations. I will explore the issues 
using the examples of troubled farmers from each village, starting with one in Baan 
Tarn.  
 
In Baan Tarn, the troubled household had cultivated 9 rais of oil palm and 45 rais of 
rice, without any land devoted to rubber plantations. The household income was 
mainly from selling rice and watermelons. The household acquired oil palm seedlings 
from NKO in 2008 but did not participate in the oil palm project due to their land 
being found unsuitable for oil palms. The farmer therefore bought the oil palm 
seedlings directly from NKO at the price of 50 Baht per seedling, which was one of 
the key factors affecting the financial situation of the household. The household also 
borrowed 30,000 Baht in 2010 and spent part of the money on agricultural crops. 
Most of the money spent on the oil palm crop was for the fertilisers they applied 
every 6 months.  
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However, the difficulties in the household started with a reduction in rice incomes, as 
the farmer explained: 
 
“We had flooding early this year (in 2010) and the rice production 
wasn’t good. So, we had less income. The price of fertilisers is very 
high lately and money was rather tight because our crops need 
fertilisers. Oil palms need fertilisers. Then I needed to borrow from 
BAAC to buy fertilisers for all the crops and to spendon my family. 
Actually, I reduced the amount of fertilisers given to the oil palms.” 
(Male, Baan Tarn, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The case of Baan Sa Ard provided a different picture of the troubled households in the 
study. All the oil palm producers in Baan Sa Ard were growing rubber, including the 
troubled household. The household had just planted 7 rais of oil palm in March 2010, 
when the farmer bought oil palm seedlings from NKO at 55 Baht per seedling. 
Rubber cultivation accounted for 20 rais of cultivated land and all 20 rais had been 
productive since mid-2009. 
 
Because the rubber had only produced a yield for the first time in 2009, the household 
did not have much in savings to support oil palm cultivation. As a result, the farmer 
relied on rubber income to facilitate the buying of oil palm seedlings and fertilisers as 
well as to cover the cost of land preparation. When there were additional 
expenditures, the household was forced to borrow more to cover the expenses.  
 
“I have three children. All of them are now in school. It was quite 
difficult when I had to pay tuition fees for my children, invest in rice 
cultivation, and buy fertilisers for both crops. That’s where the loan 
from BAAC came in. Sometimes during the rainy season there is no 
income from rubber. Then at some parts of the year you can face 
shortages if the expenses rise.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
 
The last case we will consider was in Baan Hat and presents a different view of the 
issues. Although the troubled household had cultivated rubber trees for more than 10 
years, they encountered financial difficulties with their 15 rais of oil palms. This was 
because the household had spent their savings on additional land for oil palm 
plantations. The farmer insisted that maintenance cost of oil palm had little effect on 
them, but the costs of oil palm seedlings and additional land had drastically increased 
their household expenditure.  
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“I have already spent 100,000 Baht on oil palms. Most of it was for 
getting the land. I just planted them in June this year (in 2010), but 
now I am a bit worried because my child will soon be going to school 
in Bangkok. I spent a lot of my savings. I didn’t borrow. I need to be 
economical now. Let’s pray for the price of rubber,” (Male, Baan Hat, 
semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
As we have seen, most of the households were not financially affected by the oil palm 
investment as the oil palm project and their savings from rubber cultivation had 
played an important role in supporting their oil palm investment. However, it is also 
clear that there were various factors forcing some households into financial 
difficulties after taking up oil palm growing. From the examples, the savings and 
income from rubber plantations, unpredictable natural disasters, expenses related to 
their children’s education, and the amount of oil palm investment, such as the costs of 
oil palm seedlings, land, land preparation, water system, and fertilisers, had played a 
significant role in terms of influencing the households’ financial situations. The 
justification depends on case-by-case analysis.  
 
In the next sub-section I will analyse the environmental aspect of oil palm adoption in 
the three villages.  
 
4.8.3 Environmental Aspect after the Implementation of Oil Palm 
Cultivation 
 
In terms of the environmental consequences of oil palm adoption, 41 of the 45 oil 
palm households in the study have not yet found any negative environmental impact 
from oil palm adoption. Only four households stated that dead fish had been found in 
the areas of oil palm plantations. The reasons for the dead fish were far from concrete 
and there were several assumptions amongst the farmers. One farmer assumed that the 
dead fish resulted from the water logging after flooding in the rainy season, which 
was not directly due to oil palm cultivation. Another farmer suggested alternatively 
that it was because of chemical herbicides for weed control and rodenticide for the 
control of rodents at the base of oil palm trees. These two were the main suspects 
especially when the flooding occurred around the area.  
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The oil palm literature in Chapter 3 suggests that oil palm plantations require a large 
amount of fertilisers in order to maintain and increase yields. Despite Thailand’s 
national policy of discouraging the application of chemical fertilisers and pesticides 
since the 7th NESDP (1992-1996), the amount of imported chemical inputs has been 
increasing gradually (OAE, 2010c). Rice farming is responsible for some of this 
increase, as it is one of the country’s major agricultural activities. The findings in this 
research suggest that although oil palm cultivation has consumed more fertiliser than 
many farmers initially thought, less fertiliser is applied to oil palm than to rice. One of 
the farmers who affirmed this fact to me explained,  
 
“How much fertiliser did I use on the rice crop..? I can say that it is a 
lot. Imagine: I have to have two rice paddy fields. One, which uses 
chemical fertilisers, is for selling and one, which grows naturally, is 
for my family. Oil palm crop uses less chemical inputs than the rice 
crop for sure, I can guarantee. But to tell the exact amount, I don’t 
know. One third less than rice, maybe.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-
structured interview, July 2010) 
 
In addition, some farmers reckoned that they did not buy new fertilisers especially for 
their oil palm plantations, but diverted the fertilisers that were provided for rice 
cultivation to the oil palm crop. As a result, this evidence suggests that the total 
amount of fertiliser applied by many oil palm farmers in the study has not 
significantly changed from the usual levels before the oil palm adoption.  
 
It is worth noting that there were two households in the study that had already adopted 
organic farming practices on their oil palm plantations. One of the two explained,  
 
“I saw the oil palm trees were growing well without a lot of fertiliser 
use, so I tried organic fertilisers from cow and buffalo manure. It is 
working well so far. It also reduced the cost of planting because 
chemical fertilisers now are very expensive.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-
structured interview, May 2010).  
 
Also, I further asked the farmers in the interviews whether they used fire to clear the 
land before planting oil palms, as oil palm smallholders almost always use fire in 
preparing land for cultivation because they cannot afford land-clearing machinery and 
are accustomed to this method (CIFOR, 2009). The findings suggest that there was 
only one household in the interviews that burned the land in preparation for oil palm 
planting, because it was easy. The rest of households believed that using fire to clear 
the land negatively affected the future growth of any crops in that land. One of the 
interviewees pointed out,  
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“Soils will be destroyed. You have to use a lot of fertilisers and they 
may not work. Oil palm is a long-term gain that requires land 
preparation just once in 20 years; you should then do it with care in 
my opinion. It is not worth the risk.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-
structured interview, August 2010). 
 
The literatures reviewed in Chapter 2 suggested that oil palm plantations are believed 
to be the major cause of biodiversity loss through the destruction of forests 
particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia. In other words, there is a direct relationship 
between the expansion of oil palm farming and the loss of natural forests and 
biodiversity in Malaysia and Indonesia, as Clay (2004) has presented. Contrary to 
those research findings, the evidence in this research showed that most of the lands 
used for oil palm plantations were previously agricultural lands (see Table 4.9). Thus 
it was unlikely that direct land use change has occurred, according to the farmers 
interviewed in this research.  
 
As a result of changes in government policy at different times, there exist a host of 
government offices dealing with land issues in Thailand, which result in there being 
10 different types of land certificates ranging from land use permits to land titles 
(Routray and Sahoo, 1995). The land tenure of the oil palm households in the study 
was in three types of land documents, namely title deed of agricultural land reform 
(SPK), local maintenance tax form (PBT 5), and certificate utilisation (NS 3). SPK is 
an allotment of land from Agricultural Land Reform Office, in which the land can 
only be used for agricultural purposes. The certificate entitles the owner to use the 
land and can be transferred only by inheritance. PBT 5 is evidence that the occupier 
of the land has been issued a tax number and has paid tax annually for using the 
benefit of the land. This confers no right to the land, but was formerly used to 
establish that the holder was occupying a piece of land and could apply for another 
type of certificate. 
 
NS 3 is a document which signifies the land occupier’s right to possess the land, but 
without conferring actual possession. There are no restrictions regarding the use of the 
land and the land can be transferred and leased, subject to a 30-day public notice 
period. In this research, most of the households held SPK and PBT 5 land certificates, 
whilst NS 3 accounted for just a small number of households 
 
Nonetheless, there was one case in Baan Tarn where the farmer had not obtained the 
land documents before cultivating oil palms. The farmer insisted that the land for oil 
palm cultivation was formerly abandoned arable land, which was used for raising 
cows and buffaloes, but in the interview he refused to discuss further the story of the 
land tenure. Thus, there was still a possibility that the farmer had converted forest to 
oil palm plantations, which would imply negative environmental consequences such 
as deforestation and loss of biodiversity around the study areas.  
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To summarise, the evidence in the research suggested that there was no concrete sign 
of destruction of natural habitats in any of the three villages. Although the oil palm 
plantations in the three villages were based on the application of chemical inputs, 
which could harm the environment, the amount of chemical inputs used in the oil 
palm plantations were relatively lower than the crops which had previously occupied 
the ground, which could imply the unlikeliness of overusing chemical substances to 
increase the crop production. In the next element, I will discuss the consequences of 
oil palm adoption in terms of the farmers’ satisfaction with the oil palm crop in 
relation to their needs as discussed in the first element.  
 
4.9 Responsibility Bearing Element 
 
I have adapted this element to discuss the consequences of oil palm adoption in terms 
of the farmers’ satisfaction with the crop in relation to their needs as discussed in the 
first element, as well as their problems with it. To understand the issues, the oil palm 
farmers in the study must be categorised into two groups: the farmers who were 
awaiting their first harvest and the farmers whose crops were already productive.  
 
The former group, which consisted of 39 households (see Table 4.14), was mostly 
satisfied with the outcome of their change to oil palm cultivation. Although the 
farmers had not yet reached the oil palm harvesting period, the flourishing of oil palm 
trees on their lands and their belief that the price of oil palm fruits would be good in 
the future had made them confident about their income increasing in future, which 
was an objective of many farmers in the research, as discussed in the first element. 
Whether the oil palm trees were deemed to be flourishing was based on the farmers’ 
judgments as to whether the oil palm trees had big trunks, reasonable height, and 
straight fronds. The male flower issue was a concern for some farmers since male 
flowers do not produce any fruit bunches as pointed out in Chapter 2. In other words, 
the number of oil palm fruit bunches depends on the number of female flowers. A 
lower ratio of female to male flowers indicates lower potential yields.  
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Table 4.14: Number of Households and the Farmers’ Satisfaction after Engaging 
in Oil Palm Cultivation by Village 
 
Village 
Households 
who have Harvested 
Households  
Awaiting Harvest  
Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied 
1. Baan Tarn 0/1 (0%) 1/1 (100%) 10/13 (77%) 3/13 (23%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 2/2 (100%) 0/2 (0%) 18/21 (86%) 3/21 (14%) 
3. Baan Hat 0/3 (0%) 3/3 (100%) 4/5 (80%) 1/5 (20%) 
Total 2/6 (33%) 4/6 (67%) 32/39 (82%) 7/39 (18%) 
 
Source: Data from Field Interviews (2010) 
 
One of the satisfied farmers reflected,  
 
“They (oil palm trees) are beautiful. They are the same height as my 
neighbour’s oil palm trees. It is what I expected and it offers me a 
good chance of getting good results. I can see some bunches now and 
it is a relief. Next is the price of them, but I am not afraid of it. The 
price is already good now.”  (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010). 
 
In addition, 10 households in this category reported that their children, who worked 
outside the areas, were planning to come back and live with their parents in the 
coming years when the oil palm plantations would be another source of income for 
the families. One of the interviewees explained,  
 
“Now we have rubber that creates a good income for our family. The 
price has been really good recently. Next year, the oil palm trees will 
be ready for harvesting. They (their children) said that this is good and 
they will come back to help. So, I don’t have to hire labour. If we have 
enough jobs (in the area), we will have enough money.” (Male, Baan 
Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 2010).  
 
From these farmers’ perspective, oil palm plantations had the potential to help them to 
achieve the ‘living comfortably with their children in their hometown area’ goal 
stated in the values and goals element. 
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However, there were 7 households of the 39 households who felt that their oil palm 
trees had not grown well. Four of these farmers were hugely affected by flooding and 
water logging in the rainy season, which then caused spear rot at the base of the oil 
palms. One of the four farmers was really disappointed as he lost 110 out of 200 oil 
palm trees as a result of the flooding. The farmer described,  
 
“I am so down. Less than half is left. I don’t have the heart to take 
care of them (oil palm trees) anymore. So, I leave them as they are. 
No maintenance. It really destroyed my hope.” (Male, Baan Tarn, 
semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
Significantly, two of the four households that were affected by the flooding had been 
told that their land was unsuitable for oil palm cultivation. These two households 
wanted to participate in the government project, but were not able to as their land was 
deemed unsuitable.  
 
The second problem reported by the dissatisfied farmers was related to various kind 
of rodents. In two of the unsuccessful cases, the rodents had damaged many of the oil 
palm trees. The rodents ate almost every part of the oil palm trees including fronds 
and oil palm fruits both ripe and unripe. One of the two farmers had lost 23 of his 30 
oil palm trees because of the rodents. However, both households had already 
replanted the damaged oil palm trees with the new ones, as one of the explained: 
 
“I think it is my fault for not taking very good care of the oil palms 
from the start. So, I will give it another chance and I think it is going 
to be good.” (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, July 
2010).  
 
The seventh case was insignificant, as the farmer gave no clear reasons for the below-
par development of his oil palm trees. He only talked in comparison to the 
neighbour’s oil palms.  
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Even in the case of satisfied farmers, they had faced problems related to pests and 
diseases. Apart from rodents, insect pests such as rose beetle had also damaged the 
leaf tissues of the oil palm trees. Crown disease had occurred occasionally in the 
waterlogged and flooded areas. Another type of Crown disease, which is the most 
common disorder of oil palm trees during the first three years after field transplanting, 
was found in a few cases. The main symptom of crown disease is the bending of spear 
leaves, which was assumed to result from imbalance nutrients between nitrogen and 
magnesium. However, the satisfied farmers had not been affected on a large scale by 
damage from pests and diseases to the oil palm trees. As one interviewee summarised,  
 
“It depends on the piece of land used in growing the oil palms. The 
same farm might have different landscapes. All problems can happen. 
Insects were eating the leaves of the oil palms and some were dead 
because of water logging. But, this happened to only 2 to 3 percent of 
the oil palm trees. The rest are still good.” (Male, Baan Tarn, semi-
structured interview, May 2010). 
 
Returning to the second group of farmers, amongst the 6 households who had already 
harvested oil palm fruits, only two households considered themselves successful in oil 
palm cultivation. These two households insisted that the oil palm crop has fulfilled 
their objectives, which were to reduce the hardship of cultivating rice and to be able 
to work and generate reasonable incomes throughout the year. The rest of the 
households were having difficulties in terms of how well their oil palm trees were 
growing as well as the market for oil palm fruits. Two of the four households had 
problems related to the yields of their trees, whilst all four households were 
dissatisfied with the price of oil palm fruits. The interviewees in Baan Hat stressed 
that the price of oil palm fruits at 2.50 Baht per kilogramme was not worth the 
investment. The cost of transporting the crop to the private merchant was also high. In 
addition, the fact that private merchant D did not have much capital meant the farmers 
had to wait 3 to 4 weeks for the money from selling the oil palm fruits. 
 
However, when I went into the villages, the price of oil palm fruits differed 
significantly between Baan Sa Ard and the other two villages. At the time that I 
interviewed the farmers who had already harvested in Baan Tarn and Baan Hat, the 
price of oil palm fruits was at 2.25 to 2.50 Baht per kilogramme. In contrast, the price 
of oil palm fruits was at 3.60 Baht per kilogramme when I did the interviews in Baan 
Sa Ard (see Table 4.15). This meant the farmers in Baan Sa Ard had more reason to 
be satisfied with oil palm cultivation than those in the other two villages. This was 
also the reason why the two satisfied households in this group were both in Baan Sa 
Ard (see Table 4.14). Overall, the oil palm cultivation was a success from the 
perspective of these farmers, who accounted for 76 percent of the 45 households in 
the interviews. This is to say the crop showed positive signs of achieving the farmers’ 
objectives. 
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Table 4.15: Average Monthly Price of Oil Palm’s FFB in 2010  
 
2010 FFB Price * (Baht per Kilogramme) 
January 3.88 
February 3.57 
March 3.48 
April 3.42 
May 3.38 
June 3.86 
July 4.08 
August 4.53 
September 4.83 
October 5.17 
November 5.64 
December 5.32 
 
* The farmers in the three villages received approximately 1 Baht per kilogramme less than 
the market price from the local merchants due to the long distance in delivering the products 
to the large-scale oil palm refinery in Chonburi province.  
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the key factors affecting the farmers’ decisions about oil palm 
adoption, and the consequences of the change. Using the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 3, this change to oil palm cultivation in the three villages in this 
study was understood through the adaptation of eight elements of farmers’ decision-
making (Ohlmer et al., 1998). It has emerged that there were several key factors 
influencing the farmers to engage in oil palm cultivation.  
 
An increase in economic security was the main intermediate need of the farmers in 
deciding to adopt the oil palm plantations. However, probing deeply into the issues 
revealed that the farmers had another set of values. Although they were very 
interested in increasing their incomes, this was so that they might live comfortably 
with their children in their home areas, which could lead to a reversal of the trend of 
migration in the future. 
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The uncompetitiveness of rice production in the areas had likewise tempted the 
farmers towards alternative crops including oil palm cultivation. Moreover, the 
government having offered both oil palm knowledge and funding to the farmers in the 
OPPSP had played an important role in convincing the farmers to adopt oil palm 
cultivation. The high expected of incomes from rubber plantations in the future was 
also a key factor that gave the farmers additional confidence to invest in the oil palm 
crop.  
 
The experience some farmers had of oil palm in the Southern region was essential in 
terms of providing skills and knowledge to grow and harvest oil palms. Moreover, the 
role of inspirational local leaders and the large-scale oil palm producers was crucial, 
as it was part of their culture for the Northeast farmers to have role models in order to 
start doing something different in the region. The fact that oil palm can be used to a 
wide array of products had convinced the farmers that the demand for oil palm would 
increase significantly in the future. The well-established marketing channels from 
growers to buyers in the area were a key influence on the farmers especially in the 
case of Baan Sa Ard. Characteristics of oil palm cultivation such as 15 days’ 
harvesting interval, long life-span, single-time planting, and requiring only a small 
amount of labour in growing and harvesting, also attracted the farmers.  
 
There is no doubt that understanding farmers’ decisions in adopting oil palm 
cultivation is important for comprehending the change to oil palm cultivation from the 
bottom-up perspective. Perhaps a more important issue is the extent to which oil palm 
expansion policy affects farmers. Certainly, the policy affects farmers, but the 
magnitude of its effect differs between cases. For this reason, the next chapter will 
analyse oil palm policy processes specifically in Nong Khai province using the IDS 
KNOTS team’s policy processes framework. 
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Chapter 5:  
Understanding the Change to Oil Palm Cultivation: Policy 
Processes of the Oil Palm Plantations in Nong Khai Province 
 
In the preceding chapter I have identified the key factors which influenced the local 
farmers in choosing whether or not to move to oil palm cultivation. Certainly, 
government support through the oil palm expansion policy in Nong Khai province has 
played an important role in shaping the farmers’ decisions towards oil palms. It is 
undeniable that the OPPSP has significantly influenced the farmers in this research in 
numerous ways, including by making available oil palm knowledge, the funding for 
oil palm cultivation, and oil palm seedlings. In order to encompass the oil palm issues 
fully, this chapter focuses on how the change to oil palm cultivation was significantly 
influenced by the oil palm policy processes. It uses the IDS KNOTS team’s policy 
processes framework for policy analysis of oil palm planting in Nong Khai province.  
 
As stated in Chapter 3, I developed an analytical framework which draws from the 
two main analytical approaches, namely an eight element model of farmers’ decision-
making, and the IDS KNOTS team’s policy processes framework. In this chapter, I 
apply the analytical framework shown in the following diagram (Figure 5.1) to 
analyse the change to oil palm cultivation in this research. The IDS KNOTS team’s 
policy processes framework was chosen as the main analytical tool to analyse oil 
palm policy processes because it offers a novel perspective on policy processes and 
thus set out a distinctive framework for policy analysis. Understanding the influences 
on policy of the three interconnected themes of the IDS KNOTS team’s policy 
framework enables me to address questions such as: How does policy get created and 
by whom? How are boundaries drawn around problems? How are the policy storyline 
and its associated networks elaborated? What is included and excluded? And how, 
when, and due to what influences do policies change? 
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Figure 5.1: Analytical Framework Applied in Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author 
 
There are five sections in this chapter. It starts by discussing the first theme of the IDS 
KNOTS team’s policy processes framework, namely the policy narratives theme, 
which includes the path dependency of the oil palm expansion policy in Thailand and 
Nong Khai province. The second section explores the actors and networks involved in 
oil palm plantations in the three villages in this research. It is presented in two sub-
sections: the networks of key actors along the path of oil palm production, and the 
networks of key actors that influence the oil palm farmers. The next section then 
discusses the politics/interests theme, which is the third theme in the IDS KNOTS 
team’s policy framework. The fourth section involves policy space, which will be 
identified through examining these three themes in order to make use of the policy 
space for advocating different ways of doing things in the oil palm arena. The chapter 
ends with relevant concluding points. 
 
5.1 Discourse/Narratives Theme  
 
Only recently has the Thai government begun to establish policy to push for increased 
production of biodiesel from oil palms. On 17th May, 2005 the cabinet approved the 
action plan for biodiesel development and support in order to increase the energy 
security of the country, to create rural economic development and to mitigate climate 
change. Since then a major oil palm expansion policy has been promoted in the 
Northeast region, particularly in Nong Khai province, which is a relatively remote, 
predominantly agricultural area. 
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Energy security appears to be the main driving force for Thailand’s involvement in oil 
palm-based biodiesel development. The country’s high dependence on imported oils 
is a serious threat to its energy security, in that it implies a high risk of fossil fuel 
supply disruptions from international markets, especially those in unstable regions 
such as the Middle East and Africa. According to a DOA official interviewed, the 
Thai government has seen biodiesel from oil palms as a very attractive option because 
it can easily be blended with traditional fossil fuels and thus offers an immediate 
impact by reducing the quantity of fossil fuel imported (Semi-structured interview, 
December 2010). 
 
The DOA official also mentioned that protecting the country’s trade balance and 
foreign exchange were one of the government’s priorities in pursuing a policy of oil 
palm expansion.  
 
“Reducing imports helps the trade balance. We will have more foreign 
exchange reserve and this will benefit the country as a whole. With a 
more stable economy we will have money to fight the crisis, to control 
the exchange rate. The 1997 financial crisis might not have happened. 
The last government saw this (oil palm expansion policy) as a great 
opportunity,” explained the DOA official (Semi-structured interview, 
December 2010).  
 
However, Matsuda and Kubota (1982) and Zhou and Thomson (2009) argue that in 
financial terms the amount saved by reducing imports of fossil fuels could possibly be 
less than the amount gained by exporting the crop as food, and thus it may not 
improve the country’s trade balance. In contrast, the evidence in this research 
suggests that the protection of the trade balance and foreign exchange is a valid driver 
for biodiesel development in Thailand because almost all of the oil palm produced in 
Thailand is used domestically (see Table 5.1). The DOA official pointed out that,  
 
“Unlike cassava, oil palms can reduce oil imports and increase trade 
surplus of the country. A lot of cassava is exported, so if we use it to 
produce ethanol, the trade balance might not change much from its 
previous level. But oil palms can offer this kind of benefit (improving 
trade balance).” (Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
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Table 5.1: Thailand’s Palm Oil Balance Account (2007-2009) 
 
 
* Including opening stock, production, and imports 
** Including exports, domestic uses, and closing stock 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
 
Another key driver for the oil palm expansion policy in Thailand is rural economic 
development. Because growing and harvesting the oil palm crop requires extensive 
labour and manual work, it could increase employment in the agricultural sector and 
thus provide income-generating opportunities for farmers. The local NKO official 
stressed that creating employment in local areas and reducing migration to urban 
areas were core benefits of the oil palm expansion policy,  
 
“Planting oil palms can surely create jobs for people around here. 
Having more jobs mean having more income. The government sector 
project (oil palms) helps in developing the economy of the villages, so 
there is no need for farmers to work elsewhere.” (Semi-structured 
interview, June 2010). 
 
From the central government’s perspective, a DOA official suggested that creating a 
new biodiesel market could prevent oil palm products being oversupplied, which 
could lead to a fall in price. This is to say the farmers could receive a better price for 
their crops due to increased demand.  
 
“The government wanted to develop oil palms and biodiesel because 
they can help sustain the price of oil palms in the long run. This means 
the government does not have to intervene in the market and that then 
saves the government’s budget in dealing with the price problem,” 
explained the DOA official (Semi-structured interview, December 
2010).  
 
 
Year Opening Stock Production Import Total * Export 
Domestic Uses 
Closing 
Stock Total ** 
Consumption Biodiesel 
2007 164,521 1,051,089 - 1,215,610 219,700 844,812 62,182 88,916 1,215,610 
2008 88,916 1,543,761 28,385 1,661,062 288,054 989,061 276,000 107,946 1,661,062 
2009 107,947 1,387,604 - 1,495,551 67,292 910,700 380,000 137,559 1,495,551 
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In fact, by increasing the percentage of biodiesel required to be blended with 
conventional diesel oil, the government could create a huge biodiesel market for oil 
palm products. The government mandates were in accordance with the Ministry of 
Energy (MOEN)’s 15-year Alternative Energy Development Plan (2008-2022), in 
which the government set a target of mandating a single grade of biodiesel B5 (a 
blend of 5 percent biodiesel and 95 percent conventional diesel) nationwide in 2011. 
However, the plan to mandate a single grade of biodiesel B5 nationwide had to be 
postponed to another time because of supply problems: the unavailability of palm oil, 
to be precise.  
 
“The problem is that we do not have enough oil palm to produce 
biodiesel. The government can control the demand. It is not difficult: 
just increase the blend to B5 or B10. That is why the oil palm 
expansion policy is crucial,” reckoned the official from DOA (Semi-
structured interview, December 2010).  
 
From the evidence in the research, fighting climate change is not considered a main 
driver for the Thai government as Thailand is not listed in the Kyoto Protocol as an 
Annex 1 country4
 
 and is thus not required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although mitigating climate change is mentioned in the Oil Palm Industry and Palm 
Oil Development Plan (2008-2012) (MOAC, 2008), a DOA official suggested that the 
policy’s main objectives are increasing energy security, improving trade balance, 
creating jobs and incomes for farmers, and at the same time protecting the 
environment, rather than significantly reducing the country’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
“Okay, global warming is important, but it is clearly not the priority of 
the government or the country now. If the oil palm plantations help 
reduce the global warming, it is more than fine. The point is, we need 
to make sure that oil palm expansion does not harm our environment - 
no forest clearance, for example. Helping local farmers and the energy 
security of the country are more important at this stage,” explained the 
DOA official (Semi-structured interview, December 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
4 There are 41 industrialised countries and economies in transition listed in Annex 1 of the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Their responsibilities are various, and include a 
non-binding commitment to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. 
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Nonetheless, both DOA and NKO officials admitted that the greatest concern of the 
oil palm expansion policy was the issue of food security. According to the interviews, 
some officials in the government sector viewed the oil palm expansion policy as a 
threat to national food security, which could reduce the self-reliance of the country in 
terms of producing sufficient food for domestic consumption.  
 
“It depends on the perception. Some think that growing oil palm will 
affect the food supply of the country - rice, you can say. So, they feel 
that it (the oil palm policy) does not go well with the sufficiency 
economy, which I disagree with, and then they do not want to support 
it or aren’t brave enough to push the policy forward,” elaborated the 
DOA official (Semi-structured interview, December 2010).  
 
In fact, the findings in Chapter 4 suggested that majority of the oil palm farmers in the 
research felt strongly about producing rice for their own consumption and refused to 
convert all of their land to oil palm plantations. Thailand is a food surplus country. 
Production of food, particularly rice, has immensely increased far more than domestic 
demand due to agricultural development policy in the past, such as improvements in 
irrigation systems, road networks, and the rapid adoption of green revolution 
technology in the early 1970s. The surplus is exported, to the value of 612.87 billion 
Baht in 2007. Rice is a major staple food of the country, and occupied almost 60 
percent of total cultivated land in 2007. It is grown throughout the country in flatland 
areas, which could directly convert to oil palm plantations. The Northeast region, 
which was the focus of the research, has the largest share of both rice area and 
production, standing at 50.21 percent and 34.68 percent respectively in 2007 
(NESDB, 2009a).  
 
The domestic consumption of rice is enormously less than the country’s production. 
Thus, nearly 42 percent of the total rice production in Thailand was exported in 2007 
(see Table 5.2). The country’s high ratio of rice exporting and the fact that the farmers 
in this research were unlikely to discontinue their rice paddy fields suggest that the 
change to oil palm farming is unlikely to affect the food security of the country. The 
DOA official pointed out that,  
 
“Rice lands can be used to grow oil palm, definitely. But, we exported 
rice a lot in the past, too much I think - half of the production, roughly 
- and the price has not been good. So, food security is not a problem. 
If we can use the land to do other things that can generate more 
income, it should be fine. Organic rice farming for domestic 
consumption might be the answer. Moving to more quality of rice.” 
(Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
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Table 5.2: Rice Production, Domestic Consumption, and Export (1971-2007) 
 
 
Source: NESDB (2009a) 
 
The official from NKO also shared a similar viewpoint with the DOA official,  
 
“To say that we are going to reduce rice production is very sensitive. 
Many people believe that farmers will completely switch to oil palms 
because of the policy support and then start asking what we are going 
to eat in the future. Do we have to buy rice from Vietnam in the 
future? I think this is exaggerated.” (Semi-structured interview, June 
2010). 
 
However, according to the literatures in Chapter 2, the competition between biofuels 
and food production for land and labour might place further strain on already short 
supplies of arable lands, and thereby pushing up food prices. This is to say converting 
lands to oil palm cultivation could affect the food security of the rural poor through 
the volatility of food prices.  
 
Although food prices in Thailand and elsewhere depend on various factors and 
change rapidly due to a range of powerful forces, including income growth, climate 
change, government policy, trend of staple foods, production costs linked to energy 
prices, urbanisation, and market speculation, it is clear that oil palms are one factor.  
 
 
 
Period Population (Million) 
Total Rice 
Production 
(Million 
Tonnes) 
Domestic 
Consumption 
(Million 
Tonnes) 
Export 
(Million 
Tonnes) 
Percent of 
Export 
1971-75 39.27 9.24 7.93 1.31 16.45 
1976-80 44.35 10.45 8.04 2.41 23.06 
1981-85 48.97 12.27 8.49 3.78 30.81 
1986-90 52.91 12.42 7.52 4.90 39.45 
1991-95 56.48 13.25 8.12 5.13 38.72 
1996-00 59.70 15.46 9.38 6.08 39.33 
2001-05 63.22 17.39 9.31 8.07 46.46 
2006-07 65.71 19.40 11.26 8.14 41.96 
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“Surely, there will be an impact (on food prices). But how much, we 
do not know. Maybe it is good because the price of rice will be better. 
But it will affect the poor to some degree. The question is by how 
much and how we can help them,” explained the DOA official (Semi-
structured interview, December 2010).  
 
Thus, more research response is needed to examine the impact of increased interest in 
oil palms on issues of food prices and food security: whether the threat is real and 
significant and if so, how this can be remedied effectively. It is worth noting that this 
research did not aim to focus on these issues.  
 
Returning to the path dependency of the policy, in accordance with the cabinet 
resolution on the 17th of May 2005, MOAC was assigned to determine suitable oil 
palm areas within the time frame of 6 months, to provide oil palm seedlings, to 
support oil palm planting, and to study and assess the impact of oil palm cultivation 
on farmers. In addition, the cabinet agreed to develop pilot projects in some provinces 
in the North and Northeast regions that had potential for oil palm cultivation. In the 
cabinet resolution, a financial budget of 1,300 million Baht was also approved, of 
which 800 million Baht would be available as working capital for planting oil palm, 
whilst 500 million Baht would be used for R&D as well as administration costs (The 
Secretariat of the Cabinet, 2005). 
 
In order to comply with the cabinet resolution, MOAC ordered DOA to prepare 1 
million oil palm seedlings for use in future oil palm projects in the Northeast region. 
Subsequently, the cabinet further approved the guideline of the Oil Palm Plantations 
for Alternative Energy Project (OPPAEP) on the 2nd of August 2005. The details 
included the assignment of MOAC to create a pilot project for expanding oil palm 
farming in Nong Khai province. MOAC was also assigned to produce the budget 
details of the OPPAEP and submitted for the cabinet’s approval (The Secretariat of 
the Cabinet, 2005a). The MOAC notifications were then issued to address 
identification of the potential oil palm areas, the regulations and conditions for oil 
palm seedling providers, and the regulations for farmers’ participation in the OPPAEP 
(MOAC, 2005a; MOAC, 2005b; MOAC, 2005c). 60,000 rais of land in Nong Khai 
province were listed as targeted oil palm cultivation areas in 2006 in the MOAC’s 
notifications. 
 
On the 2nd of February 2006, DOA formally announced the details of the OPPAEP 
(DOA, 2006). The aims of the project were to increase the oil palm areas in order to 
produce sufficient palm oil for domestic consumption and to use oil palm products as 
feedstock for biodiesel production. The OPPAEP targeted an increase in oil palm 
cultivation by 5 million rais in the new areas between 2006 and 2009, of which 
540,000 rais were in the Northeast region (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3: Annual Targets of Oil Palm Expansion in the OPPAEP (2006-2009) 
 
Unit: Rais 
 
Source: DOA (2006) 
 
According to the OPPAEP and the MOAC notifications mentioned earlier, interested 
farmers needed to register with local officials from Department of Agricultural 
Extension (DOAE), and then DOAE, DOA, and BAAC would consider whether the 
farmers’ lands were suitable for the oil palm cultivation. The farmers who participated 
in the project would be provided with low interest rate loans from their local BAAC, 
but must buy the oil palm seedlings from DOA-certified seedling providers due to 
concerns over low quality oil palm seedlings being offered to the farmers. In January 
2006, there were 387 oil palm seedling providers registered with DOA with an 
estimated production capacity of 16.98 million oil palm seedlings. This figure 
excludes the 1 million DOA-provided oil palm seedlings specifically for use in the 
Northeast region. The selling price of 8-month-old oil palm seedlings in the project 
was capped at 65 and 75 Baht per seedling depending on variety (DOA, 2006).  
 
Under the OPPAEP, between 2006 and 2011BAAC provided a total of 6,102 million 
Baht in loans to participating farmers in the Northeast with the total (see Table 5.4). 
The project was initially designed to establish a special organisation to purchase oil 
palm products from farmers with a price guarantee of 2.50 Baht per kilogramme of 
fresh fruit bunches. However, the interested farmers had to undertake the oil palm 
knowledge transfer programme organised by DOA before participating in the project 
in order to ensure that they had sufficient skills in planting, maintenance, watering, 
fertilising, and harvesting the oil palm trees. 
 
 
Oil Palm Areas 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
1. New Areas 535,000 1,260,000 1,590,000 1,615,000 5,000,000 
    - Southern Region 300,000 500,000 510,000 855,000 2,165,000 
    - Eastern Region 85,000 240,000 400,000 480,000 1,205,000 
    - Northeast Region 60,000 120,000 180,000 180,000 540,000 
    - Military Areas 90,000 - - - 90,000 
    - Neighbouring Countries - 400,000 500,000 100,000 1,000,000 
2. Replacing Areas 185,000 250,000 300,000 265,000 1,000,000 
Total 720,000 1,510,000 1,890,000 1,880,000 6,000,000 
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Table 5.4: Estimation of Loans in the OPPAEP (2006-2011) 
 
Unit: Million Baht 
 
* 13,000 Baht per rai includes oil palm seedling and maintenance costs at 7,300 Baht per rai 
and land preparation at 5,700 Baht per rai. The loans are made to farmers for a period of three 
years. 
 
** 11,300 Baht per rai includes oil palm seedling and maintenance costs at 7,300 Baht per rai 
and a water system installation at 4,000 Baht per rai. The loans are made to farmers for a 
period of three years. 
 
Source: DOA (2006) 
 
In March 2006, MOAC issued further notifications regarding oil palm issues (MOAC, 
2006a; MOAC, 2006b; MOAC, 2006c). The core was to simplify the regulations and 
conditions for oil palm seedling providers and interested farmers participating in the 
project. The examples were to extend the timetable for applying to be an oil palm 
seedling provider within the project and to reduce the interested farmers’ minimum 
requirement of land for oil palm cultivation from 15 rais to 2 rais per household.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil Palm Areas 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
1. New Areas 4,993.3 8,752.3 11,985.9 16,959.4 3,735.3 2,454.3 48,880.5 
    - Southern Region 
(13,000 Baht per Rai)* 
3,024 5,430 6,276.8 10,091.4 1,937.7 1,385.1 28,145.0 
    - Eastern Region 
(11,300 Baht per Rai)** 
712.3 2,121.7 3,801.7 4,931.2 1,272.0 777.6 13,616.5 
    - Northeast Region 
(11,300 Baht per Rai)** 
502.8 1,083.6 1,761.6 1,936.8 525.6 291.6 6,102.0 
    - Military Areas 
(11,300 Baht per Rai)** 
754.2 117.0 145.8 - - - 1,017.0 
2. Replacing Areas 1,864.8 2,760.5 3,648.7 3,466.2 830.5 429.3 13,000.0 
Total 6,858.1 11,512.8 15,634.6 20,425.6 4,565.8 2,883.6 61,880.5 
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The DOA, led by the team of the DOA official interviewed in the research, thus 
announced the oil palm pilot project to pursue the target of 60,000 rais in Nong Khai 
province. Primarily, DOA targeted the Hauy Mong irrigated areas of 58,363 rais in 
Tha Bo district, Nong Khai province, for planting oil palms. With the expansion in 
irrigation systems around the area in the future, the suitable areas for oil palm 
cultivation could increase to be at least 170,455 rais in Tha Bo and Si Chiang Mai 
districts, according to the DOA’s study. The yield was expected to exceed 2.5 tonnes 
per rai per year in these suitable areas (DOA, 2006a).  
 
However, at the meeting chaired by the Director General of DOA on the 19th of 
March 2006, the participants divided the suitable oil palm areas in Nong Khai 
province into two groups based on the future locations of palm oil refineries. The first 
group was in the irrigated area called Hauy Mong and its surrounding areas, which 
covered the districts of Tha Bo, Si Chiang Mai, Pho Tak, Mueang, and Phon Phisai. 
The second group was the area on the Eastern part of Nong Khai province which 
included Seka, So Phisai, and Bueng Kan districts. The DOA would provide a total of 
800,000 oil palm seedlings for the project in Nong Khai province, of which the first 
allocation of 300,000 seedlings would be ready from May 2006 (DOA, 2006b).  
 
In accordance with the cabinet resolution on the 25th of April 2006, the cabinet 
approved the OPPAEP submitted by MOAC. The cabinet, thus, assigned government 
stakeholders to structure the action plan and submit to Bureau of the Budget (BB) for 
budget consideration during the fiscal years 2007 to 2009 (The Secretariat of the 
Cabinet, 2006). On the 13th of September 2006, BAAC announced their loan policy 
for oil palm cultivation to the branch managers. The details of the loans followed the 
framework of the OPPAEP which had been approved by the cabinet. The interest rate 
for loans in the project was the Minimum Retail Rate (MRR) which was 7.5 percent 
per annum at that time (BAAC, 2006).   
 
According to the MOAC’s regulations for participating farmers, farmers who were 
interested needed to achieve oil palm knowledge and skills through the seminars and 
training organised by DOA prior to cultivating the oil palms. The farmers were then 
allowed to start the loan processes with BAAC. The number of farmers who 
completed the oil palm training programme in Nong Khai province was 732 and at the 
end of August 2006 they had an estimated 3,760 rais assigned to oil palm. Only 183 
of the trained farmers, with a total of 3,005 rais allocated to oil palm had intended to 
start growing oil palm in 2006, (see Table 5.5).  
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Table 5.5: Details of Participants in the OPPAEP (As of 31st of August 2006)  
 
 
Source: BAAC (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Districts 
Interested Farmers 
Completed the 
Training 
Programme 
Intention to Plant in 
2006 
Farmers Rais Farmers Rais Farmers Rais 
Group 1: Hauy Mong Irrigated Areas and the Surrounding Areas 
1. Mueang 70 1,024 24 196 6 79 
2. Sa Khrai 8 146 3 35 - - 
3. Tha Bo 153 3,514 68 975 3 107 
4. Pho Tak 135 3,063 53 637 9 126 
5. Si Chiang Mai 133 6,126 44 2,165 11 102 
6. Sang Khom 228 3,501 62 742 7 85 
7. Phon Phisai 186 6,252 76 857 19 208 
Group 2: The Eastern Part of Nong Khai Province 
8. Fao Rai 45 623 9 130 - - 
9. Rattanawapi 209 2,948 29 584 5 37 
10. Pak Khat 233 3,376 24 253 3 34 
11. So Phisai 369 6,109 12 290 - - 
12. Phon Charoen 88 1,390 7 88 2 23 
13. Si Wilai 104 1,538 18 391 6 102 
14. Bueng Kan 698 15,477 107 4,234 47 1,546 
15. Bung Khla 74 1,017 11 195 3 18 
16. Bueng Klong Long 126 1,563 34 369 6 57 
17. Seka 274 4,739 151 1,619 56 481 
Total 3,133 62,406 732 13,760 183 3,005 
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Despite policy narratives claiming that oil palm development was a top priority for 
both the national and provincial government during this planning period, I found that 
the oil palm expansion policy in Nong Khai province failed to achieve the initial 
target of 60,000 rais set in the OPPAEP during 2005 and 2006. The official data from 
the Nong Khai branch of BAAC indicated that only 77 farmers participated in the 
project, covering an area of only 1,384 rais. These 77 farmers were concentrated in 
only 6 of the 17 districts of Nong Khai province (see Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6: Number of Farmers Participating in the OPPAEP and Their Oil Palm 
Plantation Areas in Nong Khai Province (2006-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BAAC 
 
One of the main downsides of the project was the loan process itself. Obtaining the 
loan from BAAC involved a long and time-consuming procedure. In essence, an 
applicant farmer needed to be a member in the project, acquire an oil palm training 
certificate and be individually approved by MOAC before starting the loan process 
with BAAC. The Nong Khai branch of BAAC followed BAAC’s loan process which 
consisted of explaining, investigating, producing documents, checking documents, 
obtaining project approval, preparing loan disbursement, loan disbursement, and 
filing the documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Districts 
 Farmers Participating in the 
OPPAEP (2006-2007) 
Farmers Rais 
1. Tha Bo 5 112 
2. Sang Khom 14 214 
3. Phon Phisai 7 110 
4. Pak Khat 4 85 
5. So Phisai 2 245 
6. Bueng Kan 45 618 
Total 77 1,384 
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My interviews with farmers revealed that these processes created significant barriers 
to participation in the oil palm project, while, by contrast, they were much more at 
ease applying for loans under rice and rubber cultivation projects. In August 2006, 
there were 3,133 farmers in Nong Khai province who intended to join the OPPAEP, 
representing a total oil palm area of 62,406 rais. However, the figures dropped 
drastically to 732 farmers and 13,760 rais when oil palm training certificates were 
taken into account. This suggested clearly that the farmers were reluctant to continue 
with the oil palm project due to the complicated loan process. The farmer in Baan 
Tarn reckoned that,  
 
“Other ways of borrowing (village fund, co-operative fund, and rice 
and rubber projects) are a lot easier. We have to do many things to get 
an oil palm loan from BAAC. Wait and wait, and the opportunity goes 
away from you. It is a waste of time.” (Male, semi-structured 
interview, May 2010).  
 
However, MOAC had not achieved the expected outcomes of the oil palm policy. In 
May 2007 therefore, MOAC established the Oil Palm Industry and Palm Oil 
Development Plan (2008-2012) in order to solve the problems encountered in the 
OPPAEP. The core of the plan involved the target to increase by 2012the total area of 
oil palm plantations by 2.5 million rais in those areas that had been identified as 
potential oil palm areas in the OPPAEP. It was planned that the targets would be 
achieved in 5 years, during which the oil palm areas would increase by 500,000 rais 
annually. The plan also expected to replace 500,000 rais of low productivity and old 
oil palm trees over the entire 5 years of the plan. A rise in oil palm productivity to 3.0 
to 3.5 tonnes per rai per year and an increase in oil content of oil palm products to 
18.5 percent were also targeted (MOAC, 2008). 
 
With this oil palm expansion plan, which is still current, MOAC aims to address the 
failure of the OPPAEP by making it easier for farmers to participate in the project and 
simplifying the loan approval processes from BAAC. Interested farmers are not 
required to attend the oil palm training programme from DOA, but can request an oil 
palm certificate after attending an oil palm orientation seminar if they already have 
sufficient oil palm knowledge and skills. In order to speed up BAAC’s loan process, 
the approval process has altered so that authorisation no longer has to be given by 
MOAC but can be obtained from provincial-level Agricultural Extension Offices. In 
addition, the plan has given farmers flexibility to choose DOA-certified oil palm 
seedling suppliers who might not participate in the project. Regrettably, the number of 
farmers participating in the project in Nong Khai province has hardly increased since 
the deregulation of the current MOAC plan (see Table 5.7). In total, there were only 
112 farmers involved in the OPPAEP, representing a total oil palm area of 1,943 rais. 
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Table 5.7: Number of Farmers Participating in the OPPAEP and Their Oil Palm 
Plantation Areas in Nong Khai Province (2007-2008) 
 
Districts 
 Farmers Participating in the 
Project (2007-2008) 
Farmer(s) Rais 
1. Sang Khom 1 50 
2. Phon Phisai 6 102 
3. Pak Khat 6 63 
4. So Phisai 1 10 
5. Bueng Kan 17 301 
6. Seka 4 33 
Total 35 559 
 
Source: BAAC 
 
There are several explanations for these unsuccessful outcomes. A lack of financial 
incentive from the government was a chief reason to hinder the progress of the 
project. Although the government has accepted the financial responsibility of 61,881 
million Baht in funding farmers in the project, the interest rate in the project was 
considered too high (at 7.5 percent per year) by many farmers. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the oil palm farmers in the three villages decided to borrow from village funds, co-
operatives, and BAAC’s rice and rubber projects to support oil palm cultivation. The 
farmers insisted that the BAAC’s loan offering under the OPPAEP was unrealistic 
and would attract no one to switch to growing oil palms.  
 
“Actually, the project in 2006 and 2007 was interesting. The only 
problem was the interest rate. It was far too high,” reckoned the oil 
palm farmer in Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 
2010). 
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One official from the Nong Khai branch of BAAC insisted that the unattractiveness of 
financial support in the project had contributed to the low take-up rate among Nong 
Khai farmers. The official explained that,  
 
“The interest rate was high. Too high to attract farmers, I knew. If I 
were the farmers, I wouldn’t take it either. But it is normal for the 
bank to set a high interest rate for a project that has high risks like this 
(oil palms). The government did not come in and help at all 
financially.” (Semi-structured interview, September 2010). 
 
The distribution of rainfall in Nong Khai province is also a concern for oil palm 
cultivation in the view of the BAAC official. There is a 2-month period of heavy 
rainfall each year, which results in flooding in many districts in Nong Khai province. 
These two months of heavy rainfall lead to a high average figure in terms of annual 
rainfall in Nong Khai province, and it is the average figure that fits well with the 
requirement of 1,800 millimetres of annual rainfall for cultivating the oil palm (see 
Table 5.8). This concern prevented BAAC to confidently provide oil palm loan to 
farmers.  
 
“Nothing can guarantee the success of oil palm cultivation here in 
Nong Khai. The debates are still ongoing in academic circles. We 
have to protect ourselves by not lending BAAC’s money for an 
infeasible project. We do not want to tie ourselves into a risky project 
and that is why the financial conditions could not be attractive,” 
explained the interviewee (Semi-structured interview, September 
2010). 
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Table 5.8: Average Annual Rainfall in Nong Khai Province (2000-2009) 
 
Unit: Millimetres 
Year / 
Month 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Jan 0 0 1 9 1 0 0 0 33 1 
Feb 22 15 41 81 236 0 5 19 31 13 
Mar 16 19 34 159 57 12 81 13 98 31 
Apr 92 19 26 46 80 63 299 57 101 63 
May 140 268 252 166 248 146 239 210 212 212 
Jun 304 281 500 346 235 471 213 392 602 358 
Jul 311 275 352 215 519 331 438 218 500 333 
Aug 130 372 471 293 274 373 371 532 374 345 
Sept 221 263 338 414 299 426 139 378 332 318 
Oct 26 47 70 30 0 27 146 288 137 84 
Nov 0 5 14 0 16 57 0 4 55 15 
Dec 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 1,261 1,564 2,122 1,759 1,965 1,907 1,932 2,110 2,475 1,776 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
 
The attractiveness of rubber cultivation at that time was also the key reason for the 
failure of the OPPAEP in terms of the participation of farmers in the project. An 
increase in rubber prices in 2006 and continuing support for rubber production in the 
Northeast region from the government, which provided free or subsidised inputs and 
low-interest loans, attracted many farmers to engage in rubber planting. The rubber 
price had risen from 44.13 Baht per kilogramme in 2004 to 66.24 baht per 
kilogramme in 2006 and farmers in Nong Khai province were very attracted by the 
surging price (OAE, 2008).  
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“I heard about the oil palm project in 2006, but I was not interested at 
that time. I was busy rubber tapping and I think most of the farmers 
around here were also. When the chance came, you needed to take it 
because you do not know the price next year. Luckily, the rubber price 
is increasing each year,” (Female, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
 
The government’s project in supporting rubber plantations in the Northeast region 
through Offices of Rubber Replanting Aid Fund (ORRAF), which provided free or 
subsidised inputs and low interest rate loan to farmers, lured farmers in Nong Khai 
province towards rubber at that time. ORRAF’s support included technical advice, 
free seedlings and fertilisers, low interest loans from BAAC, and subsidised material 
inputs, especially herbicides. The rubber project also supported other income-
generating activities such as fishponds, livestock, and handicrafts in order to assist 
farmers to maintain their standard of living in the first 7 years before the rubber trees 
could be tapped (Fox and Castella, 2010). The interviewee in Baan Sa Ard 
summarised,  
 
“Rubber was a real hot topic here; there are almost 1 million rais in 
Esaan now. Everyone was talking about it. If the government can do 
the same as they did for rubber, oil palm will definitely be popular.” 
(Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured interview, August 2010). 
 
Analysing with Majone’s policy framework, which stresses the understanding of the 
policy processes through the three elements, namely evidence, argument and 
persuasion, the below-expected outcomes of the OPPAEP can be shown to result from 
the fact that the evidence and argument in favour of the policy failed to persuade the 
farmers and some key actors at the local level to adopt the oil palm plantation 
strategy. As argued in Chapter 3, there is no clear conclusion in the academic 
literature as to whether oil palm plantations can be economically viable in the 
Northeast region. An NKO official pointed out that,  
 
“At that time, no one believed that oil palms could grow well in Esaan 
soils. Many academics raised their concerns about planting the oil 
palm here. The government officials were also reluctant, especially at 
local level. The farmers then had no direction and had to delay their 
decisions.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
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One of the farmers in Baan Sa Ard who planted the oil palms in 2008 also said,  
 
“I heard about the government support, but I was uncertain. Who 
would think that oil palms would grow well here in Esaan, the most 
drought-prone region in Thailand. But, when the large-scale producers 
and some farmers started to grow, I made up my mind.” (Male, semi-
structured interview, August 2010). 
 
Despite the OPPAEP having been approved by the central government, the officials 
from PAE and the Nong Khai branch of BAAC hardly believed that oil palm 
cultivation could be economically viable in Nong Khai province. It was only in the 
irrigated Hauy Mong areas, which covers 60,000 rais of land suitable for oil palms 
that local officials believed oil palms could profitably be cultivated.  
 
“Water is a key. Other areas in Nong Khai can also grow oil palms, 
but installation of water systems is a must. Installing water systems is 
extremely costly and for that reason it is not worthwhile to invest 
here,” explained the official from the Nong Khai branch of BAAC 
(Semi-structured interview, September 2010).  
 
The PAE official has added that,  
 
“At first, I have to say I did not think oil palms were a good choice of 
crop here. So, I did not talk much about them or encourage farmers to 
grow them. But now, I believe in them. You can go and see for 
yourself. Like rubber, it takes time to know whether it works here or 
not.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
 
The failure of the OPPAEP led to the emergence of the OPPSP, which was created by 
DOA in order to distribute the 800,000 prepared oil palm seedlings to farmers in 
Nong Khai province. The project started in June 2007, and DOA appointed NKO to 
allocate the oil palm seedlings to interested farmers. The OPPSP offered farmers the 
oil palm seedlings as a loan, to be repaid in the form of money or oil palm production 
in the beginning of the 4th year of cultivation, when the farmers would begin to 
harvest (NKO, 2007). This project was a success in terms of the oil palm expansion. 
Nong Khai became the province that had the highest oil palm area (17,156 rais) in the 
Northeast region at the end of 2007. The second was Ubon Rachathani province, 
which accounted for 1,742 rais in 2007 (OAE, 2008). 
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As of May 2008, there were 16,104 rais of oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province 
that had come from NKO’s oil palm seedlings, of which the participants in the OPPSP 
own 12,001 rais. The rest of the oil palm seedlings were distributed to the farmers 
who bought the oil palm seedlings directly from NKO at the price of 50 Baht per 
seedling, and to farmers who were in the OPPAEP and chose to obtain the oil palm 
seedlings through NKO (see Table 5.9). Although the OPPSP had ended in 2008, 
NKO still offered the remaining oil palm seedlings to interested farmers at a price 
ranging from 55 to 60 Baht per seedling between 2009 and 2010.  
 
Instead of providing a full financial support package, including oil palm seedlings, 
maintenance costs, land preparation and water system installation, the OPPSP merely 
offered farmers the oil palm seedlings on loan, to be returned as money or oil palm 
production in the beginning of the 4th year of cultivation, when the farmers began to 
harvest. This, in other words, meant an interest rate of zero percent over a 4-year 
period was given to the farmers who paid 50 Baht per oil palm seedling. Although 
there were various factors shaping the decision of farmers towards oil palm 
cultivation, the evidence from the oil palm farmers in the interviews suggested that 
providing financial incentive in the project through lending oil palm seedlings would 
lure a large amount of farmers towards oil palm cultivation.  
 
“A lot of farmers around the area want the project back. I want it back 
too because I want to expand my oil palm crop. Okay, the more the 
government support there is, the more benefits for us. But it is more 
than enough, especially when the government gives the oil palm 
seedlings to you free of charge at the start, many will grow oil palms,” 
explained one interviewee (Male, Baan Sa Ard, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
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Table 5.9: Oil Palm Area and Number of Oil Palm Seedlings Distributed by 
NKO in Nong Khai Province (As of May 2008) * 
 
 
* 1 rai of oil palm cultivation requires a maximum of 25 oil palm seedlings. The data obtained 
from NKO and BAAC differed slightly in the amount of oil palm areas in the OPPAEP.  
 
Source: Adapted from NKO 
 
 
 
Districts 
OPPSP 
Acquired Directly 
from NKO OPPAEP 
Total 
Area 
(rais) 
Area Seedlings Area Seedlings Area Seedlings 
1. Mueang 42 1,050 139 3,475 - - 181 
2. Sa Khrai - - - - - - - 
3. Tha Bo 575 14,375 65 1,625 47 1,175 687 
4. Pho Tak 73 1,825 31 775 - - 104 
5. Si Chiang Mai 104 2,600 29 725 99 2,475 232 
6. Sang Khom - - 64 1,600 121 3,025 185 
7. Phon Phisai 657 16,425 406 10,150 53 1,325 1,116 
8. Fao Rai 114 2,850 267 6,675 32 800 413 
9. Rattanawapi 132 3,300 330 8,250 - - 462 
10. Pak Khat 98 2,450 112 2,800 20 500 230 
11. So Phisai 2,910 72,750 324 8,100 96 2,400 3,330 
12. Phon Charoen 76 1,900 71 1,775 - - 147 
13. Si Wilai 295 7,375 241 6,025 - - 536 
14. Bueng Kan 2,257 56,425 715 17,875 461 11,525 3,433 
15. Bung Khla 168 4,200 2 50 - - 170 
16. Bueng Klong 
Long 
99 2,475 105 2,625 - - 204 
17. Seka 4,401 110,025 273 6,825 - - 4,674 
Total  
(Rais / Seedlings) 
12,001 300,025 3,174 79,350 929 23,225 16,104 
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In fact, many farmers insisted that if NKO either provides oil palm seedlings via the 
OPPSP or sells them directly at below market price it would significantly stimulate oil 
palm expansion in Nong Khai province. This is because the price of oil palm 
seedlings from private suppliers around the area is high: 70 to 180 Baht per seedling, 
compared to 50 to 60 Baht from NKO. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
farmers were less concerned over sources of funding for land preparation and 
maintenance costs as they could obtain the funding from village funds, co-operatives, 
and BAAC’s rubber and rice projects and utilise that money to support their oil palm 
cultivation. Income from rubber cultivation could assist some farmers to purchase 
NKO’s oil palm seedlings directly without participating in the OPPSP.  
 
“I want oil palm seedlings that I can trust and at a good price. No need 
to be part of the borrowing project (OPPSP). If they just provide good 
quality seedlings, a lot of farmers will be interested. Now, it is hard to 
find the seedlings around here. The government should provide 
knowledge and teach us how to do the maintenance,” said an 
interviewee in Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 
2010).  
 
Interestingly, from the interview with an NKO official, providing oil palm seedlings 
in the OPPSP would, in turn, offer reasonable profits to the government, which could 
compensate for the 4-year zero percent interest rate provided to farmers. The actual 
cost of the double-stage nursery method (Hartley, 1988; Azman, 2002) used in the 
preparation of NKO’s oil palm seedlings in 2007 was 41.51 Baht per seedling (NKO, 
2009). The 8.49 Baht per seedling gap between the borrowing price of 50 Baht per 
seedling and the cost of production represented a healthy profit for the government, 
which would reduce the financial budget spent in funding the OPPSP.  
 
The official from NKO insisted that,  
 
“Ask me personally, I think the government should further support the 
oil palm project. The government will gain and gain, either from the 
profits in producing oil palm seedlings to sell directly to farmers or in 
the borrowing project. Farmers want the seedlings and it is a win-win 
situation.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
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However, the OPPSP may face difficulties over payback in the future, as no one 
started to return either money or oil palm production to the government in 2010.  
 
“The structure of the payback is still unclear. I still do not know who 
will be the one to collect the money from the farmers, DOA, BAAC, 
or us. Certainly, DOA is responsible for everything,” pondered one 
interviewee (NKO, semi-structured interview, June 2010).  
 
In terms of the annual yield of 3.0 to 3.5 tonnes per rai and 18.5 percent of oil content 
targeted in the current oil palm expansion plan, the outcomes in Nong Khai province 
are far from achieving those targets. The majority of oil palm farmers in Nong Khai 
province started to harvest in 2009, producing 9,762 tonnes throughout the province. 
Because the oil palms were in the early stages of harvesting, the yield per rai in Nong 
Khai province was 0.569 tonne per rai per year, which was enormously lower than the 
national average of 2.560 tonnes per rai per year in 2009 (OAE, 2010a).  
 
“Oil palms have just started here, so the crop cannot compete with oil 
palms from the Southern region of Thailand. But it depends on the 
knowledge also. If the government seriously provides sufficient oil 
palm knowledge to farmers, the crop has a chance to match the yield 
and oil content of the oil palms from the South in the future. But I do 
not think the oil palms here are going to achieve better yields than the 
South’s. The climate is different and it affects the oil palms,” 
explained NKO Official (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
 
In terms of oil palm knowledge, the evidence suggests that there is a lack of 
knowledge within the local government offices themselves, as well as a lack of 
distribution of oil palm knowledge to farmers. NKO is the leading local government 
agency in supporting oil palm knowledge throughout the Northeast region. However, 
NKO has a small number of members, just 24, of which 16 are accountants and 
administrators, whilst the other 8 are researchers and policymakers.  
 
“We do not have enough manpower. We have just what you see here, 
a very small group of people. We really need more people and money 
to push the policy forward, and so we can do more things than we are 
currently doing. I have to say we cannot do much more than this in 
this condition,” admitted an NKO official (Semi-structured interview, 
June 2010).  
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The main responsibilities of NKO were to research and develop the oil palm crop, 
produce high quality oil palm seedlings, and disseminate oil palm knowledge in the 
Northeast. NKO officials obtained oil palm knowledge from Surat Thani Oil Palm 
Research Centre (STO) based in the Southern region and applied the knowledge to the 
Northeast’s climate and soil conditions.NKO had oil palm testing fields, in which 
they did the research in 2005 in order to determine the most suitable oil palm variety 
for the Northeast region by focusing on the varieties developed by STO, which were 
Surat Thani 1 to 6. The results are presented in Table 5.10 below. The Surat Thani 2 
variety was selected for use in the OPPSP because of its drought resistance.  
 
Table 5.10: Average Yield and Oil Content of Surat Thani 1 to 6 Varieties, 
Compared Between NKO and STO Testing Fields  
 
Category Variety STO NKO * 
Average Yield 
(Kilogrammes/Rai/Year) 
Surat Thani 1 3,450 1,546 
Surat Thani 2 3,617 1,522 
Surat Thani 3 2,939 1,458 
Surat Thani 4 3,349 272 
Surat Thani 5 3,054 20 
Surat Thani 6 3,258 1,140 
Oil Content 
(Percent) 
Surat Thani 1 26 19.8 
Surat Thani 2 23 17.6 
Surat Thani 3 27 15.8 
Surat Thani 4 25 11.1 
Surat Thani 5 26 n/a 
Surat Thani 6 27 16.2 
 
* 36 months after planting. 
 
Source: NKO 
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Nonetheless, NKO undertook very little research and development and produced few 
seedlings after the OPPSP was discontinued in the late 2008, due to a lack of budget 
from the central government. Hence NKO’s only responsibility since late 2008 has 
been the dissemination of oil palm knowledge in Nong Khai and other potentially 
relevant provinces in the Northeast region, for instance, Ubon Ratchathani and Si Sa 
Ket. The evidence showed that NKO, in co-operation with district-level Agricultural 
Extension Offices in Nong Khai province and STO, arranged three to five seminars a 
year to disseminate oil palm knowledge to farmers in various districts in Nong Khai 
province. The farmers considered these attempts insufficient to enhance their ability 
to achieve the targets of increasing productivity and oil content of the crop, as stated 
in the oil palm expansion plan. The daily work of NKO, thus, involved providing 
services to farmers who came directly to NKO for advice on diverse agricultural crops 
including oil palms.  
 
The evidence also underlined that due to budget constraints PAE, SPAE, and SAE 
have organised hardly any oil palm seminars for farmers, an average of just one per 
year. The headline of the seminars focused on the growing and maintenance of oil 
palm trees, particularly their watering and fertilising requirements at different ages. 
These seminars averaged 100 participants, who were mostly oil palm growers.  
 
Although the district-level Agricultural Extension Offices were the most practical 
way for the farmers to contact the local government, particularly when they had 
problems regarding oil palm cultivation, these district-level Agricultural Extension 
Offices had no in-house oil palm research. Their oil palm knowledge was provided by 
NKO. Thus, the advice given to farmers was based on NKO’s oil palm knowledge 
and the previous experience of the officials in these three offices themselves. Because 
of their experience in the oil palm cultivation in the Southern region, two of the three 
interviewees had been appointed to responsible for the oil palm promotion in each 
district.  
 
“I gave advice to farmers from my own experience. I did not ask NKO 
because I grew oil palms when I lived in the South. Now I have also 
planted the oil palms here, so I am able to understand the problems 
and the differences in Esaan context,” explained an SPAE official 
(Semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
Certainly, the extent to which the local government had disseminated oil palm 
knowledge and developed oil palm knowledge specifically for the Northeast region 
was not in line with the targets set in the plan.  
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The climate conditions in the Northeast region are another obstacle to achieving the 
oil palm targets in this region. The yield and oil content of oil palm in Nong Khai 
province cannot compete with the Southern region’s or the superior Malaysian oil 
palms due to the climate being less suitable. The fact that oil palm plantations in 
Nong Khai province were in their infancy added another constraint to the crop yield 
there. Typically, oil palm trees will reach their peak in terms of productivity at the age 
of 6 to 10 years (DOA, 2010). Thus it is not logical to conclude from the official 
statistics at this early stage that oil palm productivity in Nong Khai province was low 
at 0.569 tonnes per rai per year and was not worth the investment.  
 
Although oil palm farmers in Nong Khai province have adopted the drought-resistant 
Surat Thani 2 variety developed by STO, a DOA official insisted that a 5-month 
period of drought annually in Nong Khai province (see Table 5.8) would still 
negatively affect the crop yield, which could not be compared to the yield of 
plantations subject to a maximum of 3 months drought in the Southern region or less 
than 1month in Malaysia.  
 
“We did not aim to beat the oil palms in the Southern region’s or 
anywhere, when we started the oil palm project in Nong Khai. We just 
wanted to help local rice farmers to have a better life,” concluded the 
interviewee (DOA, semi-structured interview, December 2010).  
 
To recap, the findings in this section suggested that in the action plan for biodiesel 
development and support approved by the Thai cabinet, the climate change mitigation 
was not considered a main driver of the oil palm expansion policy. However, the 
utmost concern of the oil palm policy was the issue of food security; the findings in 
the previous chapter suggest that the majority of the oil palm farmers in this research 
have a strong interest in continuing to produce rice for their own consumption and are 
unwilling to convert all of their lands to oil palm plantations.  
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Despite policy narratives claiming that oil palm development was a top priority for 
both the national and provincial government during this planning period, the oil palm 
expansion policy in Nong Khai province failed to achieve the initial targets of 60,000 
rais set in the OPPAEP during 2005 and 2006. A lack of financial incentive from the 
government was a major hindrance to the progress of the project. Apart from the high 
interest rate offered by BAAC, another downside of the project was the loan process 
itself. Obtaining the loan from BAAC was a long and time-consuming procedure. My 
interviews with farmers revealed that these processes created significant barriers to 
participation in the oil palm project, whilst, by contrast, farmers were much more at 
ease applying for loans under rice and rubber cultivation projects. The attractiveness 
of rubber cultivation at that time was also a key reason for the failure of the OPPAEP 
in terms of uptake. The distribution of rainfall in Nong Khai province was another 
concern which affected the confidence of BAAC in providing oil palm loans for 
farmers, leading in turn to higher interest rates.  
 
The failure of the OPPAEP led to the emergence of OPPSP created by DOA in order 
to distribute the 800,000 prepared oil palm seedlings to farmers in Nong Khai 
province. The OPPSP offered farmers the oil palm seedlings on loan, to be returned in 
the form of money or oil palm production in the beginning of the 4th year of 
cultivation, when they would start cropping (NKO, 2007).  
 
The OPPSP was a success in terms of area expansion, as it resulted in a staggering 
increase in oil palm areas from none in 2006 to 17,156 rais at the end of 2007. This 
was due to the attractiveness to the farmers of the borrowing scheme. Because oil 
palms were in the early stages of harvesting in 2009, the yield per rai of oil palm 
cultivation in Nong Khai province was hugely lower than the country’s average of 
2.560 tonnes per rai per year. A lack of oil palm knowledge on the part of local 
government and a failure to disseminate oil palm knowledge to farmers were the 
primary explanations for not achieving the yield and oil content targets. The evidence 
also shows that NKO in collaboration with district-level Agricultural Extension 
Offices and STO arranged only 3 to 5 seminars per year to disseminate oil palm 
knowledge to farmers in various districts in Nong Khai province. These attempts were 
considered insufficient to enhance farmers’ oil palm ability to achieve the targets. 
 
In the next section, I will explore how networks, coalitions and alliances of actors 
with a shared vision or similar beliefs spread and maintain narratives through chains 
of persuasion and influence. The actors/networks are not exclusively restricted to state 
institutions. Instead, they link up the civil service and the government with the private 
sector, including local leaders and large-scale producers. On this theme, I will address 
the questions of, for instance, who is inside and outside a policy network? How do 
people and institutions become enrolled into a network? How do ideas circulate 
through a network? And what are core beliefs? 
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5.2 Actors/Networks Theme  
 
In order to understand the networks and key actors related to the oil palm issues, I 
have divided this section into two parts. The first part explores the path to oil palm 
production in the three villages and the key actors involved, starting from the oil palm 
seedling providers and ending with the large-scale palm oil refinery in Chonburi 
province. The second part, then, discusses how the farmers in the three villages were 
influenced in adopting oil palm cultivation, which involved local leaders, large-scale 
oil palm producers, and government agencies.  
 
5.2.1 Networks and Key Actors in the Path to Oil Palm Production 
 
The evidence suggested that the farmers in the three villages set out on the path to oil 
palm production by acquiring oil palm seedlings. NKO and the private suppliers, 
including suppliers from the Southern region, were the key actors in providing the 
seedlings to the farmers. The farmers then grew the oil palms and sold the oil palm 
fruits to middlemen and the small-scale oil palm crushing mill in the area. The 
middlemen transported the oil palm products to the large-scale palm oil refinery in 
Chonburi province, which was 700 kilometres from Nong Khai. However, there were 
differences in the path to oil palm production amongst the three villages as depicted in 
Figure 5.2 below.  
 
Figure 5.2: Networks of Key Actors in the Path to Oil Palm  
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author; Data from Experience at the Field Site (2010) 
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As noted in the preceding chapter, NKO was the main government organisation which 
provided oil palm seedlings to most of the oil palm farmers (see Table 5.11) in two of 
the villages, namely Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard, whilst the oil palm farmers in Baan 
Hat relied on oil palm seedlings from private suppliers, including some in the 
Southern region. As described in the previous chapter, NKO provided the oil palm 
seedlings to the farmers in two different ways: either via the OPPSP and/or by selling 
them directly to the farmers at the price of 50 to 60 Baht per seedling, excluding the 
transaction cost. Some of the non-NKO seedlings in the three villages came straight 
from the Southern region suppliers since the oil palm farmers trusted the quality of oil 
palm varieties from the South and the oil palm seedlings from NKO were in short 
supply. An example can be seen in the case of Baan Sa Ard, in which none of the 
farmers’ oil palm seedlings came from local private suppliers.  
 
Table 5.11: Number of Households and the Oil Palm Seedlings from NKO and 
Private Suppliers by Village 
 
Village 
NKO * Private Suppliers * 
Contracted  
Households 
Buying  
Households 
Southern 
Suppliers 
Local 
Suppliers 
1. Baan Tarn 9/14 (64%) 6/14 (43%) 1/14 (7%) 1/14 (7%) 
2. Baan Sa Ard 9/23 (39%) 11/23 (48%) 5/23 (22%) 0/23 (0%) 
3. Baan Hat 0/8 (0%) 0/8 (0%) 1/8 (13%) 7**/8 (88%) 
Total 18/45 (40%) 17/45 (38%) 7/45 (16%) 8/45 (18%) 
 
* The cumulative number in each category might exceed the total number of interviews as 
several households acquired oil palm seedlings from more than one source. 
 
** One of the oil palm famers in this village was a local private supplier.  
 
Source: Data from field Interviews (2010) 
 
The oil palm farmers in Baan Sa Ard acquired their oil palm seedlings from different 
suppliers in the Southern region. This was in the period from 2009 to 2010 when there 
were shortages of oil palm seedlings from NKO. These suppliers delivered the oil 
palm seedlings to the farmers in Baan Sa Ard at a price ranging from 90 to 130 Baht 
per seedling including the transaction cost. One interviewee in this village explained,  
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“The demand for oil palm seedlings is high lately. The oil palms from 
the South are also good in quality or even better. The oil content and 
yields are high. They have long experience in growing oil palms. My 
friends there also recommended this company to me (see Picture 
5.1).” (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
Picture 5.1: A Farmer’s Documents from One of the Private Seedling Suppliers 
in the Southern Region  
 
 
 
Source: Photograph by the Author (2010) 
 
The reason for choosing private suppliers from the Southern region varied in each 
household depending on the farmers’ experiences in the South, suggestions from their 
friends, the companies’ reputations, and the price and quality of the oil palm varieties 
offered. One interviewee in Baan Hat bought oil palm seedlings from the company 
that had supplied the oil palm farmer he once worked with in the South.  
 
“I brought the oil palm seedlings with me when I came back to the 
village. It is the same variety because I had got used to growing this 
variety.” (Male, Baan Hat, semi-structured interview, May 2010). 
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In the interview with private seedlings supplier A, who provided the oil palm 
seedlings to the oil palm farmer in Baan Tarn, he emphasised that oil palm seedlings 
from private suppliers were of better quality than the ones from NKO. The seedlings 
from NKO were of the variety Surat Thani 2 Tenera, which gives 23 percent oil 
content with an average production of 3.6 tonnes per rai per year, whereas the DOA-
certified CP Golden Tenera variety from private supplier A offered higher figures at 4 
tonnes per rai per year, at least 25 percent oil content, and 4 to 5 months’ drought 
resistance. This private supplier A also suggested that there were other two uncertified 
oil palm varieties in the market that offered great yields, namely Cirad and Compact 
varieties (see Picture 5.2). 
 
Picture 5.2: Advertising Brochures for Oil Palm Varieties in the Study Area 
 
 
 
Source: Photograph by the Author (2010) 
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The CP Golden Tenera variety was selling at 120 to 150 Baht per seedling depending 
on the transaction cost. The private seedlings supplier A’s customers were small-scale 
farmers, who were mainly from the provinces of Nong Khai, Sakhon Nakorn, Nakorn 
Phanom and Loei, in the Northern region. The interviewee emphasised the importance 
of oil palm quality in cultivating the oil palms and gave the example of a private 
seedling supplier in Si Chomphu sub-district, So Phisai district. This seedlings 
supplier sold low quality oil palm seedlings to farmers around the Si Chomphu sub-
district areas at the tempting price of 40 Baht per seedling. Many farmers bought oil 
palm seedlings from this supplier, but years after planting the oil palms did not yield 
and the farmers lost their money. Later, this supplier stopped selling oil palm 
seedlings and moved out of the areas.  
 
Private seedlings supplier A also described a surge in the demand for oil palm 
seedlings in the past couple of years (2009-2010). Oil palm seedling suppliers in 
Nong Khai province had had a larger role in selling seedlings in 2010 since the 
OPPSP by NKO had ended and there were no longer any oil palm seedlings coming 
from NKO. Private seedlings supplier A said,  
 
“I think this year is truly a year of private suppliers in this area. A lot 
of farmers wanted to grow oil palms and I think it is a good 
opportunity to supply them with good quality oil palm seedlings. 
NKO had some sorts of problems I don’t know, but the farmers’ 
willingness to plant the oil palms is still there.” (Male, semi-structured 
interview, October 2010).  
 
In the case of Baan Hat, private seedling supplier B provided seedlings to most of the 
oil palm farmers in the village. The DOA certified seedlings came from Chumphun 
province in the South at the price of 60 Baht per seedling and this supplier added his 
mark-up to sell them at 70 to 100 Baht per seedlings including delivery service. One 
interviewee, who also lived in the neighbouring village next, had worked in 
Chumphun province and was attracted by the oil palm cultivation in the South. His oil 
palm knowledge was gained from attaining seminars in the Southern region as well as 
attaining the oil palm pilot projects organised by the large-scale palm oil refinery in 
Chonburi province.  
 
The customers of private seedlings supplier B were mostly small-scale farmers from 
Seka district and some districts in Sakhon Nakorn province. The interviewee admitted 
that the volume of oil palm seedlings sold increased considerably in 2010, which 
generated a staggering monthly profit of 10,000 to 20,000 Baht for supplier B. 
Supplier B’s plan was oil palm breeding, and he was, at that time, experimenting with 
suitable oil palm varieties.  
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Both private seedlings suppliers A and B predicted a sizeable increase in purchases oil 
palm seedlings from private suppliers in the study areas due to the dearth of oil palm 
seedlings from NKO. However, the quality of oil palm seedlings was a major concern 
in cultivating the oil palms. There were a few private suppliers who were trying to 
persuade the farmers towards the postulated higher yield of the uncertified oil palm 
varieties. The price of these varieties was as high as 180 Baht per oil palm seedling, 
excluding the delivery service. In fact, the small-scale farmers responded 
unenthusiastically to these new oil palm varieties, since the price was extremely high 
and as yet they had little trust in either the suppliers or the new varieties.  
 
“Quality of oil palm seedlings is everything. Success or failure, it is all 
about the quality. I know about the new varieties here. They look good 
on paper, but no one knows in reality. No one guarantees the 
outcomes except the sellers. The wild claims of yields of 5 to 8 tonnes 
per rai per year seem impossible to me here (in the Northeast region), 
but who knows?” said private seedlings supplier A (Male, semi-
structured interview, October 2010).  
 
Three to four years after the oil palm farmers have planted the seedlings, the issues 
are about the market for oil palm fresh fruit bunches (FFBs). The farmers in the three 
villages sold their oil palm production in two different ways. All the farmers in Baan 
Tarn and Baan Sa Ard who had harvested sold some or all of the oil palm fruits to the 
middlemen in the area. The rest of the oil palm production was transported by the 
farmers directly to the small-scale oil palm crushing mill in Tha Kok Daeng sub-
district, Seka district.  
 
Private merchant C is the oil palm buyer in the area of Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard. In 
the case of Baan Tarn, the farmers had to deliver their oil palm fruits to private 
merchant C’s place in Rattanawapi district because the farmer had only a small 
amount to sell. Alternatively, the farmer could contact the private merchant A directly 
to ask whether he was around the village to collect the oil palm fruits. However, the 
picture was different in Baan Sa Ard: private merchant C came to the neighbouring 
village, Baan Ngam, to buy oil palm fruits once a fortnight. This had been organized 
by local leader H in Baan Sa Ard (see more details in section 5.2.2).  
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In fact, the evidence from the interview with private merchant C showed that he 
bought more oil palm fruits from Nong Khai province (approximately 500 tonnes per 
year) than anywhere else. Oil palm fruits came from almost every district in Nong 
Khai province, and also from a few districts in Loei, Sakhon Nakorn and Nakhon 
Phanom provinces, which produced of 300 tonnes, 100 tonnes, and 100 tonnes 
respectively per annum. Private merchant C purchased the oil palm fruits from the 
farmers at 1 Baht per kilogramme below the market FFB price across the board, 
without grading the farmers’ oil palm production by quality. Private merchant C also 
claimed that the quality of oil palm production from the Northeast region was better 
than the Southern region’s in terms of the oil percentage, but the yield per rai per year 
was still lagging behind that of the South.  
 
Returning to the marketing channel, the Baan Hat farmers had two choices for selling 
their oil palm production. One way was to sell the oil palm outputs to the local oil 
palm crushing mill in Tha Kok Daeng sub-district, Seka district. This small-scale 
plant had been set up by a group of people who had gained experience in oil palm 
farming and palm oil extraction in the Southern region. This family business was run 
by a small number of workers using second-hand machines with the capacity to 
process approximately 10 tonnes of oil palm fresh fruit bunches per day. This small-
scale oil palm crushing mill was permanently closed in April 2010. I went to the plant 
site, but was not able to interview the stakeholder as the family had already moved to 
invest in other businesses elsewhere. The information obtained about this crushing 
mill was based on discussions with the villagers around the plant site and an interview 
with government official from SAE.  
 
Normally, this crushing mill did not operate every day, as there were insufficient oil 
palm fruits in the area. However, there were rumours amongst the oil palm growers 
that the mill’s second-hand equipment was in extremely poor condition and was no 
longer run well enough to produce high quality crude palm oil (CPO). Moreover, this 
family business did not have enough capital and cash flow, which affected their 
ability to purchase oil palm fruits from farmers. The oil palm farmer in Baan Hat 
recognised these problems since it took several weeks to receive money from selling 
the oil palm products (see also Chapter 4). Therefore, many oil palm farmers, 
including the oil palm farmers in Baan Hat, switched to dealing with private merchant 
D, even though the price he pays is 1 Baht below the market price offered by the oil 
palm crusher.  
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Private merchant D, who is located in Kum Tha Kla sub-district, Sakhon Nakorn 
province, is an alternative purchaser of oil palm products for the farmers in Baan Hat. 
Merchant D started buying agricultural products including oil palm fruits in January 
2010 after moving with his wife from Vanorn Nivas sub-district to live in Kum Tha 
Kla sub-district, Sakhon Nakorn province. The customers of private merchant D were 
from Seka and Phon Charoen districts in Nong Khai province, and a few districts in 
Sakhon Nakorn province. However, private merchant D and private merchant C were 
not competing to obtain oil palm products in the same areas, as private merchant D 
explained,  
 
“He (private merchant C) has been in this business for a long time and 
is a big name in the area. I won’t compete with him. I don’t want to 
make an enemy. So, I am going into the areas he cannot reach.” 
(Male, semi-structured interview, November 2010).  
 
Although the oil palm fruits should reach the palm oil refinery within 24 hours 
because of a loss in the percentage of oil, private merchant D only manages to deliver 
oil palm products to the palm oil refinery 4 to 10 times a month, with a consignment 
of from 8 to 13 tonnes of oil palm fruits each time. This depends hugely on the season 
of oil palm production. Typically, oil palm products in Thailand are at their peaks in 
two periods every year: from March to May and from September to October (see 
Figure 5.3). However, there are concerns over the grade of the farmers’ oil palm 
fruits.  
 
“Some cut unripe bunches to sell us: they cannot notice the ripe ones. 
But I had to buy them and told them to make it right next time. I need 
to build up customer relationships, which will help my business in the 
future,” explained merchant D (Male, semi-structured interview, 
November 2010).  
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Figure 5.3: Oil Palm Production in Thailand by Month (2007-2010) 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
 
Both private merchants C and D had to transport the oil palm products 700 kilometres 
to the large-scale palm oil refinery in Chonburi province, in the Eastern region of 
Thailand, for which they took 1 Baht per kilogramme off the FFB market price they 
paid to the oil palm farmers. Nonetheless, both merchants had suggested that a small-
scale oil palm crusher would soon arrive in the area. Private merchant B admitted that 
he was interested in investing in a 10-tonne per day oil palm crusher to produce CPO 
in the future. The interviewee planned to operate as a co-operative, community-based 
oil palm crusher; the oil palm farmers would be invited to be shareholders in the co-
operative and private merchant D would concentrate primarily on management and 
marketing issues.  
 
In contrast, private merchant C refused had no interest in setting up a small-scale oil 
palm crusher himself, but suggested that within 3 years when the oil palm production 
in the area flourished, there would be plenty of small-scale oil palm crushers.  
 
“In the next 3 years, the oil palm production in the Northeast will be 
enough for oil palm crushers to come to the area. I think less than 20 
percent of oil palm farmers have harvested so far. There is a lot of talk 
about crushers here. They will be here soon, I believe,” explained 
private merchant C (Male, semi-structured interview, October 2010).  
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Private merchant C showed no sign of anxiety about the future appearance of oil palm 
crushers in the area because he had another oil palm related business, which involved 
the selling of agricultural chemicals including oil palm fertilisers. Besides, he 
cultivated 30 rais of oil palms and planned to expand in the near future.  
 
Private supplier A also believed that CP Group, which is a large-scale food company 
listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, was closely monitoring the oil palm 
situation in the Northeast region. Because the demand for oil palm crushers from oil 
palm farmers in this region would become stronger in a couple of years, CP Group 
might be interested in seeking new market opportunity in the Northeast region.  
 
“I cannot tell you where and when the oil palm crushers will come, 
but it is certain that the CP Group are thinking about it. I don’t think 
they will start with a large one, it should be a small one in the area of 
Phon Phisai and Rattanawapi districts. Wait and see, they will surely 
come,” forecasted the private supplier A (Male, semi-structured 
interview, October 2010).  
 
When the oil palm products from private merchants C and D arrived at the Chonburi 
palm oil refinery, the refinery did not grade the quality of oil palm fresh fruit bunches. 
Typically, the Southern refineries classify the oil palm fruits based on the size and 
varieties, and the purchase price varies according to the oil content. However, the 
Chonburi refinery could not offer this service to their customers because it would 
increase the cost, and in any case there were no significant differences amongst the oil 
palm varieties that arrived at the refinery.  
 
The interviewee suggested that the oil palm fruits from the Northeast region are 
medium sized because the trees were still immature at 4 to 5 years of age and thus the 
percentage of oil could not compare to the oil palm fruits from trees over 10 years old.  
 
“The quality of oil palms should be judged when the oil palms are at 
least 10 years old. Small-size oil palm fruits definitely give less oil 
than the large ones,” he explained (Male, semi-structured interview, 
January 2011).  
 
The informant believed that the Southern region’s oil palm fruits had slightly more oil 
content (which implied better quality) than the Northeast’s due to the more suitable 
climatic conditions, such as rainfall distribution and humidity.  
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In fact, all of the oil palm fruits at the Chonburi refinery came from the Northeast and 
Eastern regions. Most of them, approximately 98 percent, were from the Eastern 
region. Although the production capacity of the refinery was 90 tonnes of oil palm 
fruits per hour, the monthly production varied from 400 tonnes per day in low season 
to 1,000 tonnes per day in peak season. The average oil palm production of the 
Northeast region was 500 tonnes per month, the majority from Ubon Ratchathani and 
Nong Khai provinces. This low figure could not tempt the refinery to establish either 
a full-scale palm oil refinery or even a small-scale crusher in the Northeast region.  
 
Expansion of production capacity to 135 tonnes per hour was a priority for the 
Chonburi palm oil refinery owners.  
 
“300 to 400 tonnes per month (in the low season) is not enough to 
build a refinery. If we decide to do so, we are looking for 700 to 800 
tonnes per day. So, I would say no chance at the moment or in the 
near future,” expressed an interviewee (Male, semi-structured 
interview, January 2011).  
 
A small-scale crusher was not possible either as CPO from a small-scale crusher is 
below the standard set by the refinery.  
 
“The quality of CPO is also different if you produce CPO from a 
small-scale crusher. The market price of oil palm fruits needs to be 
lower for the small-scale one. It would affect our company’s 
reputation in the future,” emphasised the interviewee (Male, semi-
structured interview, January 2011).  
 
The interviewee further suggested that the company will not consider producing 
biodiesel until the price of diesel oil reaches 40 Baht per litre. Producing cooking oil 
and products such as margarine, soap and shortening offers higher profits to the 
company. Thus the CPO from oil palm fruits is used mainly to produce palm oil for 
cooking purposes through the subsidiary company located in the same area. Although 
the company started to produce biodiesel in 2005, production was discontinued in 
2008 as a result of surging production costs which reduced the company’s profit 
margin.  
 
“Actually, we also want to make biodiesel. A lot of opportunity there, 
but the government came in too much in controlling the price of it. So, 
we didn’t make enough profit, or even made losses when the price of 
oil palm fruits was high. We had to do it and then stop and then do it 
and stop again. It has been like this for the past couple of years.” 
(Male, semi-structured interview, January 2011).  
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As we have seen, the production path of palm oil in this research, which involved a 
range of actors from the oil palm seedling suppliers (both local and Southern) to the 
oil palm farmers in the three villages, to the local private buyers of oil palm fruits, and 
to the local crushing mill and large-scale palm oil refinery in Chonburi province, 
differed across the three villages. This sub-section has provided an understanding of 
the shared and differing values and beliefs of these different actors in the oil palm 
network. In the next sub-section, I will explore the networks of key actors that 
influence the oil palm farmers in the three villages.  
 
5.2.2 Networks of Key Actors that Influence the Oil Palm Farmers in 
the Three Villages 
 
In order to understand this network, I divided this sub-section into two parts. The first 
deals with the inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm producers in the 
three villages, and the second is devoted to the government agencies.  
 
5.2.2.1 Inspirational Local Leaders and Large-scale Oil Palm Producers 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the roles of the inspirational local leaders and large-scale 
oil palm producers and the success of their oil palm plantations were influential 
factors in persuading the farmers to engage in oil palm cultivation. The relationships 
of the inspirational local leaders and the large-scale oil palm producers to the oil palm 
farmers in the three villages are presented in Figure 5.4 below.  
 
In the case of Baan Tarn, local leader G’s successes in oil palm cultivation have 
inspired the farmers in the village to follow her path (see also Chapter 4). Local leader 
G, who lived in Baan Tarn Mai (a neighbouring village), has 40 rais of oil palm 
plantations, as well as rice paddy fields and rubber plantations, which account for 30 
rais and 31 rais respectively. At that time half of the planted oil palms were 
productive. Since early 2009, local leader G had been harvesting 2 to 3 tonnes of oil 
palm production per month, which generated an average monthly income of 10,000 
Baht for the household. However, the remaining 20 rais of oil palm plantation was 
expected to be ready for harvesting in late 2012.  
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Figure 5.4: Networks of Inspirational Local Leaders and Large-scale Oil Palm 
Producers 
 
 
 
Source: Diagram by the Author; Data from Experience at the Field Site (2010) 
 
According to the interviewee, the first batch of oil palm seedlings, 25 percent of the 
total, came from the seedling supplier in Si Chomphu sub-district, Nong Khai 
province, at the cost of 40 Baht per seedling. As private supplier A suggested, there is 
a high possibility of receiving low quality oil palm seedlings from private seedling 
suppliers in the Si Chomphu area. Local leader G managed to achieve a healthy 
condition in 80 percent of his trees. Subsequently, she changed to oil palm seedlings 
from NKO, which accounted for 75 percent of the local leader G’s oil palm area.  
 
“The oil palm seedlings from NKO are a lot better. Less than 5 
percent of the oil palm seedlings were unable to grow into oil palm 
bunches,” informed the inspirational local leader G (Female, semi-
structured interview, August 2010). 
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Local leader G was in one of the first groups of farmers to consider oil palm 
cultivation in the Northeast area. This assisted the household to become famous 
amongst farmers interested in oil palms as well as amongst government officials in 
order to learn from their achievement. The household was granted an annual 100,000 
Baht loan from BAAC under the OPPAEP and OPPSP. They also acquired enough oil 
palm seedlings from NKO for 30 rais, of which 10 were given to them free of charge. 
In the implementation of the OPPSP, DOA officials had also taken special care of this 
local leader G, which involved frequent visits, close monitoring, and a full package of 
oil palm knowledge transfers. According to the results in this study, this was the right 
strategy, as the inspirational local leaders have played an important role in 
encouraging oil palm cultivation in locally by giving advice, forming groups of oil 
palm farmers, and taking the lead in oil palm issues. This positively affected the 
decision of Baan Tarn farmers to participating in the OPPSP.  
 
Indeed, local leader G attempted to collect the oil palm harvests of the small-scale oil 
palm farmers around Baan Tarn Mai and sell them on behalf of the group to private 
merchant C for a negotiated price. However, the oil palm production in the area had 
not reached the level where the oil palm farmers could bargain to achieve a better 
price from private merchant C. One of the chief reasons was from the oil palm 
farmers themselves. A lack of co-operation and understanding amongst the oil palm 
farmers meant that they harvested at different times, which resulted in an 
insufficiency of oil palm products at any given time to negotiate with the merchants.  
 
“People here drink (alcohol) together, but they work separately. I 
think they might get envious of another persons’ success. I have been 
trying to form a group, but I have to accept that it is not in a good 
shape,” expressed the inspirational local leader G (Female, semi-
structured interview, August 2010).  
 
Apart from the attempts to form an oil palm group, local leader G was also giving 
advice to farmers around the village who were interested in oil palms.  
 
“When people ask me about oil palms, I give them advice. Some think 
that my advice and experience are useful and then decide to plant the 
oil palms. They see my success, they understand that the oil palms can 
be real here,” explained the interviewee (Female, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
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Looking again at the production path, when the oil palm fruits are ready, local leader 
G has two options: either contact private merchant C to collect the products, or to 
deliver the products to him. If the oil palm production is plenty, say, more than 1 
tonne of oil palm fruits at a time, private merchant C will come to collect the fruits or 
give a concession for bringing them to him. Nonetheless, local leader G believes that 
the middlemen in Nong Khai province will be forced out of the palm oil supply chain, 
when the crushers arrive in the area in the near future. 
 
Likewise, the success story of the inspirational local leader H in Baan Ngam has 
strongly influenced the farmers in Baan Sa Ard towards adopting oil palm cultivation. 
Local leader H had taken oil palm seedlings from NKO before the emergence of 
OPPSP. Leader H had replaced all 50 rais of rice paddy fields with oil palms, which 
meant the household had to buy rice for their household consumption. Although 
leader H started to harvest oil palm fruits in October 2009, the major source of 
household income was from 150 rais of rubber cultivation. The household was a 
leader in rubber cultivation in Tham Charoen sub-district, So Phisai district, with 20 
years of experience.  
 
The example of group selling in the case of rubber products had encouraged the oil 
palm farmers to follow the same path, with the guidance of the well-known local 
leader H. The local leader H was very clear in his mind about supporting the oil palm 
cultivation as he planned to expand his oil palm plantations from 50 rais to 130 rais at 
the end of 2011. Leader H was trying to convince interested farmers in the area to 
adopt oil palm cultivation using the knowledge he had gained by trial and error and 
then form a group of oil palm growers. 
 
This oil palm group could offer economies of scale in buying agricultural materials 
and selling their produce to the middlemen. At that time, the local leader H organized 
an oil palm market with private merchant C in the open space in front of local leader 
H’s house. The market takes place every 15 days, and the buying and selling activity 
is on a one-to-one basis: each individual farmer negotiates separately to sell to private 
merchant C.  
 
“It is difficult to sell the products as a group. I mean to sell the oil 
palm products together in one big lot to merchant C in order to get a 
better price. Maybe it is a new thing here and it is not our culture to 
work as a group. Actually, I think it is a great move to set up the 
market place successfully. I don’t think it is a bad starting point, not at 
all,” explained inspirational local leader H (Male, semi-structured 
interview, July 2010). 
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As explained in the previous chapter, a huge amount of investment in cultivation by 
oil palm investors positively affected how confident the farmers in the three villages 
were about adopting oil palm cultivation. The large-scale oil palm producer E had 
influenced many oil palm farmers across the three villages to invest in oil palm 
plantations, particularly in the case of Baan Tarn, where the oil palms of the large-
scale oil palm producer E are planted very nearby. The large-scale oil palm producer 
E obtained 3,000 rais of oil palm area in Phon Phisai district, of which all have been 
productive since the end of 2008. The average oil palm production of 300 tonnes per 
month is a primary source of household income, as well as the 200 rais of rubber 
plantations. 
 
The large-scale oil palm producer E moved from the South to trade auto spare parts in 
the Phon Phisai area before switching to agriculture in 2003. She started with rubber 
plantations and then added 2,000 rais of oil palm in 2005. A dripping water system 
was installed for the oil palms, using water from bogs and groundwater wells. During 
her interview, this large-scale producer E stressed the importance of being a large-
scale agricultural producer. The attitude of large-scale producer E differed from that 
of the small-scale oil palm producers in the three villages in several aspects.  
 
Because of a belief that large-scale agriculture is necessary, the large-scale producer E 
planned to invest in a medium-sized oil palm crusher with a production capacity of 40 
tonnes per day, in the near future. Hence, the market for oil palm products did not 
concern producer E in the long run. In producer E’s opinion, without co-operation 
between farmers, small-scale agriculture may not be economically viable due a lack 
of economies of scale in buying agricultural materials and selling the products.  
 
“Esaan people are very lazy. They always talk about ‘some say’ and 
then do nothing. That is why it is difficult to form a group for 
anything. If they compete between themselves, put their hearts into 
agriculture, and work hard, they will definitely be successful in doing 
agriculture,” believed the large-scale producer E (Female, semi-
structured interview, November 2010).  
 
Oil palm producer E also informed us that being a large-scale investor, she was given 
10 percent of total sales in return for selling oil palm products to the large-scale palm 
oil refinery in Chonburi province.  
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Her attitude about the government sector was also different from that of the small-
scale farmers. Most of the small-scale farmers trusted the government support 
including oil palm seedlings and advice. The large-scale investors had a different 
perspective about the government sector from the small-scale farmers, demonstrated 
by producer E insisting that local government, especially NKO, lacked knowledge of 
growing oil palms. Moreover, the large-scale producer E did not trust the quality of 
oil palm seedlings obtainable from the government sector, and in particular whether 
Surat Thani 2 variety was suitable for the conditions in the Northeast. As a result, 
producer E brought the oil palm seedlings from the Southern region, of a variety 
which was a hybrid between Malaysia and Tenera varieties. This hybrid variety was 
expected to offer higher productivity and percentage of oil than the Surat Thani 2.  
 
 “I asked my friend in Chumphon province and also learnt from my 
experiences. NKO does not know anything about oil palms. They 
sometimes buy the oil palm seedlings directly from the South and 
resell them. So, why not do it yourself?,” said large-scale oil palm 
producer E (Female, semi-structured interview, November 2010). 
 
The conditions attached to the loan from BAAC could not tempt this large-scale 
producer E to be in either the OPPAEP or OPPSP. Producer E decided to take her 
custom to a private commercial bank.  
 
“The government provided nothing, or they provided something that 
did not work. I do not think we need it anyway,” explained large-scale 
oil palm producer E.  
 
The evidence shows that producer E did not increase the area planted with rubber 
because the rubber tapping process requires a huge amount of labour and, thus, is 
prone to cheating by the hired rubber tappers. In contrast, oil palm cultivation, after 5 
to 6 years of growing, uses less labour than rubber cultivation especially since the 
shade of the oil palm trees naturally limits the growth of grass. In the view of the 
large-scale oil palm producer E, oil palm cultivation is relatively easy compared to 
rubber cultivation in terms of monitoring and harvesting. Oil palm harvesting is 
carried out in daylight, which makes it easy to scrutinise the oil palm products over 
larger areas. Producer E chose to hire a 60-person oil palm harvesting team to collect 
the oil palm fresh fruit bunches at the rate of 500 Baht per tonne. The grass cutting 
was also serviced at 5 Baht per tonne by the same team.  
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It is important to note that the large-scale oil palm producer E is a head of household 
who is female. Although the percentage of female-headed households in Thailand was 
at 31.67 percent in 2007, a significant increase from 21.13 percent in 1980 according 
to NSO (2009), there were only three female-headed households amongst all the 
farmers interviewed in this research: the other two were a rice farmer who had not yet 
adopted oil palm cultivation in Baan Tarn and an oil palm grower in Baan Hat. This 
can be explained by the fact that agriculture, including oil palms, involves harsh 
physical conditions and hardship, which puts females are at a disadvantage compared 
with males. In this research, in which most of the interviewees were farmers 
producing either rice or oil palms, the number of female-headed households was at 
the time lower than the national average. Moreover, in Thai culture, it is generally 
preferred to have a male in the role of head of a household rather than a female. There 
is a firm belief that a male should lead the household and the female should play a 
supporting role: raising children, cooking, helping her husband with agricultural 
work, or doing part-time work to generate additional income for the household, which 
differs sharply from the western culture. Large-scale oil palm producer E explained 
during her interview,   
 
“I am a rare case because I have to be. I moved from the South, so I 
do not have relatives here. When my husband died, I had no choice 
but to fight for my children. I did what I love to do, which is 
agriculture. Step by step. But in fact, I am a woman, so having a man 
to lead your household is a good thing to me. It supposed to be equal, 
men and women. But deep down, no women want to lead. Men do not 
want us to lead either. They will feel ashamed.” (Female, semi-
structured interview, November 2010). 
 
On the other hand, large-scale oil palm producer F has influenced the farmers in the 
two villages, Baan Sa Ard and Baan Hat. None of the oil palm farmers in Baan Tarn 
mentioned the oil palm activities of producer F. The large amount of oil palm planted 
areas (2,800 rais in 2008) attracted the farmers to emulate the efforts of large-scale 
producer F. In fact, producer F expanded his business in the Southern region to start a 
new business in the Northeast region in the form of a family company. His businesses 
included boutique hotels in various places in the South, real estate in Khon Kaen 
province (Northeast region), a pool construction business, and oil palm cultivation.  
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Focusing on the oil palm cultivation only, producer F grew oil palms in various places 
on different scales. The figures were 30,000 rais in Songkhla province (Southern 
region), 2,800 rais in Nong Khai province, and 1,000 rais in each of Udon Thani 
(Northeast region), Nongbua Lamphu (Northeast region), and Kanchanaburi (Central 
region) provinces. The evidence suggested that large-scale oil palm producer F was 
interested in expanding his oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region due to the 
inexpensiveness of agricultural land.  
 
“We sold our land in Songkhla province to buy new land here. The 
land was very cheap and we got plenty of it for the same amount of 
money. It was worthwhile to invest here, better than in the South,” 
expressed the large-scale oil palm producer F (Male, semi-structured 
interview, August 2010).  
 
Similar to producer E, producer F did not demand any support from the government 
sector. Producer F employed two Thai oil palm academics from the universities and 
one oil palm expert from Malaysia to simplify the oil palm knowledge for practical 
purposes. Their work included investigating soil types in the planted areas in order to 
apply the most suitable fertilisers to the trees according to the variety. Funds came 
from other businesses as well as loans from private commercial banks, but not from 
the BAAC’s oil palm projects. Large-scale producer F also planned to purchase a 13 
million Baht oil palm crusher with a production capacity of 50 tonnes per day when 
their oil palm fruits started to ripen. The crusher would be located in Udon Thani 
province.  
 
Both the large-scale producer E and the large-scale producer F suggested that the sub-
district Administration Organisations were the only two local government 
organisations that came to discuss the land tenure of the oil palm cultivation with 
them. Most of the land acquired by the large-scale producers was abandoned arable 
land, formerly used for rice cultivation. Only a small amount of the land was bamboo 
land. Both large-scale oil palm producers insisted that they acquired the land legally 
with the correct NS 3 and PBT 5 documents from the farmers.  
 
“I was not afraid when the officials came to me because I did 
everything right. They will ask for money if you do something wrong. 
But I have had these kinds of experiences, so everything was on the 
paper and the documents were kept well,” underlined large-scale oil 
palm producer F (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
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It is worth noting that producer F raised the seedlings in the oil palm nursery in 
Songkhla province before conveying them to plant in the northeast region. The 
reputation of the modified Malaysian oil palm variety had influenced many farmers in 
So Phisai district and the surrounding areas who worked daily in investor B’s oil palm 
plantations, to start growing oil palms. Producer F sold the oil palm seedlings to 
interested farmers with no oil palm seedling certification from DOA.  
 
“A lot of farmers were interested and asked for the oil palm seedlings. 
I sold the oil palm seedlings to them without guarantee, replacement, 
or anything. But, I did not sell many of them, only the leftovers,” 
explained producer F (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010). 
 
To summarise, the findings in this part suggest that inspirational local leaders have 
strongly influenced the farmers in both Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard in terms of the 
techniques of oil palm agriculture as well as engaging in oil palm cultivation. The 
large-scale oil palm producers have likewise influenced the farmers in all three 
villages. However, the attitude of the large-scale producers towards the government 
sector differed from that of the small-scale farmers. Indeed, the large-scale producers 
did not trust the government agencies and asked for no support from them. In the next 
part, I will explore the network of the government agencies influencing the oil palm 
farmers.  
 
5.2.2.2 Government Agencies 
 
There are six government agencies involved in the oil palm cultivation of the three 
villages, namely Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO), Department of 
Agriculture (DOA), Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), 
Phon Phisai Agricultural Extension Office (PAE), So Phisai Agricultural Extension 
Office (SPAE), and Seka Agricultural Extension Office (SAE). In Figure 5.5, the 
relationships between these six government agencies and the three villages have been 
depicted. These government agencies are introduced below.  
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Figure 5.5: Networks of Government Agencies 
 
 
 
* BAAC was not involved directly in funding oil palm loans to the farmers. The farmers 
borrowed under the rubber and rice cultivation projects in order to support the oil palm 
cultivation.  
 
Source: Diagram by the Author; Data from Experience at the Field Site (2010) 
 
The Department of Agriculture (DOA) is one of the 15 government departments and 
offices under the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MOAC). The 
department is the government’s agricultural development think tank, whose main 
responsibility is research and development of crop varieties and agricultural 
machinery in order to increase crop productivity and value. Other responsibilities 
include certifying agricultural products to international standards, and supplying crop 
knowledge and skills to farmers for the benefit of Thailand’s agricultural development 
in the longer term.  
 
Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre (NKO) is the local government agency under 
DOA, MOAC. Initially, NKO was named Nong Khai Horticultural Research Centre 
and was reformed to NKO in 2005 because of the government policy on alternative 
energy. NKO is a supporting unit to the field study of DOA officials, in which NKO 
is responsible for providing oil palm support to farmers in the Northeast region in co-
operation with the 15 Provincial-level Agricultural Research and Development 
Centres in the Northeast. Although the institute had 24 officials, who could be divided 
into 8 policymakers and 16 administrative officials, the main responsibilities of NKO 
were to research and develop crops, produce seeds and seedlings, and provide crop 
knowledge and academic research to farmers. All of these focused on the subject of 
oil palms.  
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The Phon Phisai Agricultural Extension Office (PAE), So Phisai Agricultural 
Extension Office (SPAE), and Seka Agricultural Extension Office (SAE) are district-
level Agricultural Extension Offices under the Department of Agricultural Extension 
(DOAE), MOAC. They were created in order to stimulate the competitiveness of 
farmers in producing and managing agricultural products in response to the market. 
They are also intended to strengthen agricultural community, to advise and solve 
agricultural problems for farmers, and to disseminate agricultural knowledge acquired 
from various government agencies to local farmers. Indeed, district-level Agricultural 
Extension Offices were the local government agencies that worked closely with the 
farmers and have influenced the farmers’ crop selections in the local areas.   
 
The Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) is a state-owned 
bank, in which the Minister of Finance was an ex officio chairman of the board and 
had full authority in guiding the bank’s direction. The bank’s ultimate goal was to 
raise the quality of life of small-scale farmers in rural areas by providing loans to 
support an increase in both quantity and quality of agricultural products. Providing 
support to farmers in terms of agricultural knowledge and career development were 
also priority objectives of the bank. The strength of BAAC is its relationships with 
rural farmers throughout the country, as the bank has branches in almost every district 
in Thailand.  
 
As illustrated by Chapter 4 and the previous policy narratives section, NKO had 
strongly influenced the oil palm farmers in the two villages of Baan Tarn and Baan Sa 
Ard, either through the OPPSP or by the direct selling of oil palm seedlings. 
However, in the case of Baan Hat, the oil palm farmers had no relationship with NKO 
or DOA due to geographical difficulties. One of the farmers explained,  
 
“NKO is in Rattanawapi district, not far from Mueang district, which 
is like the capital of the province. We are more than 150 kilometres 
away from NKO, so it is difficult to go and visit them. Actually, I 
think NKO could not reach us either. They (NKO) feel the same way.” 
(Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010). 
 
The official from NKO admitted,  
 
“Long distances have an impact on our work, I have to say. Villages 
around this area, such as in Phon Phisai and So Phisai districts, are a 
lot easier for NKO to visit, to monitor, and to give advice. That is why 
I think NKO having the responsibility to look after oil palm farmers in 
Nong Khai province and the whole Northeast region is far too much, 
especially considering our manpower.” (Semi-structured interview, 
June 2010). 
 
 
 176 
The evidence showed that DOA was responsible for checking the appropriateness of 
the farmers’ oil palm lands.  
 
“The teams went in to test the soil every farmer had prepared for the 
oil palm plantations (who participated in the OPPSP). NKO was a 
facilitator because they knew the area quite well,” explained the 
official from DOA (Semi-structured interview, December 2010).  
 
This informant reckoned that the DOA teams gave priority to local leaders in oil palm 
cultivation in order to monitor the results of their oil palm plantations.  
 
“We understand the importance of local leaders in the Esaan context, 
so we want to nurture them to be successful growers in the future. We 
try to keep in contact with them as much as possible. We also learnt 
from them because they were the ones who planted the oil palms. 
They knew the problems, and we can help them solving those 
problems.” (Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
 
Because DOA is a central government agency, the relationship between the DOA 
teams and the oil palm farmers was a one-way relationship. The oil palm farmers 
would contact NKO or district-level Agricultural Extension Offices in preference to 
DOA if they needed advice regarding the oil palms.  
 
“They (DOA officials) came from the Bangkok. They told us we 
could contact them anytime. But I feel better about contacting the 
local government around here, like PAE or NKO. It is more 
convenient and we already know them (PAE officials). They have 
been around for some time,” explained an oil palm farmer in Baan 
Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The DOA official added,  
 
“Very few people contacted us (DOA) directly, even though we left 
them our numbers. We are looking more at the big picture of the 
issues, so the farmers contacted NKO first for overall suggestions. I 
think this is good. NKO is closer to them. I mean both in relationships 
and in distance.” (Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
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Although PAE, SPAE, and SAE officials had a good relationship with the oil palm 
farmers in each district, most of the farmers preferred to discuss oil palm issues with 
their local leaders and the oil palm growers in their villages.  
 
“The oil palm growers around here talk to each other very often. They 
share their experiences and sometimes go to ask local leaders about 
the harvesting. I also talked to a PAE official, but only when he came 
in to suggest the new rice scheme from the government.” Said a 
farmer in Baan Tarn (Male, semi-structured interview, May 2010).  
 
The evidence from a SAE official suggested in a similar vein,  
 
“A lot of farmers have been asking me about oil palms in the past 2 
years especially when I went to villages to talk about government 
policy and the crop selection. I answered them from my oil palm 
experience when I lived in the South. If there is something I do not 
know, I will contact NKO.” (Semi-structured interview, November 
2010). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, BAAC has influenced the oil palm farmers in the three 
villages in terms of providing funds for the oil palm plantations. However, the 
funding came from the rice and rubber plantation projects: some of the farmers 
utilised that money to support their oil palm plantations. A BAAC official 
summarised that,  
 
“We were involved directly in the OPPAEP, but it was not successful, 
as you know. A lot of farmers then used the loan from the rubber 
project to back the oil palms. I have no problems with that, if they can 
still pay the money back to us, which they did.” (Semi-structured 
interview, September 2010). 
 
The evidence in this part has shown that NKO and DOA had significantly influenced 
the farmers in the two villages, namely Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard, whilst in Baan 
Hat, the oil palm farmers had no relationship with them due to geographical 
difficulties. All of the government agencies had a two-way relationship with the 
farmers except DOA, where there was only a one-way relationship. However, most of 
the farmers preferred to discuss oil palm issues with their local leaders and oil palm 
growers in the area.  
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It is undeniable that politics affect policy processes in several vital ways. Thus, in the 
next section, I will discuss politics and how they shape oil palm policy processes. On 
this theme, I will address the questions of, for instance, who is engaged in the policy 
processes? How much capacity exists within the local government to carry out policy 
aims and implementation? And what types of relationships occur within ministries 
and departments? 
 
5.3 Politics/Interests Theme 
 
Many of the informants interviewed for this study indicated a lack of direction, 
seriousness and continuity on the part of the government in achieving its oil palm 
policy objectives. Certainly, political instability due to conflicting notions of political 
legitimacy has affected the oil palm policy processes since the political upheaval of 
2006. Thaksin Shinawatra, the Prime Minister of Thailand, was ousted from power by 
a peaceful military coup d’état on the 19th September 2006. Back in January 2001, 
Thaksin had been elected to government with unprecedented popular support through 
his Thai Rak Thai (TRT or “Thais Love Thais”) party. He immediately enacted 
“populist policies” designed to appeal to the relatively poor and rural voters, who 
were left behind by the long economic boom prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.   
 
These “populist policies” introduced by the TRT offered social welfare, income 
support, and ideas about how the poor might be given priority, which included the 
famous 30 Baht universal healthcare scheme, the one million Baht microcredit 
scheme (SML), and the One Tambon (subdistrict) One Product (OTOP) project. The 
immense popularity of these populist policies captured the hearts and minds of 
Thailand’s rural majority, particularly in the North and Northeast regions, and thus 
handed a landslide victory to the TRT in the re-election in February 2005. Thaksin 
was the first Prime Minister in Thailand’s history both to complete a full 4-year term 
in office and to be re-elected at the head of a political party that controlled parliament.  
 
Although Thaksin had put Thailand on the map of the world’s emerging markets with 
a massive rate of GDP growth, strong leadership, clear policy direction, and apparent 
democratic consolidation, his administration was accused of a lengthening trail of 
corruption, conflict of interest, and alleged abuses of power (Montesano, 2007; 
Dressel, 2010; Hewison, 2010; Chachavalpongpun, 2011; Jha, 2011). Mass 
demonstrations against Thaksin’s administration (which were later formed into the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts) began in September 2005 and 
expanded enormously in January 2006 after the tax-exempt sale of Thaksin’s 
Shinawatra Corporation (Shin Corp), worth 1.9 billion USD, to the sovereign wealth 
fund of the government of Singapore, Temasek Holdings.  
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After months of turbulence, Thaksin decided to dissolve parliament in February 2006 
and called for a snap election in April 2006, which the opposition parties boycotted. 
Predictably, Thaksin won the April 2006 election with 57 percent of the votes cast 
(Ockey, 2009), but this result was fraught with controversies due to the fact that 
Thailand’s 1997 constitution required unopposed candidates to receive the support of 
at least 20 percent of eligible voters. Later, the constitutional court annulled the April 
2006 election and directed the government to conduct a fresh election. Charges were 
also filed by the courts against the TRT for engaging dummy parties to compete in 
that election, and against the Democrat Party (DP) for boycotting it.  
 
Thaksin, as caretaker Prime Minister, responded by calling for a new general election 
in October 2006. Nonetheless, the yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) persisted in its protest against the Thaksin regime, eroding his legitimacy and 
occupying the streets with protesters in the weeks leading up to the military 
intervention on the 19th September 2006, while Thaksin was out of the country at the 
annual session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Up to this 
point, street demonstrations had distracted the focus of the government away from 
constructing and pursuing new policies, including the oil palm expansion policy in 
Nong Khai province. The fact that the cabinet approved the OPPAEP on 25th April 
2006 meant it was extremely difficult to make further progress on the oil palm policy. 
 
The interviewee at DOA explained,  
 
“The timing of the oil palm policy was really bad. It (the oil palm 
policy) started in mid-2005 and the project (OPPAEP) was then 
further refined in mid-2006. Look at this period, there were a lot of 
protesters on the streets, very long rallies and demonstrations, and 
then the coup. No government on earth could work in those 
circumstances. So, no one cared about the oil palm expansion. 
Politicians only cared about their survival in the government. It was a 
really bad situation.” (Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
 
An NKO official also felt this difficulty,  
 
“Everything had been at a standstill since we started to have conflicts. 
It seemed like everyone was so obsessed about them (conflicts) and 
the oil palms were just a really small issue to them (policy makers). I 
hoped the conflicts would end soon at that time, but in reality they did 
was not. It was getting worse.” (Semi-structured interview, June 
2010). 
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After the September 2006 coup, Thailand was hurled back into a familiar whirl of 
elections, constitution amendments, and arguments about political legitimacy that 
caused instability to the country. Five Prime Ministers, who were Thaksin 
Shinawatra, Surayud Chulanond, Samak Sundaravej, Somchai Wongsawat and 
Abhisit Vejjajiva, came into power in a time span of just 4 years (2006-2009). 
General Surayud Chulanond was named as the interim Prime Minister by the Council 
of National Security (CNS) on the 1st of October 2006. The military leaders abrogated 
the 1997 constitution and then appointed a committee to draft a new constitution, 
which was designed to elevate bureaucrats and judges at the expense of elected 
politicians, political parties, and the Prime Minister (Jha 2011). After the proceedings 
of public hearing and submissions of the 2007 constitution, the general election was 
scheduled for the 23rd of December 2007.  
 
During the Surayud government, Thaksin’s TRT was also dissolved by the military- 
appointed court and 111 of its executives were barred from political participation for 
5 years. The TRT’s successor was called People’s Power Party (PPP) and was led by 
Samak Sundaravej. It was victorious in the December 2007 election with a solid 
margin over the Democrat Party (DP), 233 to 165 seats in the revised 480-member 
assembly. However, the PAD began to wear Royal Yellow Shirts and mobilise 
support against the PPP, actively opposing Samak’s reconciliation efforts, 
rectification and amendment of the 2007 constitution, and the relations with 
neighbouring Cambodia over the Phreah Vihear dispute. The street demonstrations 
continued unabated. The Yellow Shirts demanded Samak’s resignation and, in August 
2008, intensified their protests by laying siege to several state agencies and occupying 
the Government Houses in order to prevent the elected parliament from opening. 
Meanwhile, Thailand witnessed the emergence of United Front for Democracy 
against Dictatorship (UDD), commonly known as the Red Shirts, in response to the 
activities of the Yellow Shirts. The clash between these two colours in September 
2008 resulted in dozens of injuries and a state of emergency declaration.  
 
In September 2008, the constitutional court gave a verdict that Samak was guilty of 
violating the constitutional ban against outside employment, because he was being 
hired and paid by two cookery programmes on television. This forced him to resign 
immediately, and he was then succeeded by Somchai Wongsawat, who was Thaksin’s 
brother-in-law. This change was rejected by the Yellow Shirts, who continued to fight 
against constitutional amendments, to implement the “new politics” of mostly 
appointed rather than elected representatives, and to eliminate Thaksin influence on 
the government. The protests accelerated, and the Yellow Shirts again seized the 
Suvarnabhumi airport for a week in late November 2008, shutting down all flights 
and stranding thousands of tourists in Thailand.   
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In what may represent another major twist in the tale, the constitutional court again 
dissolved the PPP and two other allied parties for alleged vote-buying in the 
December 2007 election. Thus, the PPP’s executives including Prime Minister 
Somchai were banned from politics for 5 years starting from December 2008. The 
new coalition under Abhisit Vejjajiva of the DP emerged, as some of the pro-Thaksin 
political leaders changed sides and defected to the government under the DP. The 
political legitimacy of the DP was questioned by the Red Shirts, and they took to the 
streets in protest. In April 2009, the Red Shirts disrupted the fourth East Asia summit 
in Pattaya by storming into the hotel, which resulted in a cancellation of the summit. 
From March to May 2010, the Red Shirts staged demonstrations in Bangkok in large 
numbers, which provoked widespread violence in the entire country. Town halls in 
several provinces in the North and Northeast regions and 17 buildings in Bangkok 
burnt down, including the office of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and Central 
World, which was the biggest department store in Thailand. Prime Minister Abhisit 
called for reconciliation in order to cure Thailand’s deep political polarisation, which 
in this two-month period had led to confrontations between the Red Shirts and the 
military and 91 deaths.   
 
The past few years (2006-2010) have been a difficult period for Thailand. Throughout 
those years, the oil palm policy was deeply affected by the political turmoil. A DOA 
official summarised, “If the head does not move, the tail can hardly move either. 
Everyone was at a standstill. There was no one to make a decision and that was a big 
problem. The projects were set up at the wrong time. We have had a lot of meetings 
about the oil palm issues in Esaan, but 4 years have already passed and we are still at 
the same place. The politics are unstable.” (Semi-structured interview, December 
2010). 
 
A PAE official also added the local perspective that,  
 
“Here we knew that the central government had a policy of supporting 
oil palm expansion, but that is all. The issues were forgotten until the 
DOA and NKO pushed the issues forward. But it was only a year 
period between 2007 and 2008 and then the central government was 
silent again. I could see the possibility (oil palms), so I suggested the 
oil palms to farmers myself. Do what I can do. They (policy makers at 
the central government) are maybe very busy with political matters 
lately.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
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The evidence from the interview with the DOA official suggested that several persons 
at the very top of the DOA did not support the idea of oil palm expansion in the 
Northeast region, as there was no concrete conclusion that oil palm plantations can be 
economically viable in the Northeast region.  
 
“It is still uncertain whether the oil palms can do well in Esaan. 
Several academics came out to warn the farmers about cultivating oil 
palm in Esaan. So, it is understandable that no one in the government 
sector would want to get themselves involved in the issues. It is not 
worth risking their careers when they can wait for results and support 
the crop later on. They still have time.”(DOA, semi-structured 
interview, December 2010). 
 
According to the interview, the name of NKO would be changed at some point in 
2011 from ‘Nong Khai Oil Palm Research Centre’ to ‘Nong Khai Agricultural 
Research and Development Centre’, in order to de-emphasise their role in supporting 
the oil palm crop in the Northeast region. 
 
Interestingly, there were also politics within government offices in the MOAC in 
supporting the oil palm projects. These offices were the DOA, the Department of 
Agriculture Extension (DOAE), the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), and the 
Land Development Department (LDD). Ideally, these four offices needed to work in 
harmony to promote oil palm expansion in the Northeast region: LDD would identify 
suitable oil palm areas in the Northeast region and DOA would then provide the oil 
palm knowledge to farmers, whilst OAE was responsible for the planning of oil palm 
expansion for the entire country. However, in reality, there was no integration 
amongst these three government agencies as a DOA official explained,  
 
“The communication between government agencies in MOAC is poor. 
Each one did its work without looking at the big picture of a plan or 
strategy. So, it ends up with them all working at the same tasks. LDD 
did not understand the whole story. They did their work based on their 
understanding only. So, we (DOA) have our own database, which 
differs from theirs. Actually, we also do the planning and supply it to 
OAE. You could say that we were the ones who do everything.” 
(Semi-structured interview, December 2010). 
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The SPAE official also confirmed the principal role of DOA by pointing out that,  
 
“I did not see any other government agencies involved in oil palm 
issues, only DOA, NKO (which is under DOA) and us (under DOAE). 
But all we did was go out and encourage farmers to grow, and tried to 
help them all the best we could. The rest is DOA’s responsibility. It is 
such a hard, big, and very difficult task to accomplish. I understand 
them.” (Semi-structured interview, August 2010). 
 
It is clear from the evidence in this research that political uncertainty in Thailand and 
the politics within the government agencies were the two influential factors 
contributing to the failure of the OPPAEP discussed in the policy narratives section. 
In the next section, I will identify how much policy space there is for pushing for 
different ways of doing things and for changes in the oil palm arena.  
 
5.4 Policy Space 
 
Understanding policy processes through an examination of discourse/narratives, 
actors/networks, and politics/interests helps in recognising the policy space of the oil 
palm issues in the research. According to the six types of policy spaces proposed by 
Wolmer and Scoones (2005), the oil palm issues in this research involve ‘invited 
spaces’, in which discussion on oil palm policy was led by government agencies with 
the selective participation of stakeholders.  
 
“The meetings were held many times during the 2006 and 2007 
period, about 6-7 times. But, only local government agencies were 
involved, such as NKO, Nong Khai province and all district-level 
Agricultural Extension Offices in Nong Khai, and BAAC. There were 
no farmers or seedling providers or buyers participating in the 
discussions about the future of oil palms here in Nong Khai,” 
informed an NKO interviewee (Semi-structured interview, June 
2010).  
 
According to Pretty (1995)’s seven typologies of participation, the evidence in this 
research suggests that for local oil palm farmers, participation is most likely to mean 
simply being told what has been decided or has already happened, a ‘passive 
participation’ typology, which should be seen as a type of non-participation. The PAE 
official further explained,  
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“The farmers did not know anything. They just decided whether they 
wanted to grow them (oil palms) or not. That was the farmers’ only 
role. It was like providing them with a very fixed package: they did 
not have any options. Accept the terms and the government will help 
you with growing. That was how things worked here.” (Semi-
structured interview, June 2010). 
 
The evidence shown in the three themes of IDS KNOTS team’s policy processes 
framework and the previous empirical chapter suggests that the government agencies, 
particularly DOA, work largely in ways remote from the farmers, are insensitive to 
diversity of context, and are concerned about themselves generating and transferring 
technologies. Clearly, the oil palm policy processes did not have room for farmers to 
participate in the networks, or in designing oil palm policy which directly affected 
them. The oil palm policy was made according to the traditional top-down, transfer-
of-technology (TOT) paradigm, in which the government transferred the oil palm 
knowledge to the farmers via seminars and training. In this model, development 
professionals and scientists, who usually had a background in just a single discipline, 
determined agricultural research priorities and then experimented on research stations 
in order to generate new technology. This new technology would then be handed over 
to a larger group for transfer to farmers (Chambers et al., 1989; Chambers, 1993; 
Scoones and Thompson 1994).  
 
The DOA official explained his/her mindset: 
 
“Because we (DOA) know that farmers and academics want to know 
how to grow oil palms in Esaan, we are trying to develop the oil palm 
seedlings that suit the conditions in Esaan and supply them to farmers. 
It is the main responsibility of DOA. We are krom vi cha karn kaset 
(DOA in Thai) and vi cha karn kaset means we have to seek new 
agricultural knowledge and then provide it to farmers.” (Semi-
structured interview, December 2010). 
 
Indeed, many oil palm farmers asserted in the interviews that oil palm knowledge and 
the availability of high quality oil palm seedlings were their priorities in terms of 
support from the government. However, they further insisted on the necessity for the 
participation of the local government agencies in facilitating their success with their 
oil palm plantations.  
 
“I want knowledge, but it is not just about oil palm knowledge. I need 
to know where to buy and sell the oil palms. They (the DOA team) 
came to see our land, but I want more. Not just having the land 
checked. Help with water resources is important,” declared a farmer in 
Baan Sa Ard (Male, semi-structured interview, August 2010).  
 
 185 
The traditional TOT mode of the oil palm expansion policy in this research 
accentuated the farmers’ unequal ability to participate in the oil palm projects, 
particularly in the case of the OPPSP. Allowing the farmers to borrow oil palm 
seedlings from NKO under the OPPSP meant only the farmers who were better off 
and had resource-rich farms and land benefited from the policy. In the interview, a 
PAE official pointed out that,  
 
“The farmers who grow oil palms around here are quite rich. If they 
do not have money, they will not be able to plant in the oil palms. 
They have to invest in a lot of things such as land preparation, 
fertilisers, and water systems, even though they receive oil palm 
seedlings for free through the project. They have to have rubber, or 
run a community trading shop, or have a good source of income.” 
(Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
 
The evidence was clear in the case of Baan Sa Ard, where most of the oil palm 
farmers were also involved in growing rubber. The SAE official explained,  
 
“I think a lot of oil palm farmers here grow rubber so they have 
enough money to maintain the oil palms. Definitely, they are not poor. 
They are the farmers who are seeking new opportunities here, and the 
oil palms are a good crop with a good future.” (Semi-structured 
interview, August 2010). 
 
The oil palm expansion policy was based on experiments in the research stations, in 
which the physical and economic conditions on-station were often similar to those of 
resource-rich farms (Chambers, 1993; Chambers 2005). Thus, there was a strong 
possibility of having contrasting results in comparison with those of the resource-poor 
farms, which would benefit much less - or actually lose -by participating in the 
OPPSP. The NKO official was aware of this issue in the interview and pointed out 
that,  
 
“We tested the oil palm seedlings in the experimental stations here in 
Nong Khai. They worked well, but in reality if farmers cannot prepare 
good conditions for farming such as sufficient water resource on their 
land, they might have problems with the results. Surely, some can do 
that, but some cannot do that, especially the poor, who do not have 
much capital to turn things around.” (Semi-structured interview, June 
2010). 
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In order to serve the resource-poor farmers well, the oil palm policy needs to be 
bottom-up rather than the transfer of technology (TOT) model, which is deeply 
embedded in normal professional thinking and prescription. The mindsets of most 
professionals change very slowly. As the NKO official expressed his/her view on the 
role of DOA,  
 
“If we want to succeed, we need to change here, but it is going to be 
really difficult. The central government (DOA) did not share the same 
view with us. They said they cared about local farmers, but in practice 
they did not. It has been like this for a long time. They like to think on 
their own and then come up with something for farmers. It is not 
going to work for every farmer, I am sure. The project will be a 
success, if you are lucky.” (Semi-structured interview, June 2010). 
 
To make progress with oil palm expansion, it was essential to instill new ‘farmer-
first’ behaviours and attitudes into the average professionals and particularly the role 
of DOA. The objective of this bottom-up approach was to empower farmers to learn, 
adapt, and do better by analysing, choosing, experimenting, and evaluating on their 
own, with the outsiders - including government agencies - providing support and 
consultancy (Chambers, 2005). Research and development occur primarily not on the 
research stations, but on the farmers’ fields and in their actual conditions. This is 
necessary to generate diversity, and to provide farmers with wider ranges of options 
to choose from. It is believed that the best results occur when farmers are involved in 
decision-making during all stages of the project, from design and formulation to 
maintenance of the crop.  
 
During interview, an NKO official summarised the future development of the oil palm 
policy as follows: 
 
“Farmers have to come in and help design the oil palm plan, telling us 
what they want and what they are lacking because each area has 
different conditions: soils, water resources, land gradient, and many 
more. Marketing channels in each area have to be planned wisely. I 
mean, we have to identify and to provide buyers and sellers of oil 
palms around the areas for farmers. Case by case, starting from the 
district level. Not like what we did in the OPPSP.” (Semi-structured 
interview, June 2010). 
 
This will not be easy: the professionals will need to be able to pick and choose 
appropriate methods for particular tasks based on case-by-case analysis.   
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the oil palm policy processes in Nong Khai province using the 
IDS KNOTS team’s framework as the main policy processes framework for analysis. 
After understanding the farmers’ rationale for adopting oil palm cultivation in the 
previous chapter, the analysis in this chapter has provided a complete picture in 
reflecting the reality of the oil palm issues in Nong Khai province as well as in the 
Northeast region of Thailand.  
 
The findings in this chapter suggest that the oil palm policy processes in Nong Khai 
province do not have room for farmers to participate in the networks, or to design the 
oil palm policy that directly affects them; this is passive participation according to 
Pretty (1995)’s seven typologies of participation. The policy was made in top-down, 
TOT mode, in which the government only transferred oil palm knowledge through 
seminars and trainings. There were also issues concerning the inequality of farmers in 
participating in the oil palm projects. Indeed, the OPPSP favours the rich farmers, as 
farmers need a significant amount of capital to prepare for and maintain oil palm 
crops. Implementation of the farmer-first approach is necessary in order to push the 
policy forward to serve the resource-poor farmers properly. New behaviours and 
attitudes must be encouraged in most of the professionals encountered in this 
research.  
 
The oil palm expansion policy in Nong Khai province started in 2005, when the Thai 
Cabinet approved the action plan for biodiesel development and support in order to 
reduce dependence on imported fuels and stimulate rural economic development. 
Despite policy narratives claiming that oil palm development was a top priority for 
both the national and provincial government during this planning period, the oil palm 
expansion policy in Nong Khai province failed to achieve the initial targets of 60,000 
rais set in the OPPAEP during 2005 and 2006 due to a lack of financial incentives 
from the government. Apart from high interest rate loans offered by BAAC, another 
downside of the project was the loan process itself. The attractiveness of rubber 
cultivation at that time was also a key reason for the failure of the OPPAEP in terms 
of the participation of farmers in the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 188 
Many of the informants interviewed for this study pointed to a lack of direction, 
seriousness and continuity on the part of the government in achieving its oil palm 
policy objectives. There were also politics within certain key government 
organisations, particularly in the MOAC, involved in supporting the oil palm projects. 
The failure of the OPPAEP led to the emergence of the OPPSP, which was created by 
DOA in order to distribute the 800,000 oil palm seedlings to farmers in Nong Khai 
province.  
 
In fact, the OPPSP was a success in terms of expanding the area devoted to oil palms 
due to the attractiveness of the borrowing scheme provided for farmers, which 
resulted in a staggering increase in oil palm area, from none in 2006 to 17,156 rais by 
the end of 2007. However, the borrowing project may face difficulties over payback 
in the future, as no farmers had started to return either money or oil palm production 
to the government in 2010. The local government’s lack of oil palm knowledge and 
its shortcomings in disseminating oil palm knowledge to farmers were the primary 
explanations for not achieving the yield and oil content targets in this region.  
 
In order to come up with the proper policy suggestions, all the findings in this thesis 
need to be summarised first. The next chapter, then, presents a summary of the 
empirical results of the thesis in alignment with the main research question and the 
three sub-questions. The policy implications and future research recommendations of 
this thesis will then follow.  
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
The literature reviews at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 2) revealed a substantial 
gap in understanding small-scale farmers’ engagement in oil palm cultivation, 
especially in the Thai context. In order to fill in some of these gaps, this qualitative 
research asked: what are the critical factors shaping the change towards oil palm 
adoption of small-scale farmers in the Nong Khai province (the Northeast region of 
Thailand), and what are the implications for Thailand’s oil palm policy development? 
This question was motivated by a rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Thailand, 
with the associated debates surrounding oil palm production issues and the inevitable 
arguments for and against them. In particular, production of oil palms could offer a 
route to sustainable development that could alleviate poverty and lead to a higher 
standard of living for farmers, or it could be, in contrast, a fast track to environmental 
ruin.  
 
This research, therefore, investigated these phenomena by analysing farmers’ oil palm 
adoption and the oil palm policy processes. Two sub-questions were then identified 
which would help answer the main research question. These three sub-questions are: 
1) What are the key factors affecting farmers’ decisions to adopt or not to adopt oil 
palm cultivation? and 2) What is the rationale of the oil palm policy and how is it 
implemented?  
 
In order to find answers to these questions, I developed an analytical framework 
based on the three main analytical approaches, namely the eight elements of farmers’ 
decision-making (Ohlmer et al., 1998), and the IDS KNOTS team’s framework on 
policy processes (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; 2001; 2003; KNOTS, 2006). The two 
main criteria examined were the farmers’ decisions, and the oil palm policy processes. 
First of all, the empirical analysis looked at the farmers’ decisions in relation to 
changing over to oil palms in Nong Khai province, by adapting the eight elements of 
the farmers’ decision-making model. Secondly, oil palm policy processes were 
analysed according to the IDS KNOTS team’s and Majone’s policy processes 
frameworks, in accordance with which the policy processes were examined in relation 
to three themes: discourse/narratives, actors/networks, and politics/interests.  
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This qualitative study relied on fieldwork carried out in a period of approximately 9 
months between 25th April 2010 and 15th January 2011. The fieldwork relied on 78 
semi-structured interviews categorised as follows: 63 oil palm and rice farmers in 
three selected villages in Nong Khai province, namely Baan Tarn (Phon Phisai 
district), Baan Sa Ard (So Phisai district), and Baan Hat (Seka district), and 15 key 
actors including various local and central government agencies, private seedling 
suppliers, private merchants, inspirational local leaders, large-scale oil palm 
producers, and the manager of a large-scale palm oil refinery in Chonburi province. 
These informants and research sites were chosen strategically, using purposive and 
snowball sampling techniques.  
 
This concluding chapter will bring together the research findings and analysis from 
Chapters 4 and 5 on policy processes and farmers’ decisions related to the question of 
oil palms. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter begins with some further 
analysis of the key findings. The second section offers some policy implications to 
policy makers regarding the understanding of the oil palm issues in Nong Khai 
province. The chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of this research and 
putting forward some suggestions for future research.    
 
6.1 Key Findings and Further Discussion 
 
6.1.1 The Farmers’ Decisions and the Consequences of Oil Palm 
Cultivation   
 
As argued in Chapter 3, the analytical framework developed in this research provides 
a convincing basis for the analysis of the oil palm change in the Thai context. 
Understanding the change to oil palm production through the lens of farmers’ 
decisions, and frameworks of policy processes, has encompassed the oil palm issues 
completely, as exploring only one particular perspective could not fully reflect the 
reality of the whole subject of oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province. The 
following evidence gave rise to the key findings of this research.  
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Although Thailand is a middle-income country that has made overall progress in 
development, this progress has been unevenly distributed (Parnwell, 1996; Dixon, 
1999; UNDP, 2007). Thailand’s government has invested more in industry than in 
agriculture, with the result that urban areas have grown faster than rural areas, and 
poverty is concentrated in rural districts, particularly in the Northeast of Thailand. In 
order to reduce the gap between urban and rural economic development, the Thai 
government has acknowledged the need to promote oil palm expansion, particularly 
in the Northeast region. Because development there lagged behind all the other 
regions in Thailand in terms of initial incomes and growth rate, it is no surprise that 
an increase in economic security was the farmers’ main reason for deciding to adopt 
oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province. 
 
However, it has emerged from this research that the real needs of the farmers were 
expressed as wanting to live comfortably and near to their children. These goals could 
be achieved through oil palm plantations, which could create employment and thus 
attract their migrated children to come back to work in agriculture in their home areas. 
If oil palm cultivation becomes a success in the Northeast region in the future, this 
would imply a reversal of the migration trend, from urban to rural areas, rather than 
the typical rural to urban trend (see Rigg et al., 2012) that Thailand has experienced 
so far. Rural lives in Thailand are changing. The government’s subordination of 
agriculture to the industrial sector has resulted in a decline in agriculture, which has 
fueled the migration of rural farmers to urban centres, dividing households, scattering 
families, and depleting settlements (UNDP, 2007). Off-farm employment may 
sometimes be the best alternative to insure against agricultural risks. Farming in 
Thailand has deteriorated into a position where financial returns from farming relative 
to non-farming have significantly declined (Rigg, 1994; Rigg, 2001, Rigg et al., 
2012). Without adequate opportunities in agriculture, many farmers decide to migrate 
to urban areas to find work. This migration brings remittances to villages, which 
increases rural incomes, enhances savings and assets, and reduces the slide into 
poverty.  
 
An increase in savings and assets provides an opportunity for farmers to invest in new 
crops, including oil palms. The evidence of this research pointed to the fact that there 
were a significant number of farmers who had to rely on other sources of income to 
support oil palm cultivation, including remittances from migrated family members. 
However, as mentioned earlier, there are grounds for believing that oil palm 
cultivation can raise the farmers’ incomes from farming itself, and thus encourage 
their children to migrate back from the urban areas. This precisely meets the farmers’ 
needs towards fulfilling their goal of ‘living comfortably and near to their children’.  
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This research also found that in most of the oil palm households, other major factors 
attracting them to adopt oil palm cultivation were its key characteristics, particularly 
there being only 15 days between harvests; long life-span; single-time planting; 
requiring only a small amount of unskilled labour to grow and maintain the crop; and 
daylight working hours. Oil palm cultivation has been viewed by many farmers as 
having the potential to provide an inheritance for their children, which was also 
reported as one of their needs. Many farmers suggested that these positive attributes 
of oil palm cultivation had a strong possibility of offering them a more reliable source 
of income throughout the year, as well as the chance to spread their workload evenly 
throughout the year in future. In essence, oil palm farming offers more free time to 
farmers than rice and rubber crops due to its lower labour demands during cultivation 
and harvesting. Thus, the oil palm farmers now have more time either to concentrate 
on seeking additional jobs to boost their household income or to spend in leisure. 
 
The low productivity and high production costs of rice production in the Northeast 
region had tempted the farmers to try alternative crops, including oil palm. Other 
optional crops in the area are rubber, eucalyptus and cassava. However, rubber and oil 
palms require different types of land, slightly hilly for the former and flat for the 
latter. Thus, the real competition for land was between these four crops: eucalyptus; 
cassava; rice; and oil palms. Rice was very likely to be displaced by oil palms because 
the farmers expressed their dissatisfaction with rice cultivation. The evidence in this 
research shows that 38 of the 45 oil palm households interviewed had turned some of 
their rice paddy fields over to oil palms. The ecological problems of eucalyptus 
planting, such as inhibiting the growth of other crops, and the fluctuations in the price 
of cassava, have made oil palm cultivation more attractive to the farmers interviewed.  
 
By incorporating the policy processes frameworks to understand the change to oil 
palm production within the analytical framework, this research offers a better 
understanding of oil palm policy processes and how they relate to farmers’ decisions. 
The 2005 Oil Palm Plantations for Alternative Energy Project (OPPAEP) proved to 
be a failure due to lack of financial incentives, complicated loan processes, the 
attractiveness of rubber as a crop to farmers at that time, and the political uncertainty 
since the military coup in 2006. However, the Oil Palm Plantations Supporting 
Project (OPPSP), which was developed later (in June 2007) to lend farmers oil palm 
seedlings, to be repaid in the form of money or oil palm production when the oil palm 
plantations could be harvested, had played a key role in convincing the farmers to 
convert to oil palm production. It was also found that oil palm seminars organised by 
local government agencies and the high quality oil palm seedlings provided by the 
NKO boosted the confidence of many farmers in deciding to grow the oil palms.  
 
 
 
 
 193 
This project (OPPSP) was considered a success in terms of oil palm area expansion, 
but a lack of oil palm knowledge within local government agencies and a failure to 
disseminate oil palm knowledge adequately to farmers were the chief reasons for not 
achieving the yield and oil content targeted in the oil palm expansion plan. The 
findings also suggest that the oil palm policy processes had no room for farmers to 
participate in the oil palm networks, or in designing the oil palm policy that directly 
affected them. 
 
After analysing the networks of key actors in the policy processes frameworks, the 
role and attitude of local leaders and large-scale oil palm are better understood. It was 
found that the role of inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm growers was 
prominent in convincing the farmers to make the switch. The local leaders were oil 
palm producers outside the three villages, who had brought oil palm cultivation into 
the area and had already harvested oil palm fruits. Most of the oil palm growing 
households in Baan Tarn and Baan Sa Ard mentioned the inspirational local leaders, 
as it is part of the culture of the Northeast farmers to rely on role models if they are to 
start doing something different. Some households in the interviews also described the 
large-scale oil palm producers as their motivation. 
 
Understanding the oil palm networks of the three villages, this research also found 
that the oil palms’ ability to produce an astonishing array of products, the price of oil 
palm fruits, and the link between farmers and buyers were essential factors in 
convincing the farmers to believe that the demand for oil palms would increase 
significantly in the future and thus boosting the confidence of the farmers to adopt oil 
palm cultivation. In the case of Baan Sa Ard, the farmers had a clear marketing 
channel in mind and sold their oil palm fruits as a group to their local private 
merchant in a nearby village every 15days. It is worth noting that the success of 
rubber plantations had also increased the confidence of the oil palm farmers in 
starting to cultivate oil palms: seeing their rubber trees flourish had assured many 
farmers of secure future incomes. Thus, these farmers converted their confidence in 
rubber plantations into confidence in oil palm cultivation.  
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On the other hand, it is clear that not all farmers may have had the chance to be 
successful in oil palm cultivation. In terms of the rice farmers in this research who 
had not yet adopted oil palm cultivation, the findings showed that the majority (9 out 
of 18) expressed interest in planting oil palms in the future, but were holding off 
because of concerns over future support from the government and the poor quality of 
the oil palm seedlings that were available in the area. The findings also showed that 
farmers in the ‘less than 20 rais of rice’ category were more likely to rely on 
government support in terms of funding because they refused to convert their rice 
paddy fields to oil palm cultivation. The unsuitability of land for oil palm cultivation 
was also a concern for some farmers who had upland rice paddy fields. Lack of access 
to a water supply and an irrigation system also prevented some farmers from adopting 
oil palm cultivation. Another important factor for the rice farmers in delaying oil palm 
cultivation was the fact that there were not yet many oil palm producers who had 
already harvested oil palm fruits in the three villages. This was a cultural issue, as 
Esaan people generally need to have role models before starting to do something 
which is new in their region.  
 
In terms of the consequences of oil palm adoption, there are serious concerns that oil 
palm expansion could trigger an outcry from the environmental sector for numerous 
reasons. According to the literatures discussed in Chapter 2, oil palm plantations are 
believed to be a major cause of deforestation both in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
However, the accusation of forest destruction due to oil palm expansion is far from 
reaching a conclusion and there are still debates over this issue. The findings of this 
research suggest, on the contrary, that most of the land used for oil palm plantations 
was previously agricultural land: 38 out of 45 oil palm farmers had converted rice 
paddy fields to oil palm plantations. This leads to the belief that forests had not been 
converted into oil palm plantations in the area covered by this research, and that a loss 
of biodiversity arising when forests are cleared is similarly unlikely to have happened. 
 
It is generally believed that oil palm cultivation consumes a large quantity of chemical 
fertilisers in order to increase and maintain yields, which could increase 
eutrophication in water bodies and wetlands affected by runoff. This research found 
that there was no concrete evidence of runoff from the application of chemicals. 
According to the literatures explored in Chapter 2, oil palm smallholders almost 
always use fire in preparing land for cultivation because they cannot afford land-
clearing machinery and are accustomed to this method. The findings suggested that 
there was only one household amongst those interviewed that burnt the land in 
preparation for oil palm plantations due to it being easy. The rest of households 
believed that using fire to clear the land negatively affects the future growth of any 
crops on that land. In terms of the environmental impacts of oil palm cultivation in 
Nong Khai province, this research found that there was no concrete evidence of 
destruction of natural habitats as a direct result of, for instance, the change of land use 
or the runoff from the application of chemicals.  
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Oil palm cultivation can also contribute to a range of social issues. Significant erosion 
of local culture has been reported in several studies referred to in Chapter 2. However, 
the findings showed that oil palm cultivation was consistent with the farmers’ 
personal norms and habits, especially when compared to rubber cultivation, which 
requires, for instance, working at night time, 5 or 6 days a week. Moreover, there are 
literatures in Chapter 3 suggesting that oil palm expansion has called critical attention 
to potential conflicts over land tenure, especially in the case of large-scale oil palm 
projects. Because land is a productive asset, those who have more land have more 
economic opportunity. The research findings suggest that only one household of the 
total 45 households in the three villages had not obtained land title for oil palm 
cultivation. Some of the ‘less than 20 rais’ rice farmers also suggested that they had 
insufficient land to cultivate oil palms, and thus had to wait for government support 
before they could decide to do so. Land is essential to the livelihoods of poor 
communities in rural areas since it is a means of providing for subsistence needs and 
for generating incomes. An equitable distribution of land is important because it may 
increase farmers’ employment and incomes. Land reform in Thailand is needed in 
order to address disparities in land ownership as well as to prevent rural to urban 
migration, thereby spreading the benefits of development more evenly.  
 
As the literatures explored in Chapter 2 established, oil palm expansion in the 
Northeast region has long been discussed by Thai academics, with particular focus on 
whether oil palm plantations could become economically viable in the region. Some 
suggest that planting oil palms in the Northeast region is extremely risky because the 
environment is inappropriate for them. The findings of this research suggest that most 
of the oil palm farmers (34 of 45 households) were satisfied with their oil palm crop 
due to positive growth of oil palm trees and the high price of oil palm fruits at that 
time. The farmers were confident that the oil palm crop would help them to achieve 
their objective, which is to ‘live comfortably with their children in their hometown 
areas’.   
 
6.1.2 Oil Palm Change in Nong Khai Province: A Broader Discussion  
 
Thai economic performance has been dramatic since the 1960s, which saw the 
beginning of three decades of uninterrupted rapid economic growth which ended with 
the financial crisis in 1997. Thailand then found itself trying to recover from the crisis 
and reconstruct its economy. It is clear that Thai economic performance since then 
has not been as impressive as it was to prior to 1997. Before the crisis in 1997, 
Thailand had moved from being one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-
income country. As a result of strong economic growth, income per capita increased 
from 2,250 Baht to 76,847 Baht during the period from 1960 to 1996. Moreover, the 
incidence of poverty declined remarkably from 88.3 percent of total population in 
1962 to 14.8 percent in 1996 (Warr, 2004). 
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Despite a decline in overall poverty as a result of economic development, the 
distribution of the benefits of growth was rather uneven (Parnwell, 1996). In other 
words, a significant part of the economic benefit went to a small population group, 
leaving less for the remaining larger population. However, this came as no surprise. 
There have long been major income inequalities in Thailand. Thailand’s Gini 
coefficient steadily increased from 0.41 in 1962 to 0.513 in 1996, and 0.522 in 2000, 
which is considered high even when compared with neighbouring East Asian 
Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. Whilst it is 
apparent that overall poverty reduction in Thailand correlates with economic growth, 
the distribution of income has been unaffected by economic circumstances. Inequality 
in Thai society has remained high throughout the economic boom, the crisis and the 
recovery. Perhaps the inequality in Thailand persists partly because the Thai 
government has not made a significant commitment to egalitarian redistribution.   
 
Looking at the change to oil palm farming in Nong Khai province, there are grounds 
to believe that it has favoured the richer farmers. The oil palm farmers in the three 
villages were mostly the better-off farmers, who used their rubber income to support 
their oil palm cultivation. It is clear that those who can be successful in oil palm 
cultivation have certain opportunities that not all farmers may have. First, farmers 
need to own land that is suitable for oil palm cultivation. Second, it is easier for 
farmers to switch to oil palm cultivation if they have minimal financial burdens or 
debts. Farmers also need to have enough initial capital through either agricultural 
loans or financial support from the government. Whilst access to local markets to sell 
oil palm products would help farmers to increase incomes, access to water supplies 
and irrigation systems is crucial. Furthermore, farmers cannot switch to oil palm 
cultivation without knowledge about how to grow it in the Northeastern context. The 
opportunity to gain oil palm knowledge via participation in training courses provided 
by local government is essential. These factors could lead to an increase in inequality 
of opportunity amongst farmers.  
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To ensure the benefits of economic growth are distributed more evenly, the 
government needs to come up with a development policy, including an oil palm 
expansion policy as defined in this research, which seriously addresses this problem. 
This can be done by allowing grassroots farmers to participate in designing the policy, 
both in agenda-setting and in decision-making, in order to design an appropriate 
policy that understands poor farmers, and thus reduces inequality. Understanding the 
change to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province showed that the farmers did not 
have the opportunity to participate in the oil palm networks, or to influence the design 
of the oil palm policy that directly affects them. Instead, the farmers were just told 
what had been decided or had already happened, in keeping with the traditional top-
down, transfer of technology (TOT) paradigm, in which the government transfers 
knowledge to the farmers via seminars and training based on the results of 
experiments carried out on the research stations. This restricted type of participation 
means that the voices of the poor farmers are not being heard, which could result in 
even more income inequality in the country.   
 
Looking into energy issues, global energy consumption is predicted to increase by 50 
percent over 2007 levels by 2030, and approximately 95 percent of global energy 
comes from fossil fuels (EIA, 2007). Thailand, which has experienced great economic 
and industrial development in the past three decades, has followed the trend very 
closely. Thailand is the second largest energy consumer in Southeast Asia 
(Siriwardhana et al., 2009). Being a net oil importer, the Thai government thus 
pursued the development of oil palms for biodiesel due to two main drivers: 
sovereignty and control over national energy supply, as well as enhancing rural 
development.  
 
Expanding oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region, including Nong Khai 
province, has certainly helped improve the national energy security of Thailand. 
Limited availability of oil palms, on the supply side, is the main obstacle to 
accelerating biodiesel development in Thailand. In order to cope with the rising 
demand for biodiesel, the Thai government needs to substantially increase the areas of 
oil palms in the Northeast region, which has most of the agricultural land in the 
country. Converting to oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai province can also help 
improve rural economic development, create rural employment, and reduce the urban-
rural divide. As mentioned earlier, this could lead to an urban-rural migration trend 
amongst farmers because the higher farm incomes from oil palm cultivation could 
lure farmers to move back to their hometown areas, avoiding the high cost of living in 
the urban areas. However, how farmers would make this change to oil palm 
cultivation must be understood very clearly and the oil palm expansion policy must be 
designed by hearing the voice of the poor in order to narrow the inequality gap 
between rich and poor farmers in the rural areas.  
 
 
 198 
6.2 Policy Implications  
 
Although this research has highlighted the critical factors influencing small-scale 
farmers to adopt oil palm plantations in Nong Khai province and the implications for 
Thailand’s oil palm development policy, there are many other aspects that need to be 
considered. The implications of the findings from this thesis which are relevant to 
policy are summarised here in order to provide options for policy makers to improve 
the oil palm policy processes. 
 
Policy makers should seriously consider more participation by small-scale farmers at 
all levels of the oil palm policy processes in order to ensure that the oil palm policy 
will serve the farmers’ needs well. The study found that the oil palm policy was 
developed very much in a top-down, transfer of technology (TOT) mode. This means 
that the policy process did not offer many opportunities for farmers to participate in 
the network, or to design the oil palm policy that directly affected them. Farmers 
should be encouraged to share their views of their needs, experiences and problems, 
and make suggestions with regard to improving oil palm policy. Moreover, the 
evidence of this research suggests that the government’s oil palm projects favour the 
better off, resource-rich farmers, as oil palm farmers need a significant amount of 
capital for preparing and maintaining the crop. Therefore, policy makers, in order to 
push the oil palm policy forward, must ensure that the farmers are served and treated 
with equal respect by the government. 
 
Attempts should be made to provide farmers with sufficient oil palm knowledge. This 
thesis has demonstrated that the seminars arranged by local government agencies in 
Nong Khai province were not on a regular basis and were considered insufficient in 
terms of enhancing the farmers’ ability to achieve the oil palm policy targets. 
Moreover, the findings showed that there was a lack of oil palm knowledge 
development within the local government agencies in Nong Khai province, which 
therefore had to rely on the oil palm knowledge from the Southern region based 
government agency (STO). Thus, policy makers should be aware that, in order to 
improve the oil palm policy processes, some modifications are needed to existing 
policies and regulations related to the development and transfer of the oil palm 
knowledge within the government agencies as well as the adaptation of that 
knowledge to suit the unique Northeast region’s climate and soil conditions. 
Moreover, oil palm knowledge should be made available to every farmer, rather than 
being restricted to the farmers who had participated in the government oil palm 
projects.   
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Policy makers should note the importance of inspirational local leaders and large-
scale oil palm producers. The first point to be addressed is to understand that the 
Northeast region’s culture of following role models and successful persons in 
deciding to do anything still exists. This research, as mentioned earlier, found that the 
roles and success in oil palm production of the inspirational local leaders and large-
scale oil palm producers were influential factors in persuading the farmers in Nong 
Khai province to adopt oil palm cultivation, and thus affected the outcomes of the oil 
palm policy.  
 
Another point that should be made is about ways of making use of these people to 
help achieve the oil palm policy targets. The findings in this research show that 
inspirational local leaders could steer the farmers towards either cooperative activities 
or giving up rice farming altogether, which would imply a reduction of households’ 
self-reliance. Therefore, policy makers should consider paying great attention to these 
groups of people and leading them in a strategic manner. It should be noted that 
because oil palm is a new crop to the farmers of the Northeast region, for government 
agencies to change farmers’ attitudes and behaviours alone is a challenging task that 
would require a lengthy period of time to succeed. However, co-operating with 
inspirational local leaders and large-scale oil palm producers in the area would be a 
far easier way to maximise the effectiveness of the oil palm supporting policy.  
 
Policy makers should consider providing sufficient local buyers of oil palm produce 
by, for instance, facilitating the establishment of co-operatively run, small-scale oil 
palm crushers in the local areas. In this study, the oil palm farmers did not sell their 
oil palm fruits directly to palm oil refineries or small-scale oil palm crushers, but to 
local middlemen, who had to transport the oil palm product approximately 700 
kilometres to the nearest palm oil refinery, located in the Eastern region of Thailand. 
This was due to the lack of local or community oil palm crushers in Nong Khai 
province. Without the local market for oil palm fruits, oil palm farmers had to accept 
the price of 1 Baht below market-price offered by the middlemen. However, the local 
middlemen and large-scale oil palm producers have plans to set up oil palm crushers 
in the research areas in the future, when the harvestable areas of oil palm cultivation 
have increased. In order to address the problems related to the oil palm market, policy 
makers should also consider managing the demand for oil palm fruits in order to 
stabilise the price of oil palm products, for instance, increasing the ratio of biodiesel 
from oil palms required to be blended with conventional diesel.  
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The availability of high quality oil palm seedlings is a fundamental area where 
government intervention could do much to promote the expansion policy, at no 
overall cost to the government. This research found that there was a lack of high 
quality oil palm seedlings available to farmers at a competitive price. It also found 
that the farmers trusted the quality of oil palm seedlings from the government more 
than those from their local, private seedling suppliers. In addition, the research 
suggested that the sale of oil palm seedlings to the farmers through the OPPSP 
actually generated reasonable profits for the local government agency (NKO). The 
government should therefore consider providing the farmers with a ready supply of 
good quality seedlings at an affordable price. This might be done by the local 
government agencies themselves or through co-operating with local private suppliers.  
 
The long-term continuity of the oil palm policy should be prioritised. This is to say 
policy makers should consider supporting the oil palm expansion policy as part of the 
national agenda, which would help stabilise the impact of national politics in Thailand 
as well as the politics within the government agencies. It has been known since the 
peaceful military coup on the 19th September 2006 that Thailand has been sharply 
polarised into two radically different groups of people: the Red Shirts and the Yellow 
Shirts. This research found that the political instability resulting from conflicting 
notions of political legitimacy has strongly affected the oil palm policy processes, 
especially in Nong Khai province, in a way that has led to a lack of direction, 
seriousness, and continuity on the part of the government in seeking to achieve the oil 
palm policy objectives.  
 
In addition, collaboration between the government agencies must be encouraged, 
particularly within MOAC. The findings in this research suggested that there was no 
integration amongst the government agencies in MOAC in order to promote oil palm 
cultivation in the Northeast region including Nong Khai province. In this study, the 
evidence also showed that there was a shortage of manpower to support the oil palm 
expansion policy in Nong Khai province, particularly in the local government 
agencies (NKO and the three district-level Agricultural Extension Offices). Therefore, 
policy makers should consider strengthening the workforce at local level in order to 
provide a better service and get more access to farmers in the rural areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 
Policy makers should consider using oil palm expansion to promote regional 
development in Thailand. The Thai government has been aware of the primacy of 
Bangkok since the third NESDP (1972). Consequently, policies to disperse growth 
centres to other regions, such as the BOI investment promotion packages, and the 
developments of both regional cities and ESB, have been emphasised in the following 
NESDPs. However, most of them did not meet with much success in drawing 
industries away from Bangkok, except for ESB. The North and Northeast regions are 
still the most backward regions in the country. As the findings of this research have 
shown that oil palm plantations in Nong Khai province could lead to an increase in 
income for farmers as well as encouraging urban to rural circulation, it would 
therefore help the Northeast region to catch up with the fast-growing Central and 
Eastern regions. Definitely, the Northeast region catching up through oil palm 
expansion would cause regional disparities to narrow. Oil palm expansion would 
stimulate growth in provinces away from Bangkok and hence reduce the 
predominance of Bangkok as the agglomeration core. 
 
Poverty reduction and rural development policies including oil palm expansion policy 
should be prioritised to tackle inequality. Inequality and income redistribution 
received little priority in Thailand’s development policy. They have been addressed 
through indirect policies such as expansion of basic infrastructure and government 
services to remote areas, measures to raise the income of the poor, tax incentives, and 
administrative decentralisation. However, these policies did not receive much 
attention in practice. Income across five income groups in the Gini coefficient 
remained just as unequal, and the differences in income between urban and rural areas 
did not narrow over time. The evidence in this research gives grounds to believe that 
the voices of the poor farmers have not been heard and that the oil palm policy in 
Nong Khai province appears to favour the rich farmers, who had better opportunities 
to cultivating oil palms. In order to ensure that oil palm cultivation can lead to a 
reduction in inequality, policy makers should consider redistributing suitable lands for 
oil palm cultivation, providing financial incentives and access to water supply and 
irrigation systems, and disseminating oil palm knowledge to farmers more equally.  
 
Last but not least, policy makers should consider promoting environmental awareness 
amongst farmers. Although this research suggests that there is no evidence of oil palm 
expansion in Nong Khai province contributing to environmental degradation in the 
research areas, environmental issues should not be ignored. Environmental standards 
and regulations should be strictly enforced in order to promote sustainable palm oil 
production particularly for oil palm companies to adopt more responsible practices. 
Moreover, land-use regulations must also be strictly monitored as converting forested 
land to oil palm plantations, for instance, can lead to a range of severe environmental 
consequences.   
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6.3 Further Research 
 
Because it is still unclear whether the rapid expansion of biofuels, particularly oil 
palms, could lead to, for instance, environmental degradation, increased global carbon 
emissions and a range of social issues, there have been urgent calls for a rapid 
research response to achieve a clearer picture of oil palm issues across countries. This 
thesis provides a rich insight into the reality of the change to oil palm cultivation in 
Nong Khai province. It does so by developing an analytical framework to understand 
the change from the perspectives of the farmers, the government agencies, and the 
other key actors in the oil palm networks. However, there are several possible 
directions for future research to extend the work presented here, which will be 
identified below. 
 
Further research is needed in order to see if the findings in this research hold true for 
other regions of Thailand, especially the Southern region, where the oil palm 
cultivation is mostly concentrated. People in different regions have different values 
and goals, and how they respond to oil palm policy will differ. Comparison between 
regions would provide different pictures of the oil palm issues in Thailand and these 
would be interesting to compare. Further study should also be applied to investigate 
whether or not the impacts of oil palm expansion on food security are real and 
significant in those regions, and if so, how this can be remedied effectively. 
 
This thesis did not encompass the life-cycle analysis of GHG emissions, in relation to 
which there have been considerable debates to determine calculations to present the 
carbon benefits or losses. Thus, an interesting further research project would be an 
exploration into this area to clarify whether or not oil palm cultivation in Nong Khai 
province has any positive effects on mitigating climate change, in terms of reducing 
GHG emissions. There is also a need to investigate how the carbon benefits and 
energy benefits of oil palm plantations can be maximised. Examination and 
comparison of the carbon implications of clearing different vegetation types such as 
primary forest, secondary forest, degraded forest, or different types of agricultural 
lands (rice paddy fields for example) and replacing them with oil palms would also be 
very interesting.   
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It is clear that oil palms can benefit smallholders, but the benefits are not shared 
equally with everyone impacted by or involved in palm oil production. This thesis 
deals with the small-scale farmers’ decisions to adopt or not to adopt oil palm 
cultivation in a specific location, Nong Khai province to be precise. The research 
looks into the determination of the options for small-scale farmers to use oil palms as 
a part of a farm diversification approach and their choices on the management 
spectrum. The needs of these farmers and how their needs can be met are also 
investigated. However, there is a range of social issues regarding small-scale farmers 
that are currently neglected and require further investigation. These critical areas are: 
to research into the development of mechanisms that would give small-scale farmers 
access to better prices rather than selling their products to monophony buyers at low 
prices; to research into how to ensure access to high quality of oil palm seedlings; and 
to research into oil palm-based integrated farming for smallholders in order to identify 
the best options and the ways to promote them. 
 
Oil palm cultivation in the Northeast region also requires distinctive knowledge, 
which differs from the oil palm knowledge of other regions of Thailand, particularly 
the South, due to geographical differences. There needs to be further research into the 
optimal planning and management of oil palm plantations, for example, where to 
plant, how to prepare land and manage plantations. This includes research into 
incentives and assistance that would encourage and allow small-scale farmers to adopt 
best management practice, such as zero burning.  
 
It is indisputable that there is a dearth of academic research looking into the subject of 
oil palm plantations in Thailand. This thesis has, therefore, tackled the oil palm 
change in Thailand from the bottom-up perspective, emphasising the voices of 
farmers, by developing an analytical framework that can be applied to oil palm 
farming across the country as well as to other agricultural products in the Thai 
context. By using this approach, the issues in economic, social, and political 
dimensions are clarified and illuminated. Hopefully, the findings in this thesis will be 
a useful supplement to policy makers to move forward with the oil palm issues in this 
country particularly in the Northeast region. This thesis also hopes to instigate the 
beginning of the farmers’ participation in government policy processes as well as to 
stress the importance of the policy in benefiting the farmers and the vulnerable, and in 
reducing inequality and alleviating poverty, particularly in the Northeast region, thus 
moving the country steadily towards a sustainable development pathway.  
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Appendix A:  
Nong Khai Province: Facts and Maps  
Nong Khai province is located in the upper part of the Northeast region of Thailand. 
The province sits on the western bank of the Mekong River, one of the major rivers in 
the world flowing through 6 countries namely: China; Myanmar; Laos; Thailand; 
Cambodia; and Vietnam. The province consists of 17 districts (amphoe), 113 sub-
districts (tambon), and 1,305 villages (muban)5
 
. The Northern part of the province is 
adjacent to the Mekong River (10 of 17 districts), whilst the Southern part is 
connected to Sakon Nakhon and Udon Thani provinces. The East and the West are 
share borderswith Nakhon Phanom and Loei provinces respectively. Geographically, 
the Western part of the province is forests and mountains, whilst the Central and the 
Eastern parts are flat and upland areas respectively.  
Figure A.1: The Northeast Region of Thailand and Nong Khai Province 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior 
 
 
                                                              5Nong Khai province was officially divided into two provinces namely Nong Khai and Bueng Kan on 
the 23rd of March 2011 after a cabinet resolution accepted the request of Beung Kan district on the 3rd 
of August 2010. Two of the three chosen villages in my study are located in the Bueng Kan areas (So 
Phisai and Seka districts). 
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Figure A.2: Location of Districts in Nong Khai Province 
 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior 
 
The annual rainfall in Nong Khai province differs significantly from that of the 
Northeast region as a whole. The 10-year average rainfall measured by the Nong Khai 
Meteorological Station is 1,887.1 millimetres per year, significantly higher than the 
amount of 1,504 millimetres of the Northeast region in 2009. However, the amount of 
rainfall in Nong Khai is not evenly distributed throughout the year. Thus, the province 
usually faces a long period of drought from November to March every year, where the 
amount of rainfall is lower than 100 millimetres per month. (Table A.1).  
 
Table A.1: The Annual Rainfall in Nong Khai Province (2000-2009): Millimetres 
 
Year/ 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Month 
Jan 0 0 1 9 1 0 0 0 33 1 
Feb 22 15 41 81 236 0 5 19 31 13 
Mar 16 19 34 159 57 12 81 13 98 31 
Apr 92 19 26 46 80 63 299 57 101 63 
May 140 268 252 166 248 146 239 210 212 212 
Jun 304 281 500 346 235 471 213 392 602 358 
Jul 311 275 352 215 519 331 438 218 500 333 
Aug 130 372 471 293 274 373 371 532 374 345 
Sept 221 263 338 414 299 426 139 378 332 318 
Oct 26 47 70 30 0 27 146 288 137 84 
Nov 0 5 14 0 16 57 0 4 55 15 
Dec 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 1,261 1,564 2,122 1,759 1,965 1,907 1,932 2,110 2,475 1,776 
 
Source: OAE, MOAC 
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The actual population of the province in 2009 was 537,744, of which 271,264 were 
male and 266,480 were female. Also, there were 132,919 households in the province, 
in which 6 of the 17 districts had more than 10,000 households. The average annual 
income per person was not substantially different between the 17 districts: in 2009the 
highest figure was 47,020 Baht in Bueng Kan district and the lowest was 37,013 Baht 
in Si Chiang Mai district. However, the average for Nong Khai province was 41,662 
Baht per person per year from 2000 to 2009 (Table A.2).    
 
Similar to most of the country, agriculture is the main economic activity in Nong Khai 
province. In 2009, the total cultivated land area was 2,751,159 rais, accounting for 60 
percent of the total land area in the province. Rice and rubber tree were the two 
predominant crops, occupying 77.7 percent of the agricultural land. The other crops 
growing in the province included cassava, eucalyptus, and oil palms (Table A.3).  
 
Table A.2: Number of Households, Average Income, and Population of Nong 
Khai Province in 2009, Categorised by District 
 
Districts Number of Households 
Average Income  Population Total 
(Population) (Baht/Person/Year) Male Female 
1. Mueang 15,592 44,016 30,154 30,651 60,805 
2. Tha Bo 11,207 46,700 20,737 21,485 42,222 
3. Bueng Kan 14,130 47,020 29,083 27,581 56,664 
4. Phon Charoen 4,066 41,029 8,044 7,822 15,866 
5. Phon Phisai 15,948 38,744 33,088 32,816 65,904 
6. So Phisai 11,327 38,012 22,500 22,088 44,588 
7. Si Chiang Mai 5,563 37,013 10,075 10,438 20,513 
8. Sang Khom 3,349 40,298 7,069 6,808 13,877 
9. Seka 13,946 37,502 30,421 29,234 59,655 
10. Pak Khat 4,487 40,739 10,161 9,913 20,074 
11. Bueng Khong Long 5,913 40,820 11,927 11,516 23,443 
12. Si Wilai 4,852 45,696 11,037 10,529 21,566 
13. Bung Khla 2,326 40,402 4,480 4,346 8,826 
14. Sa Khrai 4,114 37,495 8,453 8,292 16,745 
15. Fao Rai 7,894 42,683 17,377 16,413 33,790 
16. Rattanawapi 5,733 41,028 12,441 12,150 24,591 
17. Pho Tak 2,472 41,828 4,217 4,398 8,615 
Total (Nong Khai) 132,919 41,662 271,264 266,480 537,744 
 
Source: Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior 
 
 207 
Table A.3: Agricultural Areas in Nong Khai Province in 2009, Categorised by District 
 
Districts 
Number of  Land Areas (rais) Rice (rais) Rubber Tree 
(rais) 
Others 
(rais) Sub-districts Villages Total Agriculture Glutinous Others 
1. Mueang 14 147 379,660 223,407 104,075 36,751 2,085 80,496 
2. Tha Bo 10 100 222,070 155,307 86,535 38,712 2,689 27,371 
3. Bueng Kan 12 131 420,865 296,530 92,455 24,027 162,683 17,365 
4. Phon Charoen 7 58 226,511 122,244 54,241 10,344 48,697 8,692 
5. Phon Phisai 11 159 401,711 328,880 168,595 42,794 38,776 78,715 
6. So Phisai 7 95 615,789 234,071 77,808 33,346 85,890 37,027 
7. Si Chiang Mai 4 43 110,593 59,061 18,617 7,654 6,178 26,612 
8. Sang Khom 5 36 281,077 112,777 16,843 611 44,424 50,899 
9. Seka 9 135 611,518 420,316 122,956 46,452 103,660 147,248 
10. Pak Khat 6 64 136,312 124,817 35,896 6,990 57,914 24,017 
11. Bueng Khong Long 4 56 248,845 124,791 45,961 8,928 46,192 23,710 
12. Si Wilai 5 51 281,250 152,536 43,211 14,557 66,961 27,807 
13. Bung Khla 3 25 150,000 61,346 19,885 1,552 32,732 7,177 
14. Sa Khrai 3 44 131,813 55,587 23,082 23,051 1,239 8,215 
15. Fao Rai 5 72 159,937 123,826 35,900 24,569 38,163 25,194 
16. Rattanawapi 5 62 127,505 116,453 48,278 8,820 49,801 9,554 
17. Pho Tak 3 27 83,465 39,210 12,984 801 13,829 11,596 
Total (Nong Khai) 113 1,305 4,588,920 2,751,159 1,006,422 329,959 801,913 612,865 
Source: Nong Khai Provincial Agricultural Extension Office
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Appendix B:  
Phon Phisai District: Facts and Maps 
 
Phon Phisai district is located in the Central area of Nong Khai province, 50 
kilometres from the Mueang district. Basically, the district is separated into 11 sub-
districts and 158 villages. The areas that surround Phon Phisai district are summarised 
below: 
 
 The North
 The 
 is adjacent to the Mekong River and Rattanawapi district, Nong 
Khai province; 
South
 The 
 is adjacent to Baan Dung, Srang Kom, and Pen districts, Udon 
Thani Province;  
East
 The 
 is adjacent to Fao Rai district, Nong Khai province; and 
West
 
 is adjacent to Mueang district, Nong Khai province.  
Figure B.1: Map of Phon Phisai District and Its 11 Sub-districts 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior 
 
Phon Phisai district had a total population of 65,904 in 2009, with little difference 
between the numbers of male and female in the district: 33,088 and 32,816 
respectively. In 2009, Phon Phisai district had 15,948 households, of which 2,909 
were in Jumpon sub-district, which is one of the three areas studied in the thesis. The 
details of the number of villages and households, and the population in the district can 
be seen in Table B.1 below: 
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Table B.1: Number of Villages and Households, and Population in Phon Phisai 
District, 2009 
 
Sub-districts 
Number of  Population 
Total 
(Population) 
Villages Households Male Female 
1. Kud Bong 14 1,353 2,560 2,584 5,144 
2. Jumpon 26 2,909 6,164 5,948 12,112 
3. Tung Laung 12 861 1,863 1,797 3,660 
4. Na Nung 17 1,572 3,067 3,042 6,109 
5. Serm 10 1,022 2,170 2,390 4,560 
6. Lao Tang Kum 15 1,341 2,861 2,743 5,604 
7. Chum Chang 19 1,905 4,158 4,132 8,290 
8. Wat Laung 16 1,748 3,396 3,386 6,782 
9. Srang Na Khao 8 732 1,439 1,488 2,927 
10. Baan Pue 8 927 1,698 1,700 3,398 
11. Baan Pho 13 1,578 3,712 3,606 7,318 
Total (Phon Phisai) 158 15,948 33,088 32,816 65,904 
 
Source: Village Basic Information (Nrd 2C), Community Development Department, Ministry 
of Interior (2009) 
 
Most of the areas in the district are flatland with moderate to good soil conditions. 
The predominant type of soil here is sandy loam. Using natural water resources from 
Mekong River and local swamps, agriculture can continue in the dry season in some 
parts of the district. In terms of the climate characteristics, the rainwater in Phon 
Phisai district is well distributed throughout the year. The annual average rainfall in 
the district was 1,550 millimetres in 2008 with average sunshine of more than 1,500 
hours per year. The district covers a total land area of 401,711 rais, accounting for 
8.75 percent of the total area of Nong Khai province.288,017rais are agricultural land 
including rice and oil palms (PAE, 2010).   
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Appendix C:  
So Phisai District: Facts and Maps 
 
So Phisai district is situated at the Southeast of Nong Khai province, 92 kilometres 
from the central Mueang district. The district is separated into 7 sub-districts 
involving 95 villages. The areas surrounding the district are as follows: 
 
 The North
 The 
borders Pak Khat and Bueng Kan districts, Nong Khai province; 
South
 The 
borders Ban Muang district, Sakon Nakhon province; 
East
 The 
borders Phon Charoen district, Nong Khai province; and 
West
 
borders Phon Phisai district, Nong Khai province.  
Figure C.1: Map of So Phisai District and Its 7 Sub-districts 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior 
 
In 2009, So Phisai district had a population of 44,588, of which 22,500 were male and 
22,088 were female. The district also had 11,327 households in total. Tham Charoen 
sub-district (location of the selected village) ranked the second lowest in terms of 
population and number of households, at 4,517 people and 1,179 households. The 
details are shown in the Table C.1 below. 
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Table C.1: Number of Villages and Households, and Population in So Phisai 
District, 2009 
 
Sub-districts 
Number of  Population Total 
(Population) Villages Households Male Female 
1. Kham Kaew 13 2,108 3,382 3,621 7,003 
2. Tham Charoen N/A 1,179 2,262 2,255 4,517 
3. So N/A 2,080 3,289 3,129 6,418 
4. Lao Thong 10 1,072 2,005 1,885 3,890 
5. Nong Phan Tha 12 1,405 3,041 2,877 5,918 
6. Si Chomphu N/A 1,931 4,601 4,469 9,070 
7. Bua Toom 14 1,552 3,920 3,852 7,772 
Total (So Phisai) 95 11,327 22,500 22,088 44,588 
 
Source: Village Basic Information (Nrd 2C), Community Development Department, Ministry 
of Interior (2009) 
 
Most of the areas in the district are lowland with infertile soil conditions. The average 
level of sunshine in this district exceeds 1,500 hours per year. The district covers a 
total land area of 615,789 rais, accounting for 13.42 percent of Nong Khai province. 
Rice, rubber and eucalyptus were the top three crops in terms of planted area in this 
district in 2009 (SPAE, 2010).  
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Appendix D:  
Seka District: Facts and Maps 
 
Seka district is located in the Southeast of Nong Khai province. The district is 220 
kilometres from the Mueang district, which is considered to be the centre of Nong 
Khai province. Seka district is divided into 9 sub-districts and 135 villages. The 
neighbouring districts can be seen below:  
 
 The North
 The 
 is adjacent to Bueng Kan and Phon Charoen districts, Nong Khai 
province; 
South
 The 
 is adjacentto Ar Kard Umnuai district, Sakon Nakhon province and 
Baan Phaeng district, Nakhon Phanom province; 
East
 The 
 is adjacentto Bueng Khong Long district, Nong Khai province and 
Baan Phaeng district, Nakhon Phanom; and 
West
 
 is adjacentto Kham Ta Kla district, Sakon Nakhon province and 
Phon Charoen district, Nong Khai province.  
Figure D.1: Map of Seka District and Its 9 Sub-districts 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior 
 
The population in Seka district was 59,655 in 2009, of which 30,421 were male and 
29,234 were female. In 2009, the total number of households in the district was 
13,946.The Tha Sa Ard sub-district, which features in this research, had 1,642 
households. Details of the population and number of villages and households in the 
district are shown in the Table C.1 below.   
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Table D.1: Number of Villages and Households, and Population in Seka District, 
2009 
 
Sub-districts 
Number of  Population Total 
(Population) Villages Households Male Female 
1. Seka 23 2,796 6,287 6,127 12,414 
2. Sang 13 1,656 3,931 3,680 7,611 
3. Nong Thum 13 1,240 2,839 2,643 5,482 
4. Tha Kok Daeng 16 1,231 2,372 2,239 4,611 
5. Tha Sa Ard 13 1,642 3,565 3,533 7,098 
6. Pong Hai 18 1,735 3,466 3,362 6,828 
7. Nam Chan 12 1,087 2,529 2,251 4,780 
8. Ban Tong 15 1,637 3,527 3,475 7,002 
9. Sok Kam 12 922 1,905 1,924 3,829 
Total (Seka) 135 13,946 30,421 29,234 59,655 
 
Source: Village Basic Information (Nrd 2C), Community Development Department, Ministry 
of Interior (2009) 
 
Most areas in the district are upland with the fertile soil. The upland areas occupy 75 
percent of the total land area in the district, whilst 23 percent is lowland and the 
remaining 2 percent is mountainous. The key natural water resources in the district 
are: 1) Song Kharm River, which benefits the people in Tha Kok Daeng, Tha Sa Ard, 
and Nong Thum sub-districts; 2) Hee River, which supplies water to Seka and Sang 
sub-districts; 3) Seka Swamp, the main water resource for agricultural uses in Seka 
sub-district; 4) Hau Hat Swamp, which is used for agriculture in Tha Sa Ard and Pong 
Hai sub-districts; 5) Kud Sam Kha, which provides water to Sang sub-district in both 
rainy and dry seasons; 6) Kud Sang, which is used only in rainy season for agriculture 
in Sang sub-district; and 7) Pluey Swamp, which benefits farmers in Seka sub-district.  
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Seka district has a tropical monsoon climate, which can be divided into 3 seasons: 1) 
the hot season, from February to May with an average temperature of 35 degree 
Celsius; 2) the rainy season, from May to October; and 3) the cold season, which is 
from November to January with the average temperature of 12 degree Celsius. 
Generally, there is rain from February to November, September having the highest 
number of rainy days in the year. The average annual precipitation from 1999 to 2008 
was 2,396 millimetres (SAE, 2010). 
 
The district covers a total land area of 611,518 rais, equivalent to 18.78 percent of the 
total land area of Nong Khai province. Agriculture is the primary economic activity in 
the district as there is no industrial plant situated in the area. The average income of 
the people in the district was 37,502 Baht per person per year in 2008. In 2008, the 
total farm holding lands in the district was 223,506 rais. Rice was by far the major 
crop in the district, occupying 131,486 rais, 58.4 percent of the total 223,506 rais. 
Rice is normally grown once a year in the rainy season from May to October, and the 
paddy fields being left fallow during the dry season. Glutinous rice dominated the 
overall paddy fields of the district and accounted for 100,135 rais in 2008. The second 
largest crop in the district was rubber, which covered 22,979 rais in 2008. The other 
important crops in the district are cassava, eucalyptus, and oil palms (SAE, 2010). 
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Appendix E:  
Interview Guide Used in the Research 
 
1. Interview guide for the oil palm farmers in the three villages, the large-scale 
oil palm producers, and the inspirational local leaders 
 
Issues to be addressed: farmers’ decisions to adopt oil palms and its consequences 
 
1. What are the reasons for you to change to oil palms? What are your needs? 
How do you manage your farmland? 
2. Why are you still in rice cultivation instead of switching all your land to other 
crops such as oil palms and rubber?  
3. What were the problems when you were a rice farmer? 
4. Why didn’t rice cultivation satisfy your needs and motives? 
5. Why did you decide to grow oil palms instead of other crops? 
6. Why do you choose to grow oil palm on this proportion of your land?  
7. What consequences did you initially expect after changing to oil palms?  
8. How do you feel about the switch to oil palms now?  
9. Has the switch to oil palms caused any changes to your life in socio-economic 
and environmental terms? And if so, in what ways?  
10. Are the changes what you initially expected? 
11. What is your plan for the oil palm plantation in the years to come? 
 
Issues to be addressed: farmers’ attitudes and their relationships to key actors 
 
12. How do you know or acquire the knowledge for oil palm cultivation? How do 
you buy oil palm seedlings and sell your oil palm products? Do you have any 
problems with obtaining seedlings or selling your products? 
13. Does anyone (or any organisation) provide you with knowledge and funding 
for the growing of oil palms? And if so, how?  
14. Do you have any problems concerning the current situation of oil palm 
plantations around the village? Who do you contact when you have problems 
related to oil palm plantations? 
 
Issues to be addressed: the facilitating roles of the government  
 
15. Did you receive any supports or advice from local government? 
16. Which organisations do you frequently make contact with? 
17. How do they help you? Are their advice and support useful? 
18. Have you had a chance to get involved in the planning of the oil palm policy? 
If yes, how? 
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2. Interview guide for the rice farmers (who have not yet adopted oil palms) in 
the three villages 
 
1. Have you ever heard of oil palms? How do you know about oil palms here? 
Have you had information about support for oil palms from the government? 
2. What is your view of the oil palm crop? How do you feel about the crop? 
3. How is your life at the moment? Are you satisfied with your life now? What 
are your needs? How do you plan to achieve them? 
4. Why have you decided still to grow rice? How do you feel about other 
optional crops such as rubber, cassava and oil palms? 
5. Do you have any problems in cultivating rice? And if so, what are they?  
6. Do you have plans to cultivate oil palm in the future? And if so, why? 
7. If you are interested in growing oil palms, what support do you need from the 
government? How are you going to acquire knowledge and funding?  
8. Do you have confidence in the local oil palm market? Does the crop have a 
future in Nong Khai province and in Esaan region? And why?  
 
3. Interview guide for the government agencies in this research  
 
1. How do oil palm plantations get started in the Esaan region, including Nong 
Khai province? What are the stories and rationale behind the oil palm policy? 
2. Who is involved in the oil palm supporting projects?  
3. What are the roles of your organisation in supporting oil palm expansion in 
Nong Khai province? Can you explain in detail?  
4. Does the government’s oil palm project face any difficulties? How are these 
problems being solved? What are the factors affecting the success of the 
project? 
5. What is your perception of oil palm plantations in Esaan region? Does the 
crop have a future in your view, compared to other crops? Will it lead to better 
development for Thailand and in what ways?  
6. How are the voices of farmers being heard both before and after adopting oil 
palms? How was the oil palm policy formulated? Does the policy offer the 
chance for farmers to participate in the policy processes?  
7. What are the future policies and plans of your organisation regarding oil palm 
expansion in this region?  
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4. Interview guide for private suppliers (oil palm seedlings providers) 
 
1. How long have you been in this business? What are your reasons for choosing 
to engage in this business? 
2. Who are your major customers? Are they large-scale or small-scale farmers?  
3. What is the sales volume? How do the volumes change over time? 
4. How many oil palm seedlings suppliers are there in the area? Who are they? In 
what way are they different from you?  
5. Where do you get oil palm seedlings? Are they certified? Why do you choose 
this type of oil palm seedlings?  
6. How many types of seedlings are there in the market? What are the 
differentiating characteristics of each type? Which type of seedling is the most 
popular? And why?  
7. How do you acquire oil palm knowledge? Does the knowledge differ from the 
oil palm plantations in the South? If yes, how?  
8. How do you feel about planting oil palms in Esaan region? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of Esaan oil palms comparing to rubber and rice 
as well as oil palms from the Southern region?  
9. What are your future plans?  
 
5. Interview guide for the private merchants (buyers of oil palm fruits) 
 
1. How long have you been in this business? What are your reasons for choosing 
to engage in this business? 
2. How do you offer the service? What areas do you cover? Who are your major 
customers? 
3. How do you grade the oil palm fruits that you buy?  
4. How many do you buy per year? What is the trend in the last 5 years?  
5. What do you do after buying? And why?  
6. How many buyers are there in the area? Who are they? How are they different 
from yours?  
7. How is the situation with oil palms here in your view? Do you need any 
support from the government? Do oil palms have a future in Nong Khai 
province? How is it compared to other crops, including rice and rubber?  
8. What is your future plan? How will you survive if the palm oil refinery comes 
to Nong Khai province in the near future? Have you considered producing 
palm oil yourself? Why, or why not?  
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6. Interview guide for the large-scale palm oil refinery (in Chonburi province) 
 
1. How long have you been in this business? Can you explain in detail how the 
business works at the moment? How is it developing over time? 
2. How many palm oil refineries are there in this area? How do you compete 
with them? 
3. How do you grade the oil palm fruits that you buy? Where do they come 
from? 
4. Can you explain in detail your business along the supply chain: from buying 
of oil palm fruits to the end products? Who are your customers? Why do you 
decide to do these activities?  
5. What is your perception of oil palm cultivation in Esaan region? Is it possible 
in your view? Have you considered expanding your business there? And 
why/why not? 
6. What is your view of Thailand’s oil palm industry? Does the industry need 
anything to move forward especially in Esaan region? How does it compare to 
the Southern region’s oil palms?  
7. What is the future plan of the company?  
8. What is your view of the role of the government?  
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